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Abstract 
Labour market flexibility is an issue that has been much debated but remains 
controversial. It is argued in this thesis that the lack of theoretical and empirical 
clarity which has impeded the study of flexibility has resulted from two main 
deficiencies. The first is that although the public sector has been identified as a 
major site of flexible forms of labour, the sý'stematic stud), of this phenomenon 
has been largely absent. The second is that flexibility as a concept has obscured 
forms of employment relations that are distinct. 
One aim of this thesis was therefore to refocus the theoretical debates by 
drawing together a number of literatures that have so far remained discrete. 
This analysis provided the basis for a clearer empirical study by identiýying the 
relationship between restructuring public sector employment. specifically in 
social services and schools, and one aspect of labour market flexibility: 
temporary labour. A review of previous research indicated that temporar\- work 
is likely to affect women, minority ethnic groups and young workers to a 
greater extent than the wider population. The literature also highlighted the 
statistical and managerial bias in the debates and in doing so indicated the need 
for new perspectives and methods to be adopted to further an understanding of 
issues that surround flexibility. 
The research for this thesis therefore examined temporary labour in the public 
sector from the perspective of employers, workers and trade unions in two case 
study local authorities and LEAs using qualitative methods. Bý, adopting this 
approach the research data indicated that employers' conflicting motivations to 
use temporary labour are exacerbated by decentralised management functions. 
Personalised and arbitrary management associated with devolved powers 
highlighted a number of characteristics associated with temporarý' employment 
contracts. The central feature was the enhanced power imbalance in favour of 
employers created by the insecurity inherent in this form of employment, which 
resulted in forms of control that were gendered and racialised. The experience 
of temporary workers reflected these findings and emphasised the vulnerability 
of their situation. The trade union position on temporary work was however 
ambivalent, displaying a combination of responses even within branches of the 
same union, raising serious questions for trade union democracy. 
Abbreviations 
AEEU Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical 
Union 
APT&C Allied Professional, Technical and 
Clerical 
ATL Association of Teachers and Lecturers 
CANS Consultation and Negotiations Sub- 
committee 
CCT Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
COHSE Confederation of Health Service 
Employees 
WEE Department for Education and 
Employment 
EAT Employment Appeals Tribunal 
ELFS European Labour Force Survey 
ERA Education Reform Act 1988 
ERA 1999 Employment Relations Act 1999 
EO Equal Opportunities 
EOC Equal Opportunities Commission 
EU European Union 
FE Further Education 
FTC Fixed-Term Contract 
FWR Fair Wages Resolutions 
GMB General, Municipal and Boilermakers 
Union 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
ILEA Inner London Education Authority 
IRLR Industrial Relations Law Report 
6 
JCC Joint Consultative Committee 
JNC Joint Negotiating Committee 
JTUF Joint Trades Union Forum 
LEA Local Education Authority 
LFS Labour Force Survey 
LGMB, Local Government Management Board 
LGR Local Government Reorganisation 
LIFO Last In First Out (redundancy procedure) 
LMS Local Management of Schools 
NAHT National Association of Head Teachers 
NALGO National Association of Local 
Government Officers 
NASUWT National Association of Schoolmasters 
Union of Women Teachers 
NOR Number on Roll 
NPM New Public Management 
NUPE National Union of Public Employees 
NUT National Union of Teachers 
NQT Newly Qualified Teacher 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
OFSTED Office for Standards in Education 
PH Private Finance Initiative 
PO Principal Officer 
RSG Revenue Support Grant 
RSI Repetitive Strain Injtiry 
7 
RSW Residential Social \N'orker 
SHA Secondary Head Teacher's Association 
SGE Service Group Executive 
SSA Single Status Agreement 
STRB School Teachers' Review Body 
TUC Trades Union Congress 
TUPE Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 
T&GWU Transport and General 'A'orkers Union 
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied Trades and 
Technicians 
VCT Voluntary Competitive Tendering 
WERS Workplace Employment Relations SLII'\ CN' 
wi Workforce Jobs (statistical series formerly 
Workforce in Employment WIE) 
8 
Figures 
2.1 Percentage of EU Workers on Fixed Term Contracts 60 
2.2 All Temporary Workers (UK) 1984-1997 
2.3 Temporary Workers by Gender 1992-1997 
63 
64 
2.4 Number of Temporary Workers as a Percentage of Total 
Workforce by sector - US Estimates 67 
2.5 Number of Temporary Workers as a percentage of Total 
Workforce by sector - WJ Estimates 68 
2.6 Temporary Workers by Standard Industrial Classification 70 
9 
Tables 
2.1 People in a temporary job at time t distributed by their 
labour market status a year later 57 
2.2 Number and proportion of employees in temporary Nvork. 
major sectors of local government, England and Wales, 
spring 1996 (thousands) 7- 
2.3 Number and proportion of employees in temporary work. 
by broad occupational grouping, local government and', whole 
economy, England and Wales, spring 1996 74 
4.1 Numbers of fixed term and temporary contracts amongst 
'salaried' employees in 'City' LEA as at 3 rd March 1998 144 
4.2 Numbers of Temporary Employment Contracts in the Social 
Services Department of County as at 15.12.97 160 
4.3 Numbers of Full-Time Permanent and Temporary Teaching 
Staff in County as at 31.1.98 161 
4.4 Numbers of Part-Time Permanent and Temporary Teaching 
Staff in County as at 31.1.98 161 
I Comparison of City and County 
A2 Range of Formal Interviews conducted 
350 
352 
10 
Acknowledgments 
This thesis would not have been possible without the managers. Ný-orkers and 
trade unionists, who agreed to give their time and share their views and 
experiences. I would like to thank Professor Peter Fairbrother. for his guidance. 
patience and confidence in my work, even NA'hen my own was diminisýed. 
Similar thanks go to my partner, Piers, for extending this support at home in 
addition to providing the calm environment that enabled me to complete my 
work. Thanks also go to my friends and colleagues at Keele. Warwick and 
Cardiff universities for their support and encouragement. Financial assistance 
for undertaking the research came from the Economic and Social Research 
Council (award number R00429634355). 
Lastly I would like to dedicate this thesis to my father, James, whose olowing 
pride in my achievements has always been my spur. 
Declaration 
I declare that this thesis is my own work and confirm that it has not been 
submitted for a degree at any other university. 
The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists 
There was not enough work to keep everyone employed, and most of those that 
were taken on as a rule only managed to make a few hours a week, but still it 
was better than absolute idleness, and there also began to be talk of several large 
outside jobs that were to be done as soon as the weather settled. 
This bad weather, by the way, was a sort of boon to the defenders of the 
present system, who were hard-up of sensible arguments to explain the cause of 
poverty. One of the principal causes was, of course, the weather, "vhich'ývas 
keeping everything back. There was not the slightest doubt that if only the 
weather would allow there would always be plenty of work, and poverty would 
be abolished. 
Rushton & Co. had a fair share of what work there was, and Crass. 
Sawkins Slyme and Owen were kept employed pretty regularly, although they 
did not start until half past eight and let off at four ... occasionally a few extra hands were taken on for a few days, and discharged again as the Jobs they were 
taken on to do was finished. 
The defenders of the existing system may possibly believe that the 
knowledge that they would be discharged directly the job was done was a very 
good incentive to industry, that they would naturally under these circumstances 
do their best to get the work done as quickly as possible. But then it must be 
remembered that most of the defenders of the existing system are so constituted. 
that they can believe anything provided it is not true and sufficiently silly. 
All the same, it was a fact that the workmen did do their very best to get 
over this work in the shortest possible time, because although they knew that to 
do so was contrary to their own interests, they also knew that it would be very 
much more contrary to their interests not to do so. Their only chance of being 
kept on if other work came in was to tear into it for all they were worth. 
Consequently, most of the work was rushed and botched and slobbered over in 
about half the time that it would have taken to do it properly. 
Robert Tressell (1993: 371) 
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1. Theorising Temporary Work 
Budding investigators think that the purpose of a literature review is to 
determine the answers about what is known on a topic, in contrast. 
experienced investigators review previous research to deN, elop sharper 
and more insightful questions about the topic. (Yin 1994: 9) 
Introduction 
These are exciting times for students of the organisation of -vvork and 
employment. The emphasis on continuity, a feature of large scales surveý-s 
conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s (Morris and Wood 199 1), has been 
replaced by a more dynamic analysis in recent studies (Cully et al. 1998). 
Labour markets and the institutions that have grown up to service them are 
undergoing distinct changes (Crompton et al. 1996), leading many academics in 
the relevant disciplines to speculate on the 'future of work'. The discourse 
surrounding this shift is peppered with the concept of flexibility and, whilst this 
is often held up as a new and innovative approach to labour market instability. 
the passage from Tressle's Ragged Trousered Philanthropist highlights that the 
future of work has a strong resonance with the past. Tressle also proffers a 
warning as to the consequences of using job insecurity as a tool for the 
intensification of labour. This is a subject that has since provoked many 
debates and is central to the theoretical and empirical analyses presented in this 
thesis. The issues are explored by examining two areas. temporary labour and 
public sector employment, that are increasingly emphasised within related 
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debates but have, in various ways. been neglected wj*thIn IndustrIal sk-)cloloL, % 
and related fields. 
The public sector has not, in the past, been a favourite site amongst academics 
for a number of reasons that are discussed more fully in this chapter and chapter 
three. Furthermore the large scale surveys predicting little change in the use of 
employer strategy in the use of temporary work did not anticipate the large scale 
reorganisations in the public sector (Dex and McCulloch 1997). The literature 
on temporary labour is dispersed across a number of disciplines and is often 
subsumed within a number of competing concepts and definitions. Felstead and 
Jewson (1998: 2) have highlighted this issue by noting the proliferation of terms 
that have arisen to encompass what they choose to call flexible labour. Other 
terms include atypical employment; non-standard work; the insecure workforcc. 
precarious work and contingent labour. 
These concepts, including flexibility, are themselves multifaceted covering 
various arrangements that are considered to deviate from a standard of ftill-time, 
permanent employment. Rodgers (1989) includes temporary, casual, part-time, 
disguised illegal wage employment, horneworking, 'moonlighting, self- 
employment and out-working in the category of 'atypical' employment. This 
author notes that there are however important conceptual differences between 
these forms of work and that heterogeneity makes generalisation difficult. 
Temporary work itself consists of a number of elements but is usually 
considered for UK statistical purposes to be made up of fixed-term contracts. 
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casual and agency work. However, as this chapter indicates. there are further 
fine legal distinctions between forms of temporary employment contracts. 
Conceptual difficulties and blurred definitions are highli(-), hted throughout the 
thesis. In relation to this point Felstead and Jewson note that the precursor of the 
multiplication of terms used to refer to non-standard employment has been a 
lack of theoretical precision characteristic of research in this area' (1999: 2). It 
is argued here that both the imprecision and accretion of terms stem largely 
from attempts to agglomerate forms of work which do not readily fall into the 
established theoretical categories devised to explain "standard' employmem. 
The result has been to dress this residual sphere in 'one-size fits all' 
generalisations, which not surprisingly have amply covered some areas whilst 
leaving others conceptually naked. Temporary work has fallen into the latter 
category. The reasons for this neglect are unclear but this chapter identifies 
links between temporary work and the public sector, whilst chapter two 
identifies difficulties in establishing the statistical significance of this form of 
non-standard work in the UK. 
The aims of this chapter and chapter two of the thesis are therefore to show how 
greater theoretical and conceptual clarity can be achieved by untangling fonns 
of employment previously considered to be relatively homogeneous. This is 
achieved by drawing out one thread, that of temporary work. and identifying the 
flaws and lacunae in theoretical debates that have so far clouded the issues. 
This chapter examines the research and debates that stem from labour market 
and socio-legal analyses, whilst chapter two critically reviews the statistical data 
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and related research. By bringing together these previouslý- diffuse relex-aiit 
literatures, the central themes of the debate are draNvn out to develop definitions 
and identify research sites that can advance a clearer understanding of 
temporary labour. 
The public sector generally and social services and education within local 
government are established as the primary locations for a study of temporary 
work. Therefore chapter three provides a contextual basis that serves to refine 
the research agenda by exploring the theoretical issues highlighted in previous 
chapters in relation to these sectors. The culmination of the analysis is the 
production of a set of research questions detailed at the end of chapter three. 
Although methodological pointers are derived from the review of literature and 
secondary statistical data, a full discussion of methodological issues is 
contained in appendix one. The position of this discussion does not indicate the 
residual nature of these issues but rather reflects the exploratory and iterative 
nature of the research process. As a result many of the issues discussed in 
appendix one occurred during the research process and background information 
concerning the case studies is required for the reader to follow the analysis. 
Having established the research agenda, chapters four to nine contain the main 
empirical findings. These have been divided to examine the case study 
authorities (chapter four) and the perspectives of the three main parties 
involved: employers (chapter five and six); workers (chapter seven) and trade 
unions (chapters eight and nine). The analysis of the data is contained withm 
each chapter and therefore unfolds thematically. In the light of this data, 
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chapter ten reassembles the theoretical debates and provides a summary of the 
analysis. The thesis concludes by examining the implications of the research 
findings and analysis before identifying further research opportunities. 
Flexibility Revisited 
Most academic treatment of temporary work has been undertaken under the 
broader maxim of flexibility. The term 'flexibility' arose after a number of 
arguments stressed that the declining prosperity of mature economies results 
largely from rigidities in labour markets and production processes (Piore and 
Sabel 1984; Hirst and Zeitlin 1989). Such rigidities were identified at both 
macro and micro-levels and were closely related to the post-war growth in job 
security (Cousins 1999b). In brief, macro-level influences were largely 
considered to be the over-regulation of national and international labour 
markets (see chapter two), whilst micro-level rigidities resulted from employer 
practices that relied heavily on static internal labour markets. Trade union 
organisation has also been implicated in maintaining working practices that 
some have considered added to rigidity (Hayek 1980; Metcalf 1988). In the UK 
the prescription has therefore centred on the deregulation of employment 
relations which would in turn encourage employers to adopt a more varied or 
flexible approach to their staffing requirements accompanied by the legislative 
restriction of trade union activities (Smith and Morton 1993). 
A theoretical analysis of influences underpinning these changes has been posed 
under the rubric of 'post-Fordism' described by Crompton et al. as: 
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... a shift from the predominance of economies driven by manufacturiiie industries characterised by a mass, relativel-, v homogeneous. serrii-skilled 
workforce, towards economies dominated by employnient in services. 
associated with a more heterogeneous, fragmented xvorkforce. (1996: 3) 
The concept of post-Fordism has been hotly debated (e. g. Pollert. 1988b; Nolan 
and O'Donnell, 1991; De Vroey, 1984) and, whilst it is not intended to engage 
extensively with this area of study, the definition above highlights implications 
which are central to this thesis. Firstly, although the gender implications of 
post-Fordism were not considered in the early theories (Dex and McCulloch 
1997), as a result of extensive labour market segregation (see below), a shift 
from manufacturing to service sector employment has consequences for the 
gender balance of labour markets. Secondly, mass employment in the 
manufacturing sector has traditionally been considered to be the base of trade 
union organisation. Therefore any erosion of this base has consequences for 
organised labour. However the definition utilised by Compton et al. does not 
make it obvious where public sector employment, particularly public services, 
falls in this debate. Clearly manufacturing has never been the essence of public 
service and the workforce in this sector has always been gendered, 
heterogeneous and fragmented but also highly unionised. The incongruity of the 
public sector has meant it has evaded a thorough analysis within flexibility and 
related debates although, as detailed below, it is often acknowledged as 
empirically if not theoretically important. 
In the UK the concept of flexibility became the centre of debate after Atkinson 
(1984; 1985) developed the model of the 'flexible fin-n' (Cousins 1999b). 
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According to Atkinson (1985) flexibility falls into three categories: functional. 
financial and numerical. Temporary work falls into the latter category of 
numerical flexibility, which requires that a certain segment of the workforce 
must be easily dispensable. The model was further developed to include the 
concept of a core and peripheral workforce. Core workers are regarded as the 
stable component and are considered to possess skills unique to the firm. They 
therefore represent valuable assets and hence are highly regarded and rewarded 
by the employer. There are two groups of peripheral workers. The first group 
has skills that are needed at certain times but which are not specific to the firm 
and are available in the external labour market. The second group consists of 
workers who have limited skills or are unskilled. To achieve numerical 
flexibility the latter two groups are likely to be employed on a temporary basis 
either via the use of fixed-term and temporary contracts, staffing agencies or 
directly hired casual work. 
The major criticisms of the flexible firm model are to be found in the edited 
book Farewell to Flexibility? (Pollert 199 1). The editor's main criticisms 
firstly consider that the model of the flexible firm is based on flawed economic 
theories and equally tenuous concepts of post-Fordism and the 'po st- industrial 
society . 
In contrast to these theories Pollert contends that the flexible firm 
model offers a prescriptive device for work intensification linked to Taylorist 
work practices. Secondly, it is argued that the model does not 'fit the facts' in 
many important respects. The main contention is that there is little empirIcal 
evidence for the existence of a core/periphery model and no clear-cut distinction 
between core and periphery workers. It is argued that, whilst legislation has 
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reduced the rights of vulnerable workers, high unemployment and the reduction 
of trade union power has disciplined and disempowered the core , N-orkforce. 
Pollert's arguments are extended in the final chapter by Hyman (1991) who 
considers that the flexible firm model raises the constant contradiction in 
industrial relations between trust and constraint in the need to establish both 
consent and control. Hyman makes the observation that employers are likelý- to 
use a different mix of strategies for different workers. This in itself would seeiii 
to indicate the beginning of a core/periphery model. However, like Pollert, 
Hyman argues that the 'flexible firm' also inhibits core workers as theý, become 
locked into internal labour markets. Status as a core worker therefore removes 
the ability to 'exit' whilst the demand for loyalty and individualitý- as opposed 
to collectivity removes the 'voice' of core workers. Lastly both Hyman and 
Pollert contend that flexibility is inherently political. For example Pollert 
considers that the model is linked to changes in the role of the state and its 
endorsement of neo-classical economics. Hyman argues that flexibility is 
synonymous with the interests of capital as the basic goal is to transfer risk and 
costs from the enterprise to the worker. 
The above points raise some interesting questions relating flexibility to issues of 
control and the role of the state. However fixation on abstract conceptua issues 
eventually led to the unsatisfactory demise of the flexibility debate. The 
majority of discussion focussed on the nature of post-Fordism and *flexible 
specialisation9i a form of functional flexibility, with the result that in-depth 
analysis of numerical flexibility was limited. It is argued here that an emphasis 
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on flexibile specialisation reflects a managerial agenda that seeks to promote the 
positive side of flexibility. Flexible specialisation or functional flexibility 
relates largely to 'core' workers and can be given an air of legitimacy b,, - 
claiming moves towards up-skilling and multi-skilling. It is much more 
difficult, on the other hand, to put any such gloss on numerical flexibility. 
which remains a form of casualisation by any other name. 
Management discussions of flexibility have treated the concept as unitary. that 
is containing no essential conflicts, by stressing the positive aspects as 
juxtaposed to rigidity (Blyton and Morris 1991). Sirnllarlý- the concept of 
flexible specialisation serves to obscure the social relations of production 
(Rainnie 199 1). Allen and Henry (1997: 182) make the important point that, by 
allowing the flexibility debate to set a managerial agenda, the views of the 
workers it affects are ignored. By allowing themselves to be drawn into an 
extended debate concerning flexible specialisation and largely ignoring the 
obviously exploitative treatment of temporary workers, theorists critical of 
flexibility may have 'missed the wood for the trees' and allowed the 
opportunity for an extended critique to slip away. 
The minimization of the significance of flexibility as a useful concept has also 
resulted from its relation to 'typical patterns of female employment and not 
widespread adoption of a flexible workforce' (Ackers et al., 1996: 14). As 
women now make up almost half the workforce and employment growth is 
largely restricted to 'feminized' labour markets (Rubery and Fagan 1992), this 
seems a rather unsteady foundation for the glib dismissal of trends towards 
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flexible labour. Furthermore, recent data from the %N"orkplace Employee 
Relations Survey, which incorporates the views of workers, has also found that. 
whilst numerical flexibility 'appears to be quite widespread'. functional 
flexibility is either 'non-existent or negligible' (Cullý,, et al. 1998: 9). 
Flexibility or Segmentation? 
The links between labour markets segregated along racial and gender lines and 
labour market segmentation and divisions in the terms and conditions of groups 
of workers, have long been drawn. Doeringer and Piore's (1971) theory of dual 
labour markets was originally developed to explain the racial segregation and 
the poorer terms and conditions of black workers in American labour markets. 
Based on dual labour market theory, Barron and Norris (1976) noted that 
women are more likely than men to occupy marginal and precarious jobs. 
These earlier theories have been superseded by Hakim's (1979) theory of 
vertical and horizontal occupational segregation. Hakim notes that women tend 
to be segregated horizontally into certain sectors of the labour market, mostly 
the service sector, which mirrors the domestic responsibilities that they 
shoulder. Within these occupations women are then vertically segregated into 
lower status positions. 
Hakim also notes that women generally have a distinct lifetime working pattern 
which she describes as 'bi-modal' as it comprises of two separate periods of 
labour market activity. Most young women enter the labour market after 
leaving school. Many have a period of absence from paid work when they have 
children but return to the labour force when their children are older. Women 
returning to the labour market therefore often take up part-time Nvork to fit in 
with ongoing childcare responsibilities. Other segmentation theonsts have 
identified the interaction between part-time work and temporary employmem 
contracts which may explain why 'women returners in particular are likely to be 
found in temporary jobs' (Rubery and Fagan 1992: 157). This pattern is 
supported by empirical data in this research (chapters five. six and seven). 
Similarly Casey et al. (1997: 62) found a positive correlation between 
employer's use of part-time workers and the use of short-term contract Nvork, 
stating: 
... high users of part-time employees were much more likely (three 
times) to be high users of short-term contract workers than either low 
part-time users or non-users of part-timers. 
Hakim's more recent work has, ' 
however, divided segmentation theorists. In an 
article entitled 'Grateful slaves and self-made women: fact and fantasy in 
women s work orientations', Hakim (199 1) claims that some women are 
satisfied with segregation into low paid and low status jobs. She argues that 
women who accept these jobs have lower job commitment than women and 
men who put their careers before family responsibilities. Therefore job 
segregation mirrors the preferences and options of women. It could be argued 
that flexible working has benefits for women as it provides the opportunity to 
combine domestic care responsibilities with paid work. This viek,, - is 
particularly prevalent amongst researchers who draw data from national surveý's 
such as the LFS. As Dex and McCulloch (1995) note. such data reveals that 
women are less likely than men to say that they took part-time Nvork because 
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they could not find a full-time job. However. Dex and McCulloch argue that 
this is likely to be as a result of *constraints they face in the home rather than it 
being purely a matter of their preferences' (ibid: 40). This is also true of women 
in temporary work. The problematic nature of voluntary and involuntary 
temporary work is discussed further in chapter two. 
The strongest links between race, gender and 'non-standard' employment have 
been drawn by researchers studying homeworkers (e. g. Allen and Wolkowitz 
1987; Phizacklea and Wolkowitz 1995). Phizacklea and Wolkowitz (1995) are 
also fierce critics of Hakim's 'grateful slaves' theory. Firstly, it is argued that 
the evidence relating to the job commitment of women in non-standard forms of 
work is mixed. ' Secondly, Phizacklea and Wolkowitz argue that, in her 
analysis of what are and what are not considered to be 'goodJobs, Hakim relies 
too heavily on male evaluations. Thirdly, in relation to women's freedom to 
choose between labour markets, Hakim is describing options that are likely to 
be available only to better-educated, largely white, middle-class women. 
Lastly, these authors also raise the issue of the difficulty of assessing the 
complex issues surrounding the constrained choices women face when entering 
the labour market. They argue that it is unlikely that tightly controlled 
questions in large-scale surveys will reveal the patterns and processes involved. 
However, Dex and McCulloch (1997: 69) have shown, using US data, that the 
highest percentages of temporary jobs were found amongst women in the 
'Black and Other group' and that women from ethnic minority groups were far 
more likely than white women to hold full-time temporary as opposed to part- 
1 This is certainly the case in relation to part-time workers in local government. See Karran 
19 84) cited in chapter three. 
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time jobs. These perspectives indicate that, whilst useftil data can be gleaned 
from statistical analysis, it should not be used uncriticallý, ý to make 
generalisations, particularly in relation to women's orientations to xvork. 
Flexibility and the Public Sector 
The issues of labour market segregation are particularly relevant to this studý- 
because the public sector, as the largest source of employment for women and 
minority ethnic groups, is a primary site of segregation. As Ruberý- et al. note: 
... women professionals remain disproportionately concentrated in 
traditionally female professions associated with care work. Much of this 
work is concentrated in the public sector, and in many instances 
women 13 s share of male-dominated professions is also higher iii the 
public than the private sector. This division between the public and the 
private sector may become an increasingly important feature of gender 
segregation for this group of workers as may other employment 
dimensions such as employment contract or firm size. (1996: 43 5) 
Rubery (1996: 3 6) further notes that labour market segmentation has become 
more complex than the initial core/periphery theories allowed: 
Perhaps the major change that is taking place in the labour market is that 
previously advantaged groups are sharing the risks of instability, 
unemployment and low income previously faced only by secondary 
sector workers. 
This analysis is particularly relevant to this research. The discussion in chapter 
three outlines how, along with notions of employment security, the state as 
'model employer' has been greatly undermined by restructuring since the 1970s 
(Carter and Fairbrother 1999). One result has been that occupations that have 
traditionally been classed as 'jobs for life' are now experiencing 
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peripheralisation. However. the public sector is another area which has lar, -, ý: I\ 
evaded the flexibility debate (Fairbrother 1991: 69). At the macro-level Rainnie 
(1991: 47) argues: 
It should be pointed out that the model of Fordism and all the 
paraphernalia that goes with it is based on the male dominated car 
industry. Most mass production industries are female dominated and yet 
the reasons for and the implications of this phenomenon remain 
unexplored. 
Although Rainnie's emphasis is still manufacturing. in highlighting the 
gendered aspects of theorising he has captured one possible explanation of the 
omission of public sector employment from the debates. Similarly, at the 
micro-level, Atkinson's model of the flexible firm, which sparked tiiuch of the 
debate, is couched in terms specific to the private sector. The notion of a *firm' 
is itself an essentially business oriented concept and the emphasis on 
technological change and production methods reflects the dominance of the 
private sector in the theorising. The empirical dominance of the private sector 
is revealed in later but related research (Atkinson and Meager 1986) when only 
one out of 29 case studies is in the public sector. 
Although many contributors to the debate (e. g. Casey, 1991; Pollert, 1988; 
Rubery, 1989) acknowledge the importance of public sector management in 
leading the way in attempts to implement flexible working practices, their 
arguments and conclusions are drawn largely in respect of the private sector. 
Although Casey (199 1) joins the bulk of the flexibility critics by minimizing the 
extent of involuntary temporary employment, he concedes that 'it might well be 
the public sector, not the private sector. which is the vanguard of current 
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attempts to promote 'flexible' forms of working' (p. 185). Pollert (I 988a: -53)) 
argues that the flexible firm thesis 'conflates changes in the public sector, and 
the services in general, with management strategy in the private sector . 
Similarly Rubery notes: 
It is in the public sector that there have been the most evident chanLres iii 
employer strategy: the internal labour force has been increasingly 
subdivided into those on permanent and those on temporary contracts 
(1989: 166). 
It is therefore curious that the public sector has largely been omitted from the 
debate as anything other than an exception to the rule. This situation is even 
more puzzling since, when identified with the public sector, flexibility is most 
clearly seen as inherently political. As Fairbrother notes 'the major 
reorganisation of labour relations in the public sector must be attributed to the 
specific political programme of the goverm-nent' (1991: 167). Fairbrother's 
research in the civil service (199 1; 1994a) and more recently in local 
government (1996) attempts to redress the lacunae left by the private sector bias 
and in doing so adds some important dimensions to the flexibility debate. 
Fairbrother notes that the different context of the employment relationship in 
the public sector has warranted a different set of proposals required for 
restructuring. The emphasis here is placed on the use of flexible working 
practices as a 'major weapon to achieve a controlled and malleable workforce in 
a period of radical restructuring' (1991: 69). The cutting edge of this weapon 
has been moves towards decentralisation, which has encouraged the redefinition 
of managerial authority particularly at the local level. This has been facilitated 
and enhanced by the use of temporarý, employment contracts as evidence 
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suggests that decisions to use temporary workers fall increasingly to local 
managers. As a result, weakened employee status is likely to bring newly 
acquired management prerogatives sharply into focus (see chapter six). 
These arguments are supported by research that has shown that the service 
sector, particularly public services, has been the site of much decentralisation 
and deregulation. Dex and McCulloch (1995) found that the sectors subject to 
govermuent reorganisation tend to have the highest proportion of flexible Jobs. 
In relation to local goverment, Escott and Whitfield (1995) found that 
numerical flexibility was an increasing aspect of employment policy and 
practice. They further note that most temporary workers in local government 
are female. Therefore the result is that whilst restructuring ma,,,, have created 
more employment opportunities for women, segregation remains intact and 
women are concentrated in ever more precarious jobs (Dex and McCulloch 
1995). 
Labour Law, the Labour Process and the Employment Contract 
The preceding section has explored the issue of temporary work in relation to 
labour market debates and the economic rationales that have been used to 
explain its continuance. A number of themes have been identified which 
explain the overlapping nature of segmentation along sectoral lines and 
gendered and ethnic segregation in temporary work. The relationship between 
these issues and the precarious nature of temporary work is frequently implicit 
and sometimes explicit. However such an analysis cannot identiýy the specific 
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facets of temporary work that give rise to these relationships. The aim of the 
following section is therefore to examine the employment relationship in detail 
and, by doing so, locate the position of temporary labour. 
This is done firstly by an analysis of legal theories concerning the emploý-mem 
contract. However, like the labour market theories, legal analysis is beset with 
problems of definition that stem from its basis on a flawed model of societN 
rooted in 18 th and 19thcentury Liberal philosophy. In order to extend the 
examination it is necessary to incorporate it into a labour process analysis that 
explains the employment relationship in terms of a struggle for control. The 
employment contract is identified as a pivotal mechanism in the struggle. The 
paradoxes arising from the legal analysis are explained as stemming from the 
contradictory nature of a device charged with at the same time legitimising and 
concealing the extraction of surplus value. 
Labour Law and the Employment Contract 
In order to understand the legal issues that surround 'non-standard' contracts of 
employment it is firstly necessary to place them within the context of what is 
considered to be 'normal' or 'standard'. It is also necessary to move beyond a 
descriptive assessment of the rule of law to provide an analysis of jurisprudence 
and compare this to the reality in which it is applied. 
The individualist tradition of British labour law contrasts to that of most of 
Continental EuroPe, which has been influenced to a far greater extent by Roman 
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law. The conflicting philosophies of Continental and British systems have beeii 
clearly evident in the problematic application of European Union (EU) law in 
Britain and the often contradictory rulings of the European Court of Justice. A 
feature of Roman law has been the use of regulatory means of incorporating I- 
positive individual legal rights often supported by constitutional arrangements. 
The British system, by comparison, has been influenced by a tradition based on 
the feudal concept of master and servant. In this relationship contract was 
irrelevant as "a servant's status determined the obligation to work at xN-acyes t: ý 
arbitrarily fixed by the justices of the peace, usually themselves masters. " 
(Hepple and Fredman 1992: 41). Although repeal of the Master and Servams 
Acts was intended to make way for libertarian ideals based on the freedoin to 
contract, the new philosophy was shaped by the tenacity of older traditions; thus 
ensuring "the form of contract which emerged in the 19"' Century effectively 
guaranteed the rule-making powers of the employer" (ibid. ). 
Fox (1974) considered the ways in which 19 th Century theorists had viewed 
contract theory generally and the role of the employment contract within it. Fox 
argued that liberal theorists Maine and Spencer believed market principles 
embodied in the concept of contract offered the masses freedom from the 
shackles of tradition. Maine argued that all progressive societies would move 
from a system based on the status of its people fixed in a rigid hierarchy 
determined by birth to a society based on bargained contracts between free and 
equal parties. 
30 
In sum: contract society could be sociallN- and politically characterl-'ed 
as urban, modem and Liberal; status societN- as rural, traditional and 
Tory. (Fox, 1974: 210). 
Durkheirn (1984) added some further dimensions to the Liberal vision of 
society in "The Division of Labour and Society-. His ideal also encompassed a 
meritocracy legitimised by both equality of opportunity and equality of 
contractual relations. In this vision the increasingly complex division of labow- 
required control through contract enforced by a framework of social regulation 
and obligation. 
Both Spencer and Durkheim were aware that the central tenet of equality Nvas 
absentin I gth century society. However, Spencer considered that ineqLiality 
would subside with an acknowledgement and strengthening of contractual 
freedom. Similarly Durkheim argued that contract law would aid progress 
towards a more equal society and help people to accept their place within it. As 
Fox noted: 
The vision is one of social integration based on moral norms of 
individual obligation serving a corporate solidarity. It is essentially a 
unitary conception of social structure (1974: 23 5). 
The unitarist perspectives of both Spencer and Durkheirn prevented them from 
acknowledging the specific nature of the employment relationship. The past 
master of such analysis was Otto Kahn-Freund. For Kahn-Freund the concept 
of an employment contract was an inevitable oxymoron; the culmination ot'a 
legal system based on a flawed libertarian vision of how society should be 
regulated. The employment contract becomes the lens throughwhich this 
distorted view of the world can be seemingly rectified: 
It is engendered by a view of society as an agglomeration of individuals 
who are co-ordinated as equals, by a myopic neglect or deliberate 
refusal to face the main characteristic of all societies. which is the 
unequal distribution of power. The law does and to some extent must 
conceal the realities of subordination behind the conceptual screen of 
contracts considered concluded between equals. (Kahn-Freund 1972: 4- 
5) 
The hub of the problem then is a failure to distinguish between contract as a 
purely economic exchange and as the instrument that legitimises a social 
relationship based on inequality. A contract, in the commercial sense, is an 
exchange relationship between parties who, as equals, are freely able to enter 
into, negotiate and terminate a contract. The employment relationship can be 
seen to differ fundamentally from the commercial contract in a number of waý,, s. 
Firstly, the employment relationship "is typically a relation between a bearer of 
power and one who is not the bearer of power" (Kahn-Freund 1972: 8) and is 
therefore not a transaction between equals. In fact its very purpose is the 
subordination of one party to the power of the other. Secondly, subordination is 
present before the point at which a 'deal' may be said to be struck as 
"Typically, the worker as an individual has to accept the conditions which the 
employer offers... " (ibid. ). This is a condition which prevails throughout the 
relationship as the "worker does not participate in the making of the rules which 
govern his (sic) work" (ibid. 14). Lastly, because the financial risk of 
termination of individual employment contracts is diffuse for the emplo,, -er. the 
costs of termination are far higher for the worker and provide yet another facet 
of inequality. 
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The problematic -fit' of the employment relationship in a form that attempts to 
mimic the commercial contract is evident in the way disputes are handled. In a 
commercial contract the terms of the arrangement are most often clear. 
measurable and are therefore easily agreed beforehand. As such, the courts 
expect the parties, to a large extent, to be self-regulating. The employment 
relationship by comparison is complex, on going and, in some sense. is a 
process of continual re-negotiation. This has been resolved in British labour 
law by an understanding that the terms of an employment contract need not be 
expressly negotiated but may be implied by the courts in the event of a 
disagreement. The courts are however largely led by the traditions of the liberal 
perspective (Wedderburn 1989), which has meant: 
In reality ... the superior economic power of employers enables them to dictate terms of the contract which the individual employees are in no 
position to contest through the courts, least of all when they are still 
working for the employer. (Hepple and Fredman 1992: 4 1) 
In this way the law conceals reality: "... the unilateral rule - and decision- 
making power of management is presented as based on a 'contract% on the free- 
will of the employer and the employee. " (Kahn-Freund 1972: 14). Kahn-Freund 
identifies the reasons for such elaborate facades as essentially moral: 
It is necessary for the law to see relations of subordination in terms of 
co-ordination, that is an act of submission in the mask of a "contract"'. 
because this is the fiction through which it exorcises the incubus of 
"compulsory labour. " (ibid: 15) 
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The way in which the law attempts to reconcile these issues raises a number of 
contradictions deeply rooted within labour law,, vhich are illustrated notablN- b\- 
past conflicts between legislature and common law. As Kahn-Freund points 
out, this arises chiefly because what is freedom for the worker is a restraint for 
the employer and vice-versa. Therefore, whilst the legislature is seen as a form 
of protection for the individual worker against the abuses of power by the 
employer, the courts are, for the most part, ultimately motivated by a 
philosophy underpinned by the concept of the freedom to contract. 
Protective legislation thus enlarges the worker's freedom. his (sic) 
freedom from the employer's power to command, or if you like. his 
freedom to give priority to his own and his family's interests ovei- those 
of his employer. Yet, paradoxically, such liberating legislation must 
appear to the lawyer as a restraint on freedom, on the "freedom to 
contract" which, in this context, is the term the law uses for the 
subjection of the worker to the power of management. (ibid: 15). 
Positive legal regulation of the contract is alien to the liberal common law 
approach to the extent that parties are free to contract out of protective 
legislation unless Parliament expressly says they cannot (Hepple and Fredman 
1992). The insistence of the courts to place "conceptual apparatus" before 
reality has resulted in a legal view of the employment relationship which has, 
conveniently for employers, transposed the moral and the amoral. As Kahn- 
Freund again succinctly observes "I know of no case in which a court 
invalidated a contract by reason of gross exploitation ... exploited workers are 
not plaintiffs in courts of law... " (1972: 27). 
However Kahn-Freund's critique and prescription are essentially pluralist in 
nature. For him subordination is a necessary element to the orderly existence of 
society: 
There can be no society without subordination of some of its members 
to others, without command and obedience, without rule-makers and 
decision-takers. (ibid: 4) 
and more specifically in relation to production: 
Except in a one man (sic) undertaking, economic purposes cannot be 
achieved without hierarchical order within the economic unit. (ibid: 9) 
In Kahn-Freund's view it is the necessity of subordination that means a pluralitN- 
of conflicting interests is inherent between workers and employers. HoNvevei% 
in this argument, the economic power of the employer can be matched by the 
collective power of workers. True to the pluralist tradition, Kahn-Freund 
considers that the law must take a backseat and intervene only in circumstances 
in which the power of labour cannot match that of the employer and, on rare 
occasions, vice-versa for: 
As a power countervailing management the trade unions are much more 
effective than the law has ever been or ever can be. (ibid: 12). 
The pluralist philosophy has been the dominant force in shaping British labour 
law and industrial relations in the post-war period. The central pillar of this 
approach has been the application of collective laissez-faire underpinned by a 
belief in voluntarism between employers and trade unions and therefore the 
abstention of the state from anything but a minimalist regulation of the 
employment relationship. The voluntarist tradition limited statutory 
intervention to providing protection for those who fell outside the remit of 
collective bargaining, specifically women and young workers. It is therefore 
important to note that one of the many criticisms of the pluralist approach is its 
domination by male academics focusing on the work of men, narnelý- the 
manufacturing sector, and seeing solutions lying in collecti've bargaining and 
hence male dominated trade unions. 
Kahn-Freund's criticism of libertarianism is useful although as an exemplar of 
the pluralist view of the labour relationship it too is flawed. The demise of 
voluntarism has been evident since the mid 1970s and it has been actively 
reversed since 1979 by a return to neo-liberal values. A belief in collective 
laissez-faire and a pro-union recognition of a power imbalance that favoured 
employers has been almost effortlessly replaced by neo-liberal arguments, 
which consider that contractual equality is inhibited by the monopolistic pmver 
of trade unions and legislation which produce barriers to business (Hayek 1980: 
Minford 1985; Hanson and Mather 1988). Furthermore, the voluntarist view of 
the role of the state as providing a level playing field between employers and 
workers becomes inappropriate when the state is the employer. 
The legacy of the voluntarist tradition has meant that de-regulation of 
employment structures has been swift and difficult to challenge. The gendered 
nature of the voluntarist system has also meant "deregulatory measures have 
had a disproportionately adverse impact on women" (Dickens and Hall 
1995: 268). Carole Pateman (1988) adds another dimension to a feminist 
critique of contract theory. Pateman argues that in its conception civil freedom 
was not intended for universal application. The concept of citizenship is based 
in the public sphere and is essentially masculine. Therefore, although on the 
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surface patriarchy seems inimical to the principles of freedom and equalitN,. 
contracts in various forms have been used to legitimise the subordination of 
women. Pateman draws interesting comparisons between the marriage contract 
and the employment contract. It is argued that what appears to be mutually 
advantageous arrangements for both parties are in fact relationships based on 
social inequality; both involve an exchange of property in the person in the form 
of obedience based on the unequal power balance between the parties. In 
women's employment the two combine to produce a particularly effective form 
of subordination. A graphic illustration of this point is the marriage bar, which 
was a formal feature of civil service employment until 1946 but continued 
informally for much longer (Cockburn 1991). Glucksmann argues that a fon-nal 
marriage bar was a particular feature of certain forms of public sector 
employment: 
The legally enforced marriage bar covered all local government and 
civil service employment, including teaching and most other office 
work. In professional and non-manual occupations work was not so 
physically arduous as in a factory, and women were likely to be better- 
off financially and in a better position to afford labour saving domestic 
appliances ... In their situation then, waged or salaried employment was 
more compatible with domestic responsibility. Hence the need for a 
formal marriage bar: if married women were to be removed, forcible 
means were necessary to achieve the end. (1990: 223) 
Clearly public employers have a history of placing limits on women's 
employment contracts that would have been considered unthinkable for men. In 
doing so they exemplify and serve to highlight the contradictions in the 
contractual status of women. 
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Temporary Employment and Labour Law 
If, as Kahn-Freund famously stated, the employment contract is "an 
indispensable figment of the legal mind" (1972: 8), the temporary employnient 
contract may be considered to be something of an aberration as it -.,, N-ould appear 
to exemplify and amplify much of the conflict, contradiction and paradox 
evident in labour law. Unfortunately this is a field which has been a self- 
confessed area of neglect for most labour law academics (Leighton 1986). 
However, what has been written reveals a patchwork of legislation and case law 
which is neither internally consistent nor bears any credible resemblance of 
what takes place in the world of work. In short it is an area of working life in 
which "the law has been left behind"(Wedderburn 1986: 117). 
On the face of it there are precise legal definitions which separate fixed-term 
contract workers, temporary workers and casuals. What draws them together is 
that their contracts of employment, if indeed a contract can be found to exist, 
are unlike other contracts of employment in that they are not open ended but 
have a specific date of termination. This date may not always signify the date at 
which the contract will automatically cease but the point at which the 
arrangement will be reviewed. However, according to the law, it is the 
circumstances that surround the point of re-negotiation which separate the 
various forms of temporary work. Fixed-term contracts contain a specified date 
at which the contract is ended or reviewed whilst temporary contracts are 
terminable on the 'happening or non-happening of a future event' (Brown et al. 
v Knowsley Borough Council [EAT, 1986 IRLR 102]). For example a contract 
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may be for the completion of a specific task or for as long as funds are 
forthcoming. This is a fine legal distinction that in practice has proved difficult 
even for the courts to distinguish. Casual employment is even more difficult to 
discern as it is a form of temporary employment characterised by its irregular 
nature (Meulders et al. 1994). It is frequently classified as a sub-set of self- 
employment and may not be subject to a contract of employment at all. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that employers are not obliged to issue a statement of 
the terms of employment until 13 weeks have elapsed -a very long time in the 
world of a casual worker. 
One result is that the distinction between the various forms of temporary work 
breaks down in practice and produces a borderline that is difficult to draw 
(Hepple 1993). The inadequacy of the law in relation to temporary workers has 
been attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, and most fundamentally, is the 
lack of a legal definition of a temporary worker (Hepple: ibid. ). Secondly, 
existing employment law is based on the notion of full-time work centred 
around a 'normal' contract of employment with all the tangible and less tangible 
benefits that entails for the worker (Leighton 1986). The result is a lack of a 
comprehensive form of legislation covering temporary workers and what does 
exist is piecemeal and scattered over numerous statutes (See Hepple 1993 p. 
267 for a summary). The absence of a cohesive body of regulation has made the 
law concerning temporary workers difficult to pinpoint and the concept difficult 
to define, which may go some way in explaining the reluctance of legal experts 
to undertake this as an area of specialisation. 
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The incoherence of statute law has meant that legal disputes concemingy 
temporary work are often resolved with reference to case law and the courts. 
The dangers of this for the worker have been identified in the preceding section 
and, in practice, this has meant an interpretation of the equally ethereal concepts 
of employee status and mutual obligation. The result has been case law that is 
also ad hoc and inconsistent. In support of Kahn-Freund it would seem it is 
here that the legal decisions concerning temporary workers and realitý- part 
company for, as Leighton argues: 
In attaching importance to the strict wording of the contract, rather than 
its workings and practice, the court ignored the essential characteristic of 
much temporary work ... the concentration on 
legal formalities and the 
neglect of the economic and human side of the relationship can lead to 
unfortunate results. (1986: 519). 
The nature of the human side of the relationship is hinted at by Wedderburn 
when he states that flexibility, of which temporary work is an important 
component, is in fact a "buzz word normally masking an increase in 
management prerogative. " (1986: 118). Leighton, who argues that temporary 
work is almost always instituted for the convenience of the employer, confirms 
this and links the human and economic side of the relationship when stating: 
[Temporary workers] are united by the fact that they have virtually no 
job security and limited expectations of work. As recent research has 
shown ... they are generally on the 
lowest rates of Pay. denied sick and 
holiday pay and are given the least attractive work to do. (1986: 5 19). 
The institutionalisation of these aspects of temporary work is explained to some 
extent by Hepple (1993) in arguing that the approach to temporary workers i ii 
the UK has been market led rather than government led as in other EU member 
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states. Whilst the low number of temporary workers in the UK by comparison 
to other member states is attributed to the generally unregulated nature of the 
employment relationship, Hepple notes that the category of fixed duration 
contract workers is not subject to special legal restrictions as in most other 
member states. Furthermore, as Meulders et al. point out , in 1990 the UK 
government announced measures to "liberalize the market facilitating the 
recourse to positions of indeterminate duration" (1994: 5 7) although it is 
difficult to see how something that appears to be totally unregulated can be I 
further liberalised. It would appear that the libertarian philosophy of the courts 
identified by Kahn-Freund in 1972 has now also taken a strong hold in the 
legislature and is clearly illustrated in relation to the weak legal position of 
temporary workers. What is missing from these analyses is a consideration that 
temporary workers in the UK are likely to be women, belong to niinority ethnic 
groups and employees of the state. The implications this has when the emploý, er 
is also the legislator are therefore crucial but left unexplored. 
The Labour Process and Contractual Control 
The contradictions inherent in the legal concepts of 'free' labour can be traced 
to a fundamental economic necessity. In The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith 
noted the benefits to employers of free labour over slave labour: 
The wear and tear of a slave ... is at the expense of the master; but that of 
the free servant is at his own expense ... It appears, accordingl. y. from the 
experience of all ages and nations, I believe. that the work done by 
freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaN, es. 
(1986: 183-4) 
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Paradoxically, therefore, the moral objective of the laýv identified by Kahn- 
Freund to mask the 'incubus of forced labourý also serves to promote an 
economically superior production relationship. Marx described how the change 
in relationships previously identified by Smith gives the capitalist mode of 
production its distinctive character: 
When a peasant who has always produced enough for his needs becomes a 
day labourer working for a farmer; when the hierarchic order of guild 
production vanishes making way for the straight forward distinction 
between capitalist and wage-labourers he employs; when the former slave 
owner engages his former slaves as paid workers, etc., then we find that 
what is happening is that production processes of varying social provenance 
have been transformed into capitalist production. (1990: 1020) 
The contractual relationship between worker and employer therefore forms the 
basis of capitalism. Marx goes on to explain the effects this transformation has 
on the formal relations of production: 
A man who was formerly an independent peasant now finds himself a 
factor in a production process and dependent on the capitalist directing 
it, and his own livelihood depends on a contract which he as commodity 
owner (viz. The owner of labour-power) has previously concluded with 
the capitalist as the owner of money. The slave ceases to be an 
instrument of production at the disposal of his owner. The relationship 
between master and J oumeyman vanishes ... Before the process of 
production they all confront each other as commodity owners and their 
relations involve nothing but money; within the process of production 
they meet as its components personified: the capitalist as 'capital'. the 
immediate producer as 'labour', and their relations are determined by 
labour as a mere constituent of capital which is valorising itself (ibid. ) 
Although the transformation provides the apparent faýade of equality between 
commodity owners, Marx continues by outlining what this means 
for the actual 
labour process: 
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Furthermore, the capitalist takes good care that the labour adheres to the 
normal standards of quality and intensity. and he extends its duration as far as possible in order to increase the surplus-value that it yields. (ibid.. ) 
In linking the "formal" and the "real subsumption" of labour. Marx highlights 
the relationship between the employment contract and control. The formal 
subsumption of labour is embodied in the contract of employment. which 
establishes the commodified nature of the employment relationship. This in 
turn paves the way for the extraction of surplus-value and therefore the reýil 
subsumption of labour under the control of the capitalist. 
Control over the labour process has since been defined as "the ability of 
capitalists and/or managers to obtain desired work behaviour from workers" 
(Edwards, 1979: 17). This is a broad definition and much of the woi-k of laboLir 
process theorists has involved drawing out the complexity of the concept. 
Much of this analysis has been based on the apparent paradox that, whilst 
employers and their managers seek to control the labour process, the distinctive 
nature of labour forces them to obtain some degree of co-operation to harness 
its creative and productive powers. This has led theorists such as Friedman 
(1977) and Edwards (ibid. ) to analyse under what circumstances methods of 
control adopted by managers are likely to differ. Others such as Burawoy 
(1985), Fox (1974) and Braven-nan (1974) have sought to identify the 
mechanisms by which control is exerted. 
Part of the latter approach has consisted of an analysis of the best known and 
clearly identified methods of control devised by FW Taylor. In its purest form 
Taylorism was based on a belief that there is 'one best xvay' to organise the 
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labour process. In brief, this consisted of the separation of planning and 
performance of labour, the former of which was considered to be the preserve 
of the manager. Having systematically studied the tasks in hand the function of 
management was then to precisely define the most effective steps to complete 
them. With this as a starting point it is difficult to see how the use of temporary 
contracts by managers to control the labour process is comparable. However 
Taylorism has been considered to have expanded beyond a tightly defined set of 
managerial practices to encompass a concept or as Burawoy (1985) suggests an 
ideology. 
The basis of Taylorism as an ideology rests on the argument that the neutral 
fagade of scientific management served both to legitimise management 
prerogative to demand compliance and obedience and to stunt resistance by 
limiting trade union involvement. Some comparisons can be drawn here with 
the legitimising function of the concept of the employment contract and of its 
degraded form, the temporary contract, as a method of control. Whilst 
Taylorism gained legitimacy from its claims to scientific management, 
contractual control gains legitimacy from appeals to legalistic management 
Similarly, as a challenge to the basis of management control, trade unions are 
problematic to both the concepts of scientific management (Burawoy 1985) and, 
as the empirical evidence in chapters five to nine indicates, contractual control. 
Muckenberger (1989) has identified the link between legislation, management 
prerogative and contractual control. He argues that the 'original' flexibility of 
labour was assured by liberal concepts of the employment contract 'which 
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legally opened the way to nearly unlimited entrepreneurial dominance' (p. - ). 
`69 
Subsequent moves to regulate the employment relationship were sought to 
'counterbalance the unbearable absence of freedom that the or, (-, inal flexIbIlItN- 
of labour brought about' (p. 270) by legally establishing employment rights 
outside the contractual sphere. More recent appeals for de-regulation have 
sought: 
the widening of the contractual sphere or '*re -contractual i sation" - i. e. a 
process of shifting back the conditions of employment into the 
contractual regime and thus bringing them under managerial 
prerogative. (p. 270) 
In this view numerical flexibility represents a retrograde step rather than a move 
forward. Muckenberger also highlights the relationship between contracts and 
control. However, although the model of a contract is used as an initial form of 
job control by delineating the work to be done (Fox 1974), the diffuse nature of 
the employment relationship can not be captured within the scope of a contract 
- nor would an employer wish it to be. By highlighting this characteristic the 
mechanism by which the employment contract becomes an important tool for 
legitimising employers control is uncovered. The employment contract is open- 
ended in more ways than one for an employer. Unlike certain aspects such as 
hours and wages, contractual limits cannot be applied to the amount of surplus 
value that can be extracted. In many ways a true contract would be inimical to 
employers as the concept is predicated on notions of equality. rights of 
negotiation and appeal, limited performance and choice - all of which,. vould 
serve to undermine arbitrary authority as a device to extract surplus valLie. 
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In this respect the legitimising function of the employment contract is a double- 
edged sword. The concept of a contract implies both parties have rights and 
workers and their organisations have sought to reduce inequality by demanding 
rights and some form of negotiation in relation to them. Attempts to establish 
workers' rights at a universal level in the form of protective legislation have 
been paralleled by a movement at the level of the workplace. Burawoy (1979; 
1985) notes that because the amount of surplus value remains unspecified by 
the employment contract it has become the subject of struggle for control over 
the 'effort bargain'. Burawoy suggests that the workplace is analogous to the 
'internal state' in which 'industrial citizens' (workers) are deterred from 
anarchy (conflict) by the establishment of "a set of institutions that organise, 
transform, or repress struggles over relations in production and relations of 
production at the level of the enterprise. " (1979: 110). It is argued that under 
competitive capitalism regulation was largely carried out by a despotic overseer. 
The advent of monopoly capitalism and trade unionism has given rise to more 
sophisticated forms of control usually embodied in grievance and disciplinary 
procedures and collective bargaining. 
Although by 1985 Burawoy had dispensed with the 'internal state' analogy he 
maintained the concept of industrial citizenship. Because the brief in "The 
Politics of Production" is largely a critique of Bravennan (1974), Burawoy's 
emphasis is on worker resistance and the gains this has achieved. As such he 
does not emphasise how managers may seek to resist making concessions 
which limit 'arbitrary interventions' and place constraints on managerial 
discretion. It is true that under certain circumstances managers may be prepared 
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to relinquish 'appropriate' concessions to certain workers. However what 
Burawoy leaves unexplored is how. -ýý'hen those circumstances change. 
managers may attempt to regain lost control over the labour process by 
removing as far as possible rights which bestow 'industrial citizenship'. 
For employers the ideal employment relationship is one in which they can 
command the obedience of workers in an unfettered quest for surplus value but 
with limited commitment in return. In relation to this point Fox (1974) argues 
that, in their support of an idealised vision of the employment contract. Spencer, 
Maine and Durkheirn had failed to note that elements of tradition in the form of 
master and servant relations had been carried over into the employment 
contract. Status therefore remains a powerful determinant of the employment 
relationship now backed, in the form of legislation, by the coercive powers of 
the state. The state, whilst offering some degree of protection against 
management prerogative, limits this protection by "discriminating bet-ween 
different groups of workers, on the basis of whether or not they fulfil the main 
criterion of length and continuity of service" (Muckenberger 1989: 274). What 
theorists have again failed to note is that this task is simplified for the state 
when imposed upon its own employees. 
Furthermore, the work of Pateman (1988) discussed above, indicates that 
women Is subordination in the workplace is also enforced by their subordinatiol, 
in the private sphere. Therefore women are incorporated into the xN-orkplace not 
only as workers but also as women. One of the "practical strengths of the 
sexual contract in daily life is that both men and women see women workers as 
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less than full members of the workplace" (ibid: 14 1). Cockburn argues that 
women' s working lives are defined by domesticity in that 'the way, ýN-omen do 
or do not fit into the schema of paid employment and organisational life is seen 
primarily as a correlate of their marital status and, more important still. whether 
they do or do not have children' (1991: 76). In their stud), of work place 
discrimination Collinson et al. (1990: 118) provide a synthesis of these 
arguments and the concept of temporary work. They note that women \\ ere 
considered by managers to be more suitable for temporary work because of 
their "divided responsibilities between home and work, which meant that they 
could be treated first and foremost as wives and mothers, easily laid off. 
replaced and /or re-engaged". 
Henson (1996) has also noted the strong links between gender and temporary 
agency work in the US. Temporary agency work is traditlonallý, gendered, a 
feature that was reflected in the names of the early agencies, most notably 
'Kelly Girl'. Henson argues that temporary work is portrayed as providing 
flexibility for female workers that is directly linked to child care responsibilities 
both present and past by targeting the 'devoted mom' and the 'gregarious 
grandma' (ibid: 27). However he maintains the reality is similar to that argued 
by Collinson et al. above: 
Temporary employment, with its intermittent work availability and 
without a promotional track, fit well with an existing national ideologý' 
that assumed that women's labour activity was transitory, impen-nanent 
and secondary. (Henson 1996: 8) 
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Women and Trade Unions 
Theories of resistance to management control have been largely restricted to I- 
trade unionism within manufacturing and have limited the study of ývomen's 
organised resistance to forms of control that particularly affect them. The 
essentially masculine culture of most trade unions and their antipathN- to,, vards 
women workers has been highlighted by a number of feminist writers. They 
have detailed how, in the past, this has taken a directly hostile perspective, 
viewing women as strike breakers and a source of cheap labour threatening 
menýs income, a view that has been supported by some industrial relations 
academics (Forrest 1993). 
Recent views have become implicit rather than explicit as explanations for the 
exclusion of women have centred on their concentration in indListries and 
occupations that have been considered difficult to organise. Kessler for 
example argues in relation to local government: 
The isolation and dispersal of many manual and to a lesser extent white- 
collar, local authority workers, combined with the employment of large 
numbers of women part-time in caring services has always presented the 
union with major organisational problems. (1991: 2 1) 
Ironically, segregated labour markets and the *feminisation' of work is forcing 
trade unions to acknowledge the importance of women to the survival of the 
labour movement (Delsen 1990). This has been particularly true of public 
sector trade unionism where increased ,, N-hite-collar and female unionisation has 
added some buoyancy in a period of otherwise sinking national union 
membership (Cousins 1987). However. although unions have recognised the 
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numerical value of women's membership. attempts to encourage ýN-onien into 
union hierarchy have been halting. Where women have managed to reach 
senior positions and sway the bargaining agenda of their union they are likely. 
as with their male counterparts, to have held senior and secure positions withiii 
their jobs, for as Rees has notes, there are *clear links between "careers" in 
work and "careers" in the union' (1990: 193). Exclusion from the bargaining 
table means that issues, which are important to particular groups of women. are 
treated as peripheral if they appear in the bargaining agenda at all. One clear 
example of this is temporary work (see chapters eight and nine). 
Moreover, not only have these issues been excluded from bargaining agendas, 
but policies that have discriminated against temporary workers have been 
actively pursued. This has been the more general experience of women in the 
past as trade unions have colluded with employers in keeping women Is jobs in 
the secondary labour market by excluding them from apprenticeships and 
professional bodies and worked in partnership with the state in the maintenance 
of the 'family wage'. Similarly, in the past, trade unions have prioritised 
schemes which link pay to seniority and redundancy to 'last in first out' (LIFO). 
both of which discriminate against women who have reduced length of service 
usually because of care responsibilities. The use of temporary workers to 
cushion the blow of reorganisation and redundancy is akin to LIFO and 
therefore contains many of the same discriminatory elements (Dickens 1992). 
It could be argued that the use of temporary contracts in this NA-ay is more 
detrimental than LIFO as temporary contracts are often constructed in such a 
way that temporary workers may never gain the required tenure. 
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Feminists have however been ambivalent towards the trade union moN, eineiit 
(Cousins 1987) as a number of studies have indicated that women who are 
represented by a trade union enjoy better terms and conditions of employment 
compared to those who are not (Ellis 1988; Millward and Woodland 1995: 
Main 1996). However most of these studies refer to pay differentials. NVomen's 
pay is likely to be increased in the general pay bargaining round and this is of 
course preferable to lower pay. But it does not indicate any direct engagement 
by trade unions on issues that specifically affect women. Similarly. in relation 
to public sector unionism, whilst Rees (1992) identified that NALGO had been 
particularly active in relation to equalities issues in local government, Ten-y 
(1996) notes that, post-merger, Unison had not fully addressed the issue of 
women s representation. 
Summary 
The use of temporary contracts offers employers an attractive option for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, by bringing the contractual nature of the 
employment relationship into the foreground, the inequality of the arrangement 
is emphasised as temporary employment falls through the meagre legislative 
safety net. As a result temporary employment contracts exemplify the unequal 
facets of the employment relationship identified by Kahn-Freund and Hepple. 
The power imbalance is laid bare in the ease with which the employer can offer 
and withdraw employment opportunities -a feature that is particularlý- enhanced 
in depressed labour market conditions. 
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Secondly, Fox (1974) and Burawoy (1979.1985) argue that, although a power 
imbalance certainly exists in most forms of wage employment, the open-ended 
nature of the standard employment contract introduces a degree of 
indeterminacy to the employment relationship, which opens the Nvaý' to struggle 
over the effort bargain. Temporary contracts, by removing the indeten-ninacy of 
tenure present in open-ended contracts, narrow this particular route of worker 
resistance and further slants the effort bargain in favour of the employer. This 
is reinforced by the marginalisation of temporary labour from collective 
representation and trade union protection. Furthermore, temporary work would 
appear to predominate amongst groups of workers who have traditionally been 
excluded from both notions of full-time employment and collective 
representation. Therefore, finally, temporary employment contracts provide a 
sub-set of labour that can be used as a bridge of compromise between capital, 
state and organised labour. 
The dual role of the state as legislator and employer raises a number of 
implications that are brought to the fore in relation to temporary labour in the 
public sector. Labour market theorists, particularly in relation to flexibility, 
have indicated a relationship between temporary work and state employment 
but have left the connection unexplained. The aim of the following chapters is 
therefore to establish the nature of these links both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Chapter two establishes the quantitative relationship by a 
secondary analysis of statistical data, whilst chapter three contextualises this 
data within an analysis of public sector restructuring that has surrounded the 
statistical trends. 
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2. Defining and Locating Temporary Work 
The previous chapter identified links between temporary work and public 
employment. However, whilst the existing research in this area has referred to 
this relationship, there has been little in the way of empirical evidence produced 
to establish the extent and nature of the connection. The main purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to examine available statistical data that chart the growfli of 
temporary labour in the UK and demonstrate its prevalence in the public sector. 
This is achieved by providing a novel secondary analysis of Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) and related data. The quantitative relationship between temporary 
labour and the public sector is not clear from LFS data in its current format. 
Therefore a secondary analysis which focuses on a sectoral comparison is 
applied. However, before a thorough analysis can be undertaken, there are 
number of theoretical issues that need to be addressed. 
Chapter one established that there are a number of conceptual deficiencies in 
relation to theoretical perspectives of non-standard work. In relation to this 
point Felstead and Jewson have noted the dominance of the statistical analysis 
over theoretical concerns in the academic treatment on non-standard work. One 
result is that definitions have been developed largely as a result of the pragmatic 
requirements of statistical data collection and remain * untheorised' (1999: 5). 
However the ascendancy of the quantitative approach means that the majority of 
existing data and research on temporary vvork is in this form. The challenge t1or 
researchers is to draw what is useful from this data NN-hilst being aware of its 
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limitations. Much of the research that has relied on either primary or secondarv 
statistical data has done so uncritically. The aim of this chapter is therefore to 
critically examine the available statistical data on temporary work and the 
research it has provoked. In the light of this analysis and in conjunction -with 
arguments drawn from chapter one. the theoretical and empirical focus of the 
thesis is stated. 
Whilst the empirical focus of this thesis is national and sectoral rather than 
international and general, it is important to start by locating temporary work in 
the UK within a global picture because debates about temporary work in the UK 
are largely benchmarked against other OECD nations. In order to criticallý, 
analyse this research it is therefore necessary to point out the limitations in 
comparisons of international statistical data. Furthermore, by systematically 
reviewing OECD, EU, UK and eventually sectoral and occupational statistical 
data, important recurring trends and themes are revealed. These include the 
gendered nature of temporary work and the predominance of such work within 
the public sector. One causal explanation that links these findings is that 
temporary work is likely to predominate in the public sector because both are 
gendered -a relationship that is reinforced by the link between part-time and 
temporary work. 
OECD Statistics 
The overarching conclusion about the extent and trends in temporary work in 
the eighteen OECD countries is that of national diversity. There are wide 
divisions between the countries over the scale and scope of temporarý- work as 
well as the national patterns of growth and decline. OECD commentators ha\ e 
suggested that the low magnitude and stability in numbers of temporary v, -orkers 
in the UK points to its relative unimportance as an employment issue 
(OECD, 1996: 19). However one influential report does indicate a number of 
interesting points specific to temporary work in the UK (OECD, 1996). In 
contrast to most other OECD countries, temporary work in the UK appears to 
be economically 'pro-cyclical'. The report describes the links thus: 
... 
if temporary work arrangements are allowed, in particular wheii fliev 
imply a lower cost and/or easier procedures of hiring and firing, 
economic growth might lead to employment growth mainly through 
such [temporary] jobs. In a slump employers would tend to let these 
workers go first. During upturns, the bulk of hirings would then be in 
the form of temporary work arrangements. The incidence of temporary 
work should thus increase in upturns and decrease in downturns. 
(ibid: 8) 
This seems to imply that temporary work in the UK stems largely from cost- 
based decisions furnished by limited employment protection for workers. 
Nonetheless the report concedes that 'Temporary employment is likely to be 
driven by many, not necessarily well-understood factors' (ibid). As chapter one 
identified, most of these factors are likely to emanate from the distinct social 
nature of the employment relationship and are therefore not easily identified in 
statistical data. However one factor, which is not emphasised by the report but 
is evident in the figures it presents, is the relatively high percentage of UK 
temporary workers who are not included in labour force statistics either prior to 
or after a spell of temporary employment. This is particularly marked in the 
latter case as Table 2.1 illustrates. 
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Table 2.1 
People in a temporary job at time t distributed by their labour market 
status a year later 
Percentages 
France Germany Spain Great Britaiii 
March First Quarter 
1992-3 1992-3 1993-4 1992-3 
Incidence of 
temporary 2 10 15 0 31.5 9.3 
employment at . . 
time t 
Employed 68.0 84.2 75.0 74.9 
Temporary 30.3 68.4 64.0 
_3 
9.8 
Permanent 31.7 14.6 8.9 25.3 
Self-employed 6.0 4.9 6.6 9.7 
Unemployed 25.3 10.9 18.4 5.7 
Not in the labour 
force 6.7 4.9 6.6 19.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: OECD Employment Trends 1996 - table 1.14 pg. 17 
Although the Great Britain has the lowest incidence (5.7%) of unemployment 
following temporary employment, it has the highest incidence (19.5 %) of 
temporary workers who subsequently drop out of the labour force. These 
periods out of the labour market are described as 'a spell involving family 
responsibilities' (ibid: 17). 
Unfortunately the figures suffer from a number of inconsistencies that make 
international comparisons difficult. Specifically, longitudinal figures are only 
available for France, Spain, Germany and Great Britain and even these figures 
are not directly comparable as they cover slightly different periods. Difficulties 
of comparative research have been well documented (e. g. Hantrais and Mangen. 
1996; Oyen, 1990; Ragin, 1991) as have the problems more specifically related 
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to cross-national data on employment (e. g. \, Iaurice et al., 1986). Hantrais 
(1996) notes that. in relation to quantitative research. international comparisons 
are hampered by a lack of comparable data, whilst. Maurice et al. (ibid. ) argue 
that such differences emerge from the social traditions and institutional forms 
specific to nations making it necessary to contextuallse comparative research. 
In relation to these general arguments, the problems related to comparing 
OECD figures on temporary work have been detailed by Campbell and Burgess 
(1997), with reference to Australia. They argue that temporary work is often a 
weak and unfamiliar statistical category, which is not widely used as a basis foi- 
disaggregation. For example they note that: 
The OECD uses "temporary employment" as an omnibus category to 
cover fixed-term contracts, temporary agency employment, seasonal 
employment, casual employment and some types of government 
employment schemes. (ibid: 5). 
By specifying the distinctiveness of the Australian case, Campbell and Burgess 
argue that differences in definition reflect national divergences in experience. 
The dominance of casual work in Australia and the way this is emphasised in 
national statistics means that other forms of non-permanent employment are 
underestimated. Similar national 'quirks' are likely to be reflected in the 
statistics for each of the OECD countries. In part, this is acknowledged by the 
OECD: 
Given the important differences in definitions and regulations of 
temporary employment across OECD countries, cross-countrv 
comparisons of the incidence of temporary emploý-ment are hazardous. 
(1996,6). 
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EU Statistics 
Campbell and Burgess (1997) note that the problems associated with 
international statistical comparison are less severe amongst EU countries 
because of the existence of the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) which. 
because it included a common question on temporary employment. offers a 
more consistent data set. As Figure 2.1 indicates, omitting OECD figures. 
particularly for Australia (23.5%) and the USA (2.2%), removes two extremes 
and gives a closer bunching of figures for temporary work in EU countries, 
although there are still quite wide national divergences with Spain at the top and 
Luxembourg, Belgium and the UK reporting low numbers of temporary 
workers. 
Hantrais (1996) notes that even so-called harmonised data sets such as Eurostat 
merely give the impression that quantitative comparisons are unproblematic. In 
relation to temporary work, Meulders et al. (1994) note that, although question 
40 of the ELFS gathers 'harmonised' statistical data for EU countries, there are 
still a number of points that need to be considered. Firstly, the question refers 
to a 'reference week' which is not necessarily the same in each country, which 
could be affected by varying seasonal work patterns. 
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Secondly, the question is not asked of identical sets of workers in each countrý-. 
While the question is only presented to -persons in subordinate direct 
employment' in most countries, in Italy and the United Kingdom the data also 
contains information on the self-employed. In relation to this last point 
Meulders et al. note that the distinctions between different forins of temporary 
work are particularly blurred in international comparisons stating: 
... the concept of the self-employed worker with a temporary occupation is none too clear (since it is the worker himself [sic] who specifies t1le 
duration of his activity). This said, this type of self-employed worker is 
widespread in Italy... (Meulders et al., 1994: 36) 
Moreover,, sectoral comparisons between different countries may be difficult to 
establish. This is particularly true of the public sector, which may vary widelý' 
in size and function between European countries. In their conclusion Meulders 
et al. sum up the problematic nature of even relatively harmonised EU statistical 
data and it is worth quoting their remarks at some length: 
The statistics that the different countries have been able to collect seem 
to be largely insufficient to enable a correct understanding and 
description of atypical employment and its development to be arrived at. 
In the majority of cases the experts came up against a total lack of data, 
or data whose accuracy was questionable. This lack of accuracy stems 
from the fact that the forms of employment under consideration are not 
always clearly defined (officially and/or statistically), and this does not 
allow clear distinctions to be drawn between them. Moreover. a certain 
delay in the taking into account of new phenomenon by the statistical 
apparatus is naturally inevitable. Nevertheless, the fact should not be 
overlooked that some relatively old forms of atypical employment such 
as night and temporary work are very inadequately covered by the 
national and community statistics. (Meulders et al.. 1994: 230) 
Meulders et al. are reiterating the point made bv Felstead and Jewsoii (1999) 
that the poor conceptual i sation of non-standard work generally and temporary 
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work specifically has limited the usefulness of statistical data as a research tool. 
Drawing conclusions on the basis of this data alone is therefore inadvisable. 
UK Statistics 
Contrary to the suggestion of OECD commentators that temporary work is an 
unimportant feature of UK labour markets, the graphical representation of 
longitudinal US data contained in Figure 2.2 indicates a sharp rise in the 
number of temporary workers since 1992. The British Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) did not begin to collect data on temporary employment until the spring 
quarter of 1984 and, as Figure 2.2 illustrates, there has been a continual increase 
since then. The increase was quite gradual between 1984-91 and accelerated 
after 1992. 
The question of gender was not introduced until 1992 (see Figure 2.3 below), 
but once done, it is clear that women have occupied the majority of temporary 
jobs. It has been argued that, as recent increases have been more marked 
amongst men, the gap between men and women in temporary jobs has closed 
since 1992. However this position should not be overstated for. as Figure 2.3 
indicates, any closure has been slight. Furthermore Dex and McCulloch (1997) 
have noted that, whilst men and women have similar levels of flexible 
employment in some occupations, there are certain occupations where women 
are far more likely to hold non-standard jobs than men. 
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Interestingly, Dex and McCulloch (1997) single out health associated 
occupations, teaching professions and jobs in science and engineering as 
displaying this particular characteristic. What they do not emphasise. althotigh 
implicit in their findings, is the dominance of public sector employment 
amongst these occupations. 
Department of Employment statisticians have noted a number of ways in which 
UK statistics for temporary workers are likely to be inaccurate (Kin. (.,, 1988). As 
noted for international comparisons, many of the problems stem from the 
conceptual fuzziness surrounding different forms of temporary work and the 
blurred boundaries between these forms. When this is linked to the self- 
assessment required by the US a number of problems occur. One specific 
example of this problem is that people working on a long succession of 
temporary contracts are unlikely to consider themselves to be temporarý, 
workers. Self-assessment by respondents is therefore likely to result in the 
overstatement of permanent jobs relative to temporary jobs. Thisproblemis 
likely to be exacerbated as 30% of responses to the US questionnaire are made 
by proxy, that is by another member of the household, usually a relative (LFS 
Users Guide, 1996). If temporary workers themselves have difficulty in 
categorising their employment contract, the likelihood that a family member 
would be able to do so seems remote. 
Furthermore government statisticians note that, although the US is the best 
source of data for international comparisons, the disadvantages are that: 
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being a sample survey. it is subject to sampling error and is therefork: 
very limited in what is available at local area level: and -second... it is not ideal for industrial classifications (Labour Market Trend--,. December 
1997: S3). 
The relevance of this point becomes evident NA-hen attempting to compare 
statistical data on temporary workers in the public and private sectors. If a 
simple head count is used, the number of temporary workers in the private 
sector is almost three times greater than for those in the public sector. Howe\ er 
if a comparison is made of the temporary workers of each sector as a percentacle t-- 
of the total workforce for that sector. as Figure 2.4 illustrates, a very different 
picture emerges. 
Temporary Work in the Public Sector 
By using US data in this way, it can be seen that temporary workers curreiitlý- 
make up 10.66% of the total public sector workforce - almost double the 
national average and closer to the aggregate European average. However these 
points can be extended still further if the shortcomings of the US are avoided. 
Govermuent statisticians note that the inadequacies of the US industrial 
classifications stem from the 'self-appraisal' of respondents 'who may have a 
different perception of the sector in which they work to that of their employer' 
(Labour Market Trends 1997: S3). They consider another data set, the 
Workforce Jobs series (WJ formally the WiE. Workforce in Employment series) 
to be 'particularly useful for analysis by industry' (ibid. ). 
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The estimates of the WJ for total numbers of public sector emplovees is lower 
than that of the LFS, thereby appearing to confirm that many more people 
consider themselves to be employed in the public sector than is actually the 
case. If the WJ figures are substituted in the equation to establish the total 
percentage of temporary workers employed in the public sector, as illustrated bý- 
Figure 2.5, the total rises to 13%. This sectoral divergence is supported by 
national data, illustrated in Figure 2.6, which provide statistics for temporary 
workers according to standard industrial classification. These figures show that 
by far the largest number of temporary workers are concentrated in one single 
classification - public administration, education and health. 
By highlighting the importance of the public sector, further deficiencies in the 
way national statistics are collected and displayed are evident. Firstly the public 
sector is a moving target and there have been a considerable number of changes 
as to how the sector is defined for statistical purposes. Labour Market Trends 
lists 38 changes between 1983 and 1994 (Hughes 1996) and a clear distinction 
between the public and private sectors was only introduced into LFS data in 
1993. These factors, coupled with changes to survey questions, have inhibited 
the construction of accurate time series data (Dex and McCulloch 1995). 
Secondly aggregation is a particular problem for public sector statistics as the 
classifications used make it difficult to pinpoint exactly where public sector 
temporary work is expanding. Furthermore the aggregated nature of labour 
force statistics masks the true extent of gender segregation (West 1996) as 
gender divisions are not provided for temporary work in the different sectors. 
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Clearly national and international statistical data have severe limitations and on 
their own provide only a partial understanding of the nature of temporary , N-ork. 
However a disaggregated analysis of US data completed by the Local 
Government Management Board (LGMB 1998) supported by their own joint W 
staffing watch survey provides some remedy to the shortcomings of UK data. 
Interestingly, the secondary analysis of existing figures carried out bý- the 
LGMB followed research conducted by the Cranfield School of Management: 
'indicated that many local authorities may not have corporate 
information about the patterns their employees are working. For 
example, some of the authorities interviewed in the research did not 
have temporary contracts as a field on their personnel infon-nation 
systems' (ibid: 2). 
Similarly, in a secondary analysis of WIRS data, Casey et al. (1997: 45) 
commented on the high non-response rate to questions on short-term contracts 
in public sector workplaces. Casey et al. considered this to result from a lack of 
data held by employers. 
The LGMB analysis found that , in 
local authorities, one in eight workers are 
employed on temporary contracts which includes as many as one in five 
teachers. This comPares to a figure of one in fifteen workers in the wider 
economy. These findings reflect the national patterns of distinction between the 
public and private sectors detailed above, with temporary work in local 
government almost double the national average and closer to EU averages. The 
study also reveals a higher incidence of temporary contracts in local 
government amongst women (14%). young workers (25%). disabled people 
(17%) and ethnic groups (15%). This concurs Nvith the more general finding of 
71 
Dex and McCulloch (1997: 87) that 'flexible work is not evenly distributed in 
the British economy. It is disproportionately experienced by individuals with 
certain characteristics. ' These findings accord with international statistical 
summaries in which Rodgers (1989) found that women, young people and 
immigrant workers are more likely to hold precarious forms of work. 
Interestingly the LGMB report claims that, going against the trend nationallý-, 
recent increases in temporary work in local government have been more marked 
amongst women than men. In relation to this point, the report draws strong links 
between part-time and temporary work. Twenty-two percent of part-time 
workers in local government were classed as temporary in comparison to 7% of 
full-time workers. This further compares to 13% (part-time) and 5% (full-time) 
in the wider economy. 
As tables 2.2 and 2.3 below indicate, the dispersion of temporary work amongst 
different local govermnent departments and occupations was uneven with the 
highest numbers in education and the lowest in social services. 
Table 2.2 
Number and proportion of employees in temporary work, major sectors of 
local government, England and Wales, spring 1996 (thousands) 
No. 
Social services 21 
Teachers, lecturers 112 
Other education 73 
6 
20 
16 
Rest of local govermnent 87 10 
Source: (LGMB, 1998: 97) 
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However the low figure for social services (6%) should be viexed with caution. 
Firstly the report strongly and repeatedly draws links between part-time and 
temporary work, with the contention that temporary work is also likely to be 
part-time. The report identifies that education and social services departments 
contain by far the highest numbers of part-time employees. Therefore it would 
be expected that temporary work should also be found predominantly in these 
two departments. Secondly, the analysis of temporary work by broad 
occupational grouping lists the highest numbers of temporary workers amongst 
'professional occupations' (17%) closely followed by 'personal and protective 
occupations' (15%). It is argued that this latter category particularly will be 
found predominantly amongst social services employees. Furthermore the 
second largest category, 'Rest of local government' (10%) is an aggregated 
figure which may disguise the prominence of temporary workers in social 
services if, as is likely, it is dispersed amongst a large number of departments. 
Lastly, the low figures for social services arrived at by the LGMB do not match 
the findings of this research. In both the case study authorities the largest users 
of temporary workers were the education and social services departments (see 
chapter four for figures). 
Another way of distinguishing the patterns is to examine the data on temporary 
work by broad occupational group, as indicated in Table 2.3. However, whilst 
the aggregated category of 'professional occupations' is seen as containing the 
highest number of temporary workers, this is compared with disaggregated 
categories of non-professional occupations. If a simple professional/non- 
professional distinction is made, the largest number of temporary workers 
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(145,000) would be found in the non-professional category. This breakdown 
suggests a re-examination of the figures for social services is important and 
necessary. 
Table 2.3 
Number and proportion of employees in temporary work, by broad 
occupational grouping, local government and whole economy, England and 
Wales, spring 1996 
Local Government Whole Econom) 
No. % No. % 
Managers & 77 
Admin. 
Professional 125 17 297 14 
Occupations 
Associate prof 14 8 128 7 
& technical 
Clerical and 34 10 261 8 
Secretarial 
Personal & 77 15 209 9 
Protective 
Sales - - 75 4 
Plant & machine 127 6 
Operatives 
Other 20 9 145 9 
Total 293 13 1401 7 
Source: LGMB, 1998: 97 
* Figures too small for accurate analysis 
Working with Statistics 
Notwithstanding the general inexactitude of national statistics, a number of 
conclusions have been drawn from them. As the OECD report typifies, 
the threat of insecure temporary work is often considered to be low for 
British workers as 7.5 per cent is lower than most other European 
countries. This observation has been accompanied by suggestions by some 
politicians, organisations and academics that job insecurity may be a state 
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of mind rather than a reality (see TUC 1996). T,, vo such cases will be 
reviewed in detail. 
Robinson (1999) highlights temporary work in the public sector. 
However, because of an over reliance on aggregated statistical data, he 
draws a number of dubious and conflicting conclusions about the nature of 
temporary work. Firstly, Robinson considers that the growth in temporary 
employment is a recent phenomenon. However, as he later states, it is 
difficult to get an idea of long term trends concerning temporary work 
because figures have only been collected since 1984. He further notes that 
temporary work has increased in most industries - especially public 
services where the highest incidence is amongst professionals mostly 
employed on fixed-term contracts. From this Robinson draws the 
conclusion that: 
These figures on the make-up of temporary employment are worth 
stressing because in the public debate temporary employment is 
often associated with low-paid, low-skill, 'casualised' 
employment... this is far from the trutlý. The 'typical' temporary 
worker is much more likely to be a well-paid professional, 
employed on a fixed-term contract within the public sector, which 
gives some clues as to why we have witnessed this recent 
expansion in temporary employment. Within the public sector, 
schools and health service trusts have been given greater freedom 
to determine their own recruitment practices at a time of budget 
constraints. Many seem to have responded by expanding their use 
of fixed-term contracts. (p. 89-90) 
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Robinson further states: 
Temporary staff waive their rights with respect to unfair dismissal 
and redundancy pay. However, in every other way a professional 
worker on a fixed-term contract will look indistinguishable from 
their permanent colleagues as they will be on the same pay scale. 
will contribute to the same occupational pension fund. attend the 
same training courses and so on. (p98-99) 
Many of the claims in the above statements cannot be made with any 
certainty using US data alone. Firstly, the concept of a 'professional 
worker' is always tenuous and Robinson offers no definition. Social 
services are identified in this research as a major user of temporary 
workers and social workers are often considered to be 'professionals'. 
However 80% of social service workers are thought to have no recognised 
qualifications or training (IRS 1999). Secondly, apart from making the 
link between temporary work and the public sector, most of the 
conclusions drawn by Robinson are in direct opposition to those made by 
the LGMB - despite both having used the same statistical data sets. The 
reasons behind such incongruous conclusions are likely to stem from the 
different levels of aggregation used. Robinson bases his analysis on 
highly aggregated national statistics, whilst the LGMB use a disaggregated 
form of the same data in conjunction with locally collected information. 
Furthermore as Dex and McCulloch (1997) note, Robinson's figures 
coincide with the change over of US data from annual to quarterly 
surveys. They argue that 'seasonal/casual work is likely to be 
considerably more volatile on a quarterly basis' (1997: 96) and the large 
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dip in temporary work reported by Robinson over this period is likely to 
have been affected by this change. 
Similarly, in examining job insecurity in the public sector, Morgan et al. 
(2000) note a number of dichotomies. They use three aspects to assess the 
level of job insecurity: 
e changes in the structure of public services jobs which have made 
employment and earnings more uncertain 
9 the removal or attenuation of protective regulation 
9 changes in the beliefs and attitudes of public service workers 
themselves who may have come to regard their employment as 
precarious. (p. 145) 
The authors draw mixed conclusions. Whilst they recognise certain aspects 
of public employment give cause for concern (the high use of temporary 
workers and reductions in protective legislation) their principal finding is: 
... notwithstanding the restructuring of employment relations in the 
public services, employees remain substantially more secure than 
their private sector counterparts. Thus, the risk of redundancy is 
less in the public services, public service contractors tend to 
provide more advantageous employment conditions, performance 
pay is less widely used and exposes a smaller proportion of risk 
and trade union membership and collective bargaining are much 
more extensive. These objective differences, moreover, are 
reflected in the attitudes of public service workers who are less 
likely to regard themselves as insecure than employees in the 
private sector. (2000: 145) 
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The dichotomy in their findings arises because Morgan et al. 1. 
like 
Robinson (1999), view public sector workers as homogenous when in fact 
they are highly polarised. One of the distinguishing features of the public 
sector is the wide range of occupations of which it comprises and thus the 
vast differences between the terms and conditions of employees 
(developed further in chapter three). 
One growing aspect of the polarisation among public sector workers is 
their contractual status. Whilst it may seem germane to talk of a reduced 
risk of redundancy, security of pay and trade union representation for 
workers on permanent contracts, these are issues which are likely to be 
outside the experience of temporary workers. In this respect Morgan et al. 
fail to consider that there may be links between the security of some public 
sector workers and the insecurity of others. The growing numbers of 
temporary workers, as evidenced in chapters five and six, act as a buffer 
for the core of permanent workers, which reduces the necessity of 
redundancy amongst their ranks. One reason for the oversights of Morgan 
et al. is their reliance on aggregated quantitative statistical data, which 
cannot establish causal links between phenomena such as these. 
To return to the work of Robinson (1999), a second set of conclusions 
drawn relates to the relationship between the amount of regulation in 
national labour markets and the incidence of temporary work. The key 
question he asks here is: 'do countries with less regulated labour markets 
have a higher proportion of their workforce in non-standard employmentT 
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(p. 93). Robinson provides the usual caution about comparing national 
data but his answer is 'no'. given that the UK and US have the most 
deregulated labour markets and among the lowest incidence of temporary 
work. By comparison Robinson cites Swedish statistics that show a high 
incidence of temporary work in what is widely considered to be highly 
regulated labour markets. 
However, in relation to the UK, Robinson (mistakenly) considers waiver 
clauses to be an integral part of temporary employment contracts. He 
argues that, because of deregulated labour markets, waiver clauses offer 
the only legal advantage to employers for using temporary contracts. He 
further states that the low level of non-standard employment in the UK is a 
good indication that employment protection is not burdensome. This 
position takes a rather narrow view of what benefits might accrue to 
employers by using temporary contracts. If legal benefits are the only 
advantage, then why is there an apparent disparity between the public and 
private sectors when employment law is the same for both sets of workers? 
Furthermore, as the interim report of the Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (Cully et al. 1998) found, only 20% of workplaces used fixed-term 
contracts which ran for more than one year, required for the insertion of a 
waiver clause, and only 22% of those had waiver clauses attached. 
As from October 1999, the Employment Relations Act (1999) removed the 
legal basis by which employers could attach waiver clauses in respect of 
unfair dismissal. It will therefore be interesting to note the effect this has 
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on the levels of temporary work. For, as Dex and McCulloch (1997) note. 
Britain's low level of regulation does not necessarily mean there are no 
institutional pressures against the use of flexible work as pressures also 
stem from the custom and practice of individual organisations. This point 
is particularly relevant to public sector organisations, which have strong 
traditions of recognising custom and practice. 
In contrast, Cousins (1999a) takes a more in-depth look at non-standard work 
and de/regulation and comes to some quite different conclusions from 
Robinson. She examines specific examples of legislation and regulation in four 
countries, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, and examines their impact on 
non-standard work. In her conclusion Cousins states that, although similar 
pressures have been influential in the increase of non-standard work, it is not 
necessarily the case that convergence is taking place, since these forces are 
mediated by 'social, political and institutional structures within each country' 
116). 
Cousins shows how, in Germany, the Employment Promotion Act 1985 has 
allowed employers to relax the rules regarding fixed-term contracts ( FTCs). 
However the industrial relations and employment law tradition in Germany still 
strongly favours permanent work. Therefore there has been little increase in the 
use of FTCs since 1985 and, where they have occurred, they have been 
particularly subordinated to the superiority of permanent work, producing. 
discrepancy and segmentation. In Spain, by comparison, the weakening of 
legislation that restricted the use of FTCs has resulted in an explosion in their 
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numbers. However one similarity with Germany is that there remains a hicgjhlý- 
privileged core sector, which the trade unions have favoured. Sweden offers yet 
another variation in that, although there are high numbers of FTC workers, their 
terms and conditions are highly protected and their jobs more secure than their 
European counterparts. However, as Robinson failed to note, the increase in 
Sweden has happened against a backdrop of deregulation, privatisation and 
decentralisation of collective bargaining. 
The UK section of Cousins' chapter does not expand the temporary worker 
issue - possibly because it is statistically difficult to justify as important. 
Similarly, whilst the author points out the importance of the public sector, there 
is no engagement with the issue. However the value of these findings for this 
research is the illustration of the subordinate role played by legislative 
frameworks in the decisions of employers in relation to temporary work. 
Industrial relations traditions and trade union involvement are crucial factors 
and need to be explored for any thorough understanding of the issues 
surrounding temporary employment. 
Assessment 
The preceding debate has sought to show the limitations of using statistical data. 
particularly in highly aggregated forms. The dangers of an over-reliance on 
such data when drawing conclusions have been identified. However, a 
disaggregated analysis of statistical data has revealed some interesting points, 
which would appear to contradict some of the more conservative theories 
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concerning temporary work. These figures suggest three things: firstl%. that for 
certain sections of the British workforce, job insecurity is an inherent feature of 
their employment and not merely a state of mind. Secondly. the higher 
incidence of temporary work in the public sector generally and local 
government and education specifically, would appear to indicate particular 
attractions for public service employers. Thirdly. the concentration of 
temporary contracts within certain social groups suggests they offer an inferior 
form of employment to already disadvantaged and marginalised workers. 
However, Cousins work illustrates that, whilst the statistical data can pose 
certain research questions by pointing to the extent and location of certain forms 
of temporary work, it cannot reveal the complex social relations that are the 
basis of such forms of work. The previous chapter identified that issues of 
control are likely to figure greatly in the relationship between temporary 
workers and their employers. In this respect the statistical data can shed no 
light on the experiences of temporary workers. Therefore as Felstead and 
Jewson state: 
A fundamentally different approach is needed. One such would be to 
define non-standard forms of employment in terms of the social 
relations of production. This principle seeks their common denominator 
in the relationship between the seller and purchaser of labour power. 
(1999: 5) 
In relation to temporary work, both the theoretical debates discussed in chapter 
one and the secondary statistical analyses in this chapter indicate that the focus 
for such an approach should be the public sector and more specifically 
education and local government. Therefore a particular form of social relations 
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of production is likely to be linked to the majority of temporary work in the UK. 
The importance of the public sector in such an analysis also reinforces other 
major themes that have recurred in the review of existing research. particularly 
women, minority ethnic groups and trade union membership, as high 
proportions of all three are present in this sector. 
One other major and recurring theme has been the conceptual fuzziness that 
surrounds non-standard work generally and temporary work particularly. This 
has led to serious definitional problems, which have contributed to flawed 
theorising and imprecise empirical data collection. In chapter one I argued that 
the agglomeration of heterogeneous forms of non-standard work into *one si/c 
fit all' theorising has hampered analysis and in this chapter it is clear that 
aggregated statistical data clouds more than illuminates an understanding of 
temporary work. The tensions between theoretical and empirical concerns in 
relation to non-standard work are exemplified by Gallie et al. (1998). These 
authors take up the challenge presented by definitional problems and make the 
important point that non-standard employment contracts are not homogeneous 
and represent 'fundamentally different groups in the workforce' (ibid: 173). 
These authors argue that neglect of this point has meant that a *good deal of the 
discussion on temporary work is seriously flawed as a result' (ibid. ). However 
Gallie et al. consider the main differentiation between temporary workers to be 
the length of contract. They therefore draw a distinction between temporary 
workers employed on contracts of 12 months or less, which they define as 
I short-term temporary workers' and those employed on contracts between 12 to 
36 months, which they refer to as 'contract workers'. Usim-, data drawn from 
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their Employment in Britain Survey in which the authors utilised this distinction. 
they conclude that contract workers in comparison to short-term temporary 
workers are likely to have: 
o higher skill levels 
9 be more qualified 
9 receive more training 
9 have higher task discretion 
e have more interesting work 
9 have greater job pressure 
9 have a more visible career ladder and better promotion opportunities 
o feel less vulnerable 
It is important to highlight the variability of terms and conditions experienced 
by temporary workers, but by taking a quantitative approach Gallie et al. have 
fallen precisely into the conceptual trap flagged up by Felstead and Jewson 
(1999). By attempting to formulate numerical definitions of temporary work 
that are compatible with the collection of statistical data and quantitative 
methodology, they have been blind to a number of important qualitative points 
in relation to non-standard employment contracts. 
Firstly one of the main uses of temporary contracts stated by emploý-ers is covei, 
for maternity leave (Hunter and Maclnnes 1992). The lengths of such contracts 
are therefore similar regardless of the occupation for ý, vhich cover is provided. 
The corollary is that the maternity-leave cover provided for a semi-skilled clerk 
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is likely to be the same length as that of a doctor or law, ver. Furtliermore. 
because temporary contracts are often 'rolled over', the formal duration of a 
contract does not necessarily reflect the length of time a temporary , vorker is 
likely to be employed. So, as this research identifies (chapter seven). teachers 
employed on short-term contracts may be employed for indefinite periods. 
Similarly care workers may be employed for many years on what are still 
classed as casual contracts. Moreover it is not unusual for workers to have 
overlapping contractual status resulting from multiple job-holding. As chapter 
five indicates,, care workers often worked at one institution on a permanent 
contract whilst working at another on a casual basis. It is therefore argued that 
the length of a contract is not a valid indicator or predictor of employment 
characteristics. To introduce such arbitrary distinctions leads to an equallý, 
flawed discussion of the nature of temporary work. 
Similarly Gallie et al. note that part-time and temporary work are often treated 
as sharing comparable labour market positions when in fact they are quite 
different forms of employment contract. This is of course true in principle, as 
part-time work per se is 'open-ended' in the same way as full-time permanent 
work. However, what Gallie et al. fail to note is that part-time work can also be 
temporary and, as the LGMB (1998) and this research indicate (chapter four), 
this is often the case. The theoretical arguments in relation to gender suggest 
that it is highly unlikely that the links between part-time and temporary work 
are coincidental. Therefore, to drav, - a complete distinction between the t-wo. as 
they have done, is again to oversimplify the nature of temporary -work. 
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The critical analysis of Gallie et al. (1998) above indicates the need to guard 
against arbitrary and simplistic divisions within forms of temporary work and 
between forms of non-standard work. As the data in this thesis reveals. there 
are complex relationships between temporary work and other forms of non- 
standard work and indeed permanent employment. The empirical emphasis in 
this thesis is therefore on contractual arrangements that are not 'open-ended'. 
These include fixed-term, temporary and casual contracts in the many numbers 
of combinations in which they occur, whether part-time or full-time and 
regardless of the nominal length of the contract. The omission of agency Nvork 
has been made because one principal purpose of the thesis is to study the state 
as employer. The introduction in agency work of a third party - the agency - 
renders this relationship indistinct. Therefore, whilst this form of work is 
discussed when it is relevant, it has not been studied directly or systematical ly. 
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3. The Changing Public Sector 
The previous chapter concluded by arguing that, after reviewing the theoretical 
debates and statistical data, the focus in a study of temporary work should be 
the specific social relations of employment in the public sector. The first aim of 
this chapter is therefore to examine the role of the state as employer. its claim to 
be a 'model' employer and the position of temporary work within the model. 
Central to this argument is the contested and quixotic nature of the model. 
Thornley (cited in Carter and Fairbrother, 1999) has questioned the existence of 
the state as a model employer. Carter and Fairbrother (1999: 14 1) argue that, 
whilst state employment may have reflected some aspects of a model emploý-ei- 
in the past, the restructuring that started in the 1960s and noticeably gained pace 
in the 1980s has 'effectively ended discussion of the state as a "model 
employer" '. 
It is argued here that the concept of the state as a model employer is based on a 
profound ambivalence. The traditional suggestion has been that a model 
employer is essentially one that strives to provide the best working conditions to 
employees. Such an analysis does not sit easily with predominance of 
temporary labour in the public sector identified in chapter two, which provides 
evidence that the role of the state as a model employer is more far-reaching and 
contradictory than this analysis would allow. Therefore an alternative analysis. 
which can explain the high levels of temporary work in the public sector, is 
offered. 
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By examining legislative, policý- and ideological changes in local government 
and education it is possible to establish mechanisms that have precipitated the 
levels of temporary labour in these areas. One important aspect of the changes 
has been a shift in the social relations of production of public services. 
advanced by a pronounced emphasis on what has been described as the 'New 
Public Management'. This concept and its relevance to temporary work in 
public services is explored in relation to the critical management and labour 
process literatures highlighted in the previous chapters. Similarly the centrality 
of gender, contractual control and public sector trade unionism continue to be 
traced within these debates. The chapter is concluded by drawing out a set of 
research questions to guide the primary empirical enquiry, the results of which 
are contained in chapters four to nine. 
The State as Employer - Rethinking the Model 
In the UK the state is the largest single employer and its influence extends 
beyond this into the private sector. The role of the state as employer is 
influenced by the role of the state generally. This point is illustrated by 
Fredman and Morris (1989) when they identify a number of distinctive features 
of the state as employer. Those which are relevant to this research are firstly 
that central goverment has the power to introduce legislation 'which enables 
the State to endow some of its "managerial" decisions with the force of law' 
(ibid: 7). Secondly the state has a set of accountabilities different from those of 
the private sector, which are political as much as economic in origin. The most 
obvious distinction between public and priN, ate employers is their source of 
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revenue. The public purse from which employees are paid is funded primarily 
from taxation. Therefore 'this allows governments when dealing with their 
employees to override commercial concerns in favour of political and 
macroeconomic factors' (ibid: 7). Lastly public sector employment is 
essentially bureaucratic in nature, meaning that 'Managerial power does not 
derive from ownership of capital alone, but from a hierarchy of authority. which 
is constituted by legal or administrative rules' (ibid: 9). 
Whilst the relationship between the state and capital is more complex than their 
analysis allows (see Carter, 1997; Bonefeld, 1991; Cousins 1987). Fredman and 
Morris (1989) raise some important distinctions between public and private 
employers. The contradictory position of the state as employer became clearly .1 
evident in the move away from the traditional abstentionist role of the state to a 
form that has made increasing use of policy and the law to intervene in 
industrial relations in the public sector. Although this has been a trend since the 
use of incomes policies in the 1960s and 70s, a fundamental shift in ideology 
since 1979 has resulted in the most radical changes fuelling a dramatic turn- 
around in the concept of the state as model employer. 
The concept of the model employer has traditionally been used as a form of 
barometer that is meant to act as an indicator of good employment practices to 
private sector employers. At the heart of the model was a traditional pluralist 
conception of industrial relations based on stable and orderly collective 
bargaining (Carter and Fairbrother 1999). In the past the inception and support 
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for collective bargaining through the use of Whitley councils and legislation 
such as the Fair Wages Resolution provided examples of this aspect. 
The Whitley councils were recommended by Royal Commission in 1917 to 
establish collective bargaining throughout British industry. To provide a lead 
the government of 1919 adopted Whitley councils for civil servants and set the 
equivalent for teachers in the Burnham committee. Local government was 
slower to take on the principle of Whitleyism and widespread union recognition 
was not achieved until 1943 (Carter and Fairbrother 1999) and national 
collective bargaining was not introduced until after the Second World War 
(Corby and White 1999). However by the 1940s this form of centrallsed 
collective bargaining had become '... almost exclusively associated with the 
public sector... ' (ibid: 124). 
Adoption of the Fair Wages Resolutions (FWR) represented a more direct 
influence of the state, this time as an indirect employer, on private sector 
employers. The initial FWR was passed in 1891 and updated versions in 1946 
(Rubery 1995). The later version of the FWR required private sector 
contractors working within the public sector to observe the minimum terms and 
conditions of employment set by union agreements for the relevant trade or 
industry. As Rubery (ibid: 555) states: 
This provision thereby both protected public sector employees from 
competition based on 'unfair' wages and at the same time encouraged 
the extension of industry-wide collective agreements to firms that 
otherwise might have chosen to set pay independently. 
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However the concept of the state as a model employer has since been 
considered to be over-simplified as discrimination. low pay and poor terms and 
conditions have prevailed in many areas of public service (e. g. Rahman, 1985: 
Beaumont, 1981; Thomley. 1996). One explanation for this dichotoniy is that 
the public sector workforce is widely heterogeneous and stratified. At the top 
levels of public employment there are relatively highly paid professionals 
which, as the arguments of Robinson (1999) and Morgan et al. (2000) indicate. 
are often held up to be the norm. However much larger numbers of unskilled 
workers, many of whom are women and/or belong to minority ethnic groups, 
constitute the majority of public sector employees. As such, Carter and 
Fairbrother (1999: 127) argue that the concept of the model employer has 
(. obscured the nature of class relations' within the public sector. Therefore, if 
the model exists at all, it may only cover the top strata of public sector workers. 
although deciding where that top strata begin may prove difficult. For example, 
the Doctor's Pay Review Body (1999) have recently stated that junior doctors, 
who are nearing what may be considered the top strata, are earning low pay 
when their long hours are converted into an hourly pay rate. These arguments 
highlight the inadequacies of the concept of the model employer and the 
contradictory nature of the forces at play when considering the state as 
employer. 
Contradictions surrounding the model have taken a different turn since 1979. 
Michael Allison, then Secretary of State for Employment, stated in 1982 in 
reference to the abolition of the Fair Wages Resolution: 
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In practice the Goverru-nentxill continue to set an example. The 
example is a good one. It is that those placing contracts should not 
interfere with the pay and conditions agreed by contractors and their 
employees. (cited in Fredman and Morris 1989) 
This perspective would appear to turn the traditional concept of the model 
employer on its head. Carter and Fairbrother (1999) explain this change in 
direction by arguing that the model employer has undergone a transformation 
from one 'premised on relatively opaque employment relations to one where, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, relations between management and employees 
have become more transparent as wage relationships' (p. 122). These authors 
argue that, whilst state support for trade unions and centralised bargaining 
masked class relations in public employment, 'the growing emphasis on cost 
reduction and increased productivity shows that even where state workers do 
not produce profits ... they increasingly 
have surplus labour appropriated' 
(1999: 128). 
One outcome of this shift has been that the employment rights of public sector 
workers have come under attack. The Fair Wages Resolutions were rescinded in 
1983, accompanied by the Government's renunciation of International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Convention 94 on Labour Clauses in Public Contracts. 
Other examples have included the dismantling of collective bargaining 
machinery for nurses and teachers and the initial refusal of the pre,., ýious 
government to apply Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(TUPE) regulations to workers affected by compulsory competitive tendering 
(CCT). This latter abuse occurred despite private legal advice that this was 
almost certainly illegal (Foster and Scott 1998). But perhaps the inost blatant 
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example was provided by events at GCHQ in which the right to independent 
trade union representation was outla-ýved by the Conservative government, later 
to be reinstated by the current Labour government. 
Horton points to a politically directed shift away from the tradition of the model 
employer to a 'new mode employer more likely to view staff as -human 
resources" being used to achieve the organisation's objectives than employees 
whose welfare is a major concem'(1997: 9). However this view assumes that 
employees' welfare was at some point a leading concern rather than a by- 
product of a preference for a particular form of industrial relations. It also 
presumes a narrow sphere of influence for the role of the model. The analysis 
ni-. above indicates that the driving force behind the concept of a model employer 
was to influence industrial relations in the private sector. Explanations of -vN-hy 
the state would seek to do this lie in arguments that contend the major function 
of any capitalist state is to secure the conditions under which capital can 
flourish (see Clarke, 199 1). 
These are complex debates that cannot be fully explored here. However the 
voluntaristic nature of industrial relations in the UK has meant that the options 
for the state to intervene have been considerably reduced. This has meant that 
its role as the largest single employer has taken on a greater importance in 
efforts to influence capital/labour relations. Therefore, when the prevailing 
view considered that orderly collective bargaining would secure optimum 
conditions for the growth of capital, the model employer was determined 
accordingly. When, on the other hand, market principles and flexibility are 
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thought to be the key to economic prosperity the model is transformed to 
encourage this view. By removing any assumption that the material conditions 
of workers are at the heart of the model. the two seemingly polar aspects of the 
model can be reconciled. 
In this respect the state has also displayed an ambivalent perspective in relation 
to 'precarious' work. The provision of secure employment has been an essential 
feature of the traditional model employer as indicated in the report of the 
Priestley Commission (195 5): 
The 'good employer' is not necessarily the one who offers the highest 
rates of pay. He [sic] seeks rather to provide stability and continuity of 
employment, and consults with representatives of his employees upon 
changes that effect both their remuneration and their conditions of work. 
(p. 3 9) 
It is difficult to know, despite this claim, how far temporary work has featured 
in public employment in the past. National statistical records of temporary 
work are a recent phenomena and individual local authorities have not 
maintained records (Hegewisch 1999). However as Carter and Fairbrother 
(1999) note, temporary contracts, particularly amongst women, have long been 
a feature of civil service employment. 
In considering the approach to job insecurity in Western European states in 
general, Ricca (1989) states: 
... Government 
declarations are more often than not opposed to 
precarious work, yet this opposition is rarely reflected in specific 
legislative texts or actions. (p. 287) 
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Ricca argues that the best measure of the intentions of the state towards 
precarious work is the way in which it treats its own employees and, as the 
statistical data in the previous chapter has shown, UK govemments have taken 
the lead as promoters of temporary work. The increased use of precarious Nvork 
in the public sectors of most Western European countries has been a strategy 
designed to combat the rising numbers and concurrent costs in public 
employment to avoid tax increases. This offers further evidence that the concept 
of the 'model employer' is subservient to the needs of capital accumulation and 
is no longer sustainable in a traditional sense. However such a shift has not 
occurred in a vacuum but has been, particularly in the UK, an integral part of a 
radical state restructuring which has held at its epicentre the concept of 
flexibility. 
Restructuring the State 
An ideological commitment to a Keynesian welfare state and the social 
partnership on which it had been founded had begun to wane well before the 
election of the Conservatives in 1979 (Farnham and Horton 1996; Corby and 
White 1999). However the change of government proved to be something of a 
watershed, as the objectives for dismantling the post-war settlement were 
openly voiced. Under the new ideology the primary role of the state was openIN, 
proclaimed to be the provider and guardian of an environment in which capital 
could flourish unhindered. One 'barrier to business' was considered to be rigid 
and over regulated labour markets. The prescription was therefore the provision 
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of a 'flexible' workforce. However. as Ricca (1989) notes: 'many policy- 
makers seem to confuse the concepts of precariousness and flexibility" (p. 288) 
and in most instances flexibility is a euphemism for the managerial prerogative 
to hire and fire. This has led Standing to claim that the Keynesian welfare state 
has given way to 'Malthusianism ... that sees the stick of insecurity as essential 
for the wealth of nations. ' (1997: 28). 
The economic and political objectives of successive Conservative governments 
since 1979 have been reinforced by previously marginalised right-,, N-ing 
academics and economists. The ideological attack on the trade union movement 
found succour in the theories of Hayek (1980), Minford (1985) and Hanson and 
Mather (1988) who all lay the nation's economic ills squarely at the feet of 
organised labour. Thatcher's view of the 'insatiable' public sector (1995: 124) 
echoes the theories of Bacon and Eltis (1976) whose critique of the welfare state 
contends that valuable resources ebb from the 'wealth creating' private sector 
into the 'wealth consuming' public sector. Similarly the public choice theorist 
Niskanen (197 1) identifies public sector personnel as the key cause of 
inefficiency. It is argued that professionals and bureaucrats will extend their 
budgets beyond socially optimum levels as their personal rewards in the form of 
income, status and power are determined by the size of the bureaucracy they 
control. The theories of the neo-classical academics were transcribed into 
policy in the think tanks of the 'New Right' namely the Institute for Economic 
Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute. Accordingly the protestations of 
professionals against public sector cuts were dismissed as self-interested 
attachment to bureaucracy (Thatcher, 1995). 
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Therefore, chief amongst the economic imperatives of the 'Nexv Right* was the 
intention to curb public spending in an attempt to control inflation and reduce 
what were considered to be unacceptable tax burdens on business and 
disincentives for hard working individuals. The political imperatives were 
shrouded in the contradictory rhetoric of 'rolling back the state' whilst creating 
the 'strong state' (Gamble 1988) capable of seeing through these policies. In 
terms of containing the cost of public services. this essentially meant stripping 
dissenting, largely Labour controlled authorities of their autonomy whilst 
centralising power in Whitehall (McNaughton 1998). It also meant curbing the 
powers of another strongly dissenting body: the trade union movement - 
specifically public sector trade unions whom, after the recurrent public service 
strikes of 1978-9 which became known as the 'Winter of Discontent' (Kessler 
and Bayliss, 1992), had been demonised by the incoming Thatcher government. 
Containing public sector unionism was seen as essential to the economic 
imperative of reducing public sector spending, as labour costs were by far the 
largest single expenditure of most public employers, so that the brunt of 
economic reforms were bome by public sector workers. Much of the 
restructuring was explicitly designed at weakening public sector trade unionism 
(Smith and Morton 1993, Smith and Morton 1994; Walsh 1995; Foster and 
Scott 1998). This was particularly the case for local goverment unions as the 
following remarks of Nicholas Ridley, Secretary of State for the Environment 
reveal: 
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... the root cause of rotten local services lies in the grip which local 
government unions has over those services in many parts of the 
country ... Our competitive legislation will smash that once and 
for all. 
(cited in Local Government Chronicle 1989: 6) 
The ideas of the 'New Right' were applied to a prescriptive academic analysis 
of local government by Henney (1984) who argued that the performance and 
behaviour of local goverm-nent 'left a lot to be desired' and that: 
local authorities behave as they do because of a lack of consumer 
influence relative to the interests of the politicians and employees. an 
inherently weak management structure ... weak sanctions upon poor 
performance; a lack of effective accountability, and political decision- 
making that is in the interests neither of consumers or ratepayers. (p. 
389). 
True to the prevailing zeitgeist, Henney singles out the then Greater London 
Council (GLC), council housing and education for particular scrutiny. In 
relation to the latter he states: 
The key - and it is only the key - to resolving the crises of local 
government finance and of ending the confused relationship between 
central and local government - is to shift the cost of education from 
local government. (p. ) 397 
However the majority of the prescription concerns the management of local 
government: 
Councils should be run more like a company board, with the councillors 
acting as directors, setting policies and checking on performance but not 
being involved in daily administrative details. For their part, officers 
should be expected (and have powers delegated) to manage. and 
performance should be demanded of them. (p. 405) 
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It is difficult to know if the ideas and prescription propounded by Henney were 
directly influential. However, as the following section outlines. eN, ents that 
befell local government following its publication bore many similarities to the 
thrust of his advice. 
Local Government Restructuring 
Local government oversees the provision of a number of public services 
including education and social services and can be considered as a key agent of 
the welfare state (Stoker 1991). It is the biggest sector of public employment 
and provides an interesting dichotomy when examining the state as emploýýer 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, local government has some political autonomy 
in that council members are locally elected and their political affiliations are not 
necessarily the same as central government (Winchester and Bach 1995). 
Furthermore, if the Labour Party group controls the authority, the elected 
members are likely to have some affiliation to the trade union movement 
(Kessler 1991). However, individual authorities have a good deal of discretion 
in matters relating to employment (Kessler 199 1; Horton 1997; White 1997). 
Illustrative of this is that, whilst rates of pay are negotiated nationally under the 
Whitley system, individual authorities and even departments are able to decide 
exactly which grade should be applied to a particular post. Thus, identical jobs 
may be on quite different grades in adjacent authorities. Similarly. whilst 
national bodies have issued models and guidance on matters such as joint 
consultation, job evaluation and grievance and disciplinary procedures , it is left 
to each authority to determine locally whether to adopt these models or iiot 
(Kessler 1991). Furthemiore, there is no set pattern to the decision-mak-ing, 
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processes of individual authorities in any field and this includes decisions on 
personnel matters. The Council committees. sub-committees. chairs, chief 
executive, departmental chief officers and departmental personnel officers inay 
be empowered to take decisions on personnel matters depending on the extent I 
of delegation given by the Council (Stoker 1991). 
The powers of local authorities , including their capacities as employers, derive 
ultimately from statute. Authorities are essentially bound by legislation passed 
by Parliament, which gives central government the ability to control their 
activities. As such, local government has been the location of 'one of the 
primary political and industrial battlegrounds of the 1980s' (Foster 1993). 
Although, as Cochrane (1993) notes, 'attacks' on local goverm-nent predated the 
Thatcher government, the pace and the mode altered dramatically after 1979 as 
the state used its role as legislator to radically alter the public sector industrial 
relations environment. Within three weeks of the general election in 1979, after 
a meeting with local authority associations and unions, the new Secretary of 
State for the Environment placed a recruitment freeze on all local authorities 
and commissioned a review of staffing requirements (Karran 1984). 
In the years following 1979, although local government reform was uni- 
directional (away from public ownership and towards the private), legislation 
was piecemeal and tentative. However, following the re-election of the third 
Conservative government in 1987, legislation in 1988 firmly established CCT in 
local government services and introduced Local Management of Schools (LNIS) 
into primary and secondary education (Foster and Scott 1998). These 
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legislative changes coupled with policies such as the purchaser'provider split 
and bolstered by funding cuts have required public sector managers to operate 
under vastly different criteria and conditions to those previously considered to 
be appropriate for the 'model' employer (White 1997). The new environment 
has created pressures and uncertainties that, amongst other things. have fostered 
the use of temporary employment contracts and other non-standard working 
conditions (White: ibid. ). Support for these developments is concisely 
illustrated by a quote from a 'leaked' internal circular issued by Michael 
Portillo, then Secretary of State for Employment, which suggests that all new 
temporary workers be offered contracts of limited duration "to avoid workers 
qualifying for full employment rights" (LRD 1995: 15) 
Clearly the main tool of central government in attaining its objectives was 
legislation backed by administrative directives. Between 1980 and 1995 over 
one hundred pieces of legislation affected local government (Colling and Femer 
1995). These have been accompanied by over 20 changes to local government 
finance administration (Farnham and Horton 1996). The 'aggressive use of the 
law' has resulted in the juridification of central-local government relations by 
which major constitutional changes have been brought about with the minimum 
of consultation (Stoker 1991: 154). The main thrust of the legislative and policy 
changes was to reduce the financial and political autonomy of local government 
by putting tight controls on their revenue raising capabilities. Most avenues for 
independent means of raising funds were blocked and restrictions on asset sales. 
rate capping, the uniform business rate and the infamous Community Charge 
brought local government finance under stringent legislative control. 
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The effect was to create a greater reliance on central goverment grants. which 
take three main forms: specific grants used to finance particular services - 
largely education; the revenue support or "block' grant; and challenge funding I 
for which authorities may compete for additional capital grants. All local 
government grants are tightly circumscribed by central government and have 
become even more so since the introduction of *spending guidelines' or 
expenditure ceilings in 1990 (Gibson 1998). In relation to the block grant, 
central government ministers set the amounts for individual authorities after the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announces the total sum for local government in 
the annual budget. Even the revenue support grant, claimed in the 1980s ovlien it 
was introduced by Michael Heseltine as the vanguard of local self-government, 
is rigidly defined by the Standard Spending Assessment (SSA), which 
effectively removes any negotiation between central and local government 
(McNaughton 1998). Specific grants and challenge funding are awarded for 
limited periods, usually no longer than three years, after which a fresh 
application has to be made. In addition to these tight controls on central 
government funds, a system of targets was introduced with penalties for 
authorities that over-spent. The penalties were deducted from the following 
year's grant but the precise formulae used to set targets was changed every year 
(Stoker 1991). These features introduced a large element of uncertainty into the 
financial planning of local authorities and were cited in the research as major 
reasons for the increased use of temporary and fixed-term contracts. 
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In addition to financial control. local government faced a barrage of centrally 
enforced internal restructuring. The main thrust of this change has been to 
impose market principles by transforming what was considered to be the 
inefficient bureaucracy of publicly administered services to a new form dubbed 
the 'enabling' authority. First introduced by Nicholas Ridley in 1986. then 
Secretary of State for the Environment (Young 1996), the enabling authoritý- is 
essentially a purchaser and monitor of services rather than a direct provider. 
Rather than undertaking provision of services using their own directly 
employed workforces, it was envisaged that authorities, where possible. would 
facilitate or enable other agencies and organisations (both private and voluntary 
sector) to act on their behalf This was achieved by a mix of policy and 
legislation, which, amongst other things, introduced CCT into areas of public 
employment which could most easily be performed by the private sector. At the 
heart of the contracting procedure was the issue of cost minimisation, which 
was achieved in the main, by reductions in the terms, conditions and job 
security of public employees (Foster 1993; Colling 199' 3a; Colling and Ferner 
1995; Foster and Scott 1998). The need to compete with contractors ensured 
that this was the case even when services were retained 'in-house' by direct 
service organisations. A second motivation was an instinctive dislike of the 
influence and strength of the public sector trade unions (Ascher 1987) and CCT 
often placed the unions in the untenable position of having to negotiate pay cuts 
and other unpalatable concessions in order to retain services in-house. 
Specific local authority departments and services that remained within the remit 
of local government employment were also the target of central govemment 
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reform. Market testing and internal or *quasi' markets were established in areas 
that initially proved less amenable to outside contracting. This xN-as 
accompanied, in the case of social services, by legislation such as the Children 
Act (1989) and the NHS and Community Care Act (1990). both of which Nvere 
aimed at reducing the professional autonomy of social workers and cutting, costs 
(Carpenter 1994). Similarly, as discussed in greater detail below, eight major 
pieces of legislation in education introduced the development of the national 
curriculum and pupil testing, which are argued to be a form of de-skilling for 
teachers, whilst LMS has fundamentally changed the management and 
financing of schools (Ironside and Seifert 1995). 
For some authorities this ideological shake-up was also accompanied by a 
physical geographical re-organisation. Local government re-organisation. 
(LGR) has often been used in the past by central government in attempts to 
bring local government to heel. The most blatant use of this tactic was seen in 
1986 when the Greater London Council and the six other metropolitan counties, 
all under Labour control, were abolished. Stoker (1991) argues that, although 
no cost-benefit analysis was allowed and the reform went against the thrust of 
govern. ment policy: 'The Government wanted to make a dramatic gesture, to 
show that it could take action against those who opposed it' (p 17). A second 
round of re-organisation, less vengeful but equally disruptive, was undertaken 
between 1992 and 1996 when 46 of the county councils lost control of second- 
tier district councils in the creation of new 'unitary' authorities. 
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Local authorities are heterogeneous organisations and have not reacted 
uniformly to the changes imposed bý, central government. 'ýý'hilst some 
authorities embraced the 'New Right' ideology. others devoted great ingenuity 
and their remaining powers to deflect the onslaught. These included *a ývide 
range of measures to buy time, raise revenue or cut costs, some of which go 
under the collective title of creative accountancy' (Elcock 1996). In an effort to 
counter such resistance and police the uptake of their legislative and policy 
measures, central government created the Audit Commission. Established in 
the 1982 Local Government Finance Act, the Audit Commission is nominally 
independent. Their governing body is however appointed by central 
government. The role of the commission was largely to oversee the 
implementation of centrally imposed procedures and to support the previous 
government in their ideological quest for 'value for money'. In this capacit), the 
Commission are also charged with ensuring that local authorities have made 
4 proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and the effectiveness in 
the use of resources' (Local Govermnent Finance Act s. 15 (1)). However, on 
occasion the recommendations of the commission were less than supportive of 
key central government reforms and local authorities used them as a basis for 
resistance. 
In a revealing article Karran (1984) pinpoints the gendered nature of much 
restructuring by examining the rise of part-time workers in local government. 
He disputes the claims of the Conservative Govemment of the time that local 
government staffing and wage costs were expanding beyond control. Karran 
establishes that increases in staffing numbers had been amongst largely part- 
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time women workers and that crude 'head count' statistics were used to inflate 
staffing estimates. Karran further shows that, by substituting part-time for full- 
time labour, local authorities made considerable direct cost savings on a number 
of different dimensions. Firstly, women are generally in lower paid jobs than 
men; secondly, part-time work is generally paid at lower hourlN- rates; thirdl%. 
women and part-time workers are less likely to remain in employment long 
enough to accrue pension rights; lastly, at that time, part-time workers were 
subject to longer qualification periods for most employment rights. Karran also 
notes a number of less obvious benefits from employing part-time staff: 
Stopping work before lunch or starting work after lunch, part-time 
workers are less likely to use local authority catering provisions for a 
midday meal... trying to cram work into a half working day, part-timers 
may be willing to do unpaid overtime to complete a job while their ftill- 
time equivalents, having longer working hours, might leave an 
unfinished task for the following day. Hence part-timers may represent 
value for money... (p. 5 3) 
In conclusion Karran argues: 
Local authorities altered their employment patterns in favour of more 
lower paid women and part-time workers, so as to obtain the same 
amount of labour at a lower cost. Hence paradoxical as it might seem, 
local government increased total employee numbers and cut labour 
costs. (p. 56) 
In relation to these issues it is important to note that the recent legislation 
establishing the same access to employment rights for part-time workers will 
have significantly reduced the economic benefits to employers. However many 
of these rights are removed if part-time work is linked to temporary 
employment contracts (Dex and McCulloch 1995). In a study of local 
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government the link is established by Escott and Whitfield (1995) who found 
that numerical flexibility. largely in the form of temporary employment 
contracts, to be a growing feature of employment policy and practice. They 
argue that such work is based upon ý low pay, on very short hours. xvith poor 
terms and conditions, few employment rights, little or no job securitý- and no 
short-term or long-term income protection' (p. 164). 
Education 
Schools are a major site for much part-time employment amongst women 
employed in the public sector and are one of the most highly unionised sectors 
(Ironside and Seifert 1995: 3). As the statistical data reviewed in chapter two 
highlights, the education sector also employs a considerable number of 
temporary workers. Furthermore, the largest element of most local authority 
budgets is that allocated to education, which in turn has been the site of direct 
central government intervention. Although formally part of the local 
government system, education departments have traditionally enjoyed a large 
degree of autonomy recognised in the establishment of separate local education 
authorities or LEAs. The result has been that many issues concerning the 
running of schools, including industrial relations, have by-passed the local 
government committee system and have been directly handled by the LEA. 
The education system generally, and the tripartite relationship between central 
government, local government and the teaching profession specifically. has 
borne the brunt of the growing paranoia concerning the declining economic Cý 
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health of the nation (McVicar 1996). Declining productivity and what was 
considered to be an outmoded skill base was blamed on an education system 
accused of being out of touch with the needs of a competitive economic systern 
(Ranson 1990). Criticism took the same form as that leveled at local 
government generally, in that it took shape and gained momentum with the 
growing confidence of successive Conservative administrations after 1979. 
Educational crisis was considered to be the inevitable result of poor 
management of schools and colleges (Ranson, ibid. ). The general arguments 
concerning inefficient bureaucracies and self-interested professionals were 
directed squarely at LEAs and teachers respectively and much of the ensuing 
legislation was aimed at demolishing the tripartite relationship by incrcniciitalIN- 
removing the power base of both. 
Teachers displayed continuing collective strength during the pay strikes of 
1985. The government's response was to marginalise the teaching unions by 
dismantling the Burnham Committee, the teaching profession's version of the 
Whitley Council system of centralised pay negotiation and settlement. Its 
replacement was the School Teacher's Review Body (STRB). The main 
political arguments used to justify the change were that 'affordability' rather 
than 'comparability' could be the only workable way in which public sector pay 
could be set. Therefore, after years of successive weakening by various 
govermuents, Burnham was abolished under the 1987 Teacher's Pay and 
Conditions Act. After three years of supervision by the Interim Advisory 
Committee the STRB was established under the 1991 Education Act to create 
.a form of permanent and compulsory arbitration operating ,, vithin cash limits 
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imposed by the government' (Ironside and Seifert 1995: 33). The declared 
intent was to rule out both collective bargaining and industrial action. Ironside 
and Seifert (1995) interestingly note that ironically -it is the new emplovers and 
managers who are most frustrated by pay revie, ý, v: it limits the ability to vary paN 
to accord with the needs of the school and its budget' (p. 44). These authors 
suggest that attempts to circumvent these restraints have included using higher 
levels of incentive allowances,, new gradings, and 'local flexibility' (1995: 44. ). 
Although Ironside and Seifert are not clear as to the type of flexibility. the 
statistical data in chapter two confirm this could easily mean numerical 
flexibility and the increased use of temporary teachers. 
As in its attacks on local government, central govermnent has used legislation to 
radically restructure the role of the LEA. Again, not by coincidence, the Inner 
London Education Authority (ILEA) was singled out for particular attention 
when, under the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA), it was dismantled and its 
role fragmented between individual London boroughs. The Act also introduced 
the option for schools to opt out of LEA control altogether by seeking Grant 
Maintained status which allows schools to be funded directly by central 
government. This development plus the creation of the City Technology 
Colleges in 1986, a forerunner of Private Finance Initiative (PFI), and the 
removal of Higher Education and Further Education colleges has meant that the 
jurisdiction of the LEAs has been progressively reduced. However, because the 
vast majority of schools remain within the remit of the LEA, the main 
instrument under ERA has been the creation of Local Management of Schools 
(LMS), which substantially weakens the LEA's role. The political rhetoric used 
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to justify LMS was based on the preference for market based competition. The 
arguments revolve around the necessity for schools to be more responsiN e to 
parental or 'consumer' needs and the increased accountabilitý- of school 
managers for the use of resources (McVicar 1996). 
In order that some form of market mechanism might be brought to bear in 
schools, ERA introduced the open enrolment in accordance with parental 
preferences. In addition, following ERA. the financial management of schools 
has undergone radical restructuring. Individual schools were allocated budgets 
by the LEA of approximately 85% of their total expenditure. However, under 
the Act, LEAs were also required to use predetermined formulae to ascertain the 
amount each school will be allocated. At least 75% of the amount was 
determined by pupil numbers or number on roll (NOR) although these levels 
will be increased as a result of reviewed policies under the 'Fair Funding' 
initiative 
. The combination of open enrolment and 
financial restructuring 
meant that school finances were increasingly tied to pupil numbers at a time 
when these could not be relied upon with any certainty. Furthermore, 
underpinning the restructuring of school finances has been attempts to cut 
public expenditure and offset the growing financial needs of schools by 
searching out alternative time limited sources of funding. In conjunction these 
developments have had a particularly dramatic effect on the uncertainty of 
school budgets, which has resulted in the increased use of temporary labour. 
As well as financial insecurity ERA significantly altered the major personnel 
function formally carried out by the LEA by bestowing greater powers of 
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appointment, suspension, discipline and dismissal on head teachers and the 
governing body. Discretion for the contractual arrangements of staff no, %N- falls 
to the head teacher and governors with the role of the LEA relegated largely to 
that of administrator. However, the LEA still plays an important role as the 
legal employer and, as a result, responsibilities are somewhat fragmented. This 
has led to an interesting situation in which head teachers and governors. \N-ho 
are often not employment specialists, are empowered to make employment 
decisions, whilst the LEA are financially liable under tribunal rulings. The 
position has recently been clarified in a statutory instrument (The Education 
(Modification of Enactments Relating to Employment) Order 1998 SI No. 218). 
This states that, although the governing body is the correct respondent to any 
application to an industrial tribunal, any award of compensation or costs is to be 
made against the LEA. Thus a number of tensions have been introduced into the 
management of schools, with the use of temporary employment contracts again 
offering a good example. 
The culmination of a raft of education reforms has been that, whilst 
management had been a term that had largely evaded the education service until 
the 1980s (McVicar 1996), legislation and policy has been directed at bringing 
about a culture change in schools in which senior teachers are increasingly 
required to take on a management function. The result in practice has been to 
marginalise the LEA until 'there is a major question mark over whether [they] 
are needed any more' (ibid: 227). An important result is that the future of 
industrial relations in education is uncertain. which, as Ironside and Seifert 
(1995) argue, has wider implications for the quality of the service: 
... the breakdown in LEA-wide personnel and industrial relations functions means that some of them must be devolved to schools, and 
that this requires school managers to take decisions previously outside 
their competence. This opens the door to both poor quality decision- 
making and, more importantly, to the creation of a management- staff 
split in schools with all that implies for the continuation of team 
management and whole-school development. (p. 120- 1). 
These points raise a number of issues that illustrate the contradictions evident in 
public sector restructuring and the premises on which it is based. During the 
introduction of restructuring the contradictions were obscured by neo-liberal 
rhetoric. The following section examines how, following a change of 
government, the focus but not the thrust of the rhetoric has been altered. 
New Labour 
Clearly the last twenty years have been traumatic for public services but the 
election of a Labour government in 1997 appeared to offer respite. In February 
1997, three months before the general election, Peter Hain, the then Labour 
shadow employment minister, announced that the New Labour Government 
would tackle job insecurity by firstly looking within the government's 'own 
back yard' (Hain 1997). By this Hain meant public employment, specifically 
the Civil Service after research had revealed a particularly high percentage of 
casualisation following the creation of the 'Next Steps' agencies. However 
since their election, this initiative has disappeared without trace whilst many of 
the old controls remain in place and new ones such as 'Best Value' are as yet 
uncharted territories. 
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The details of Best Value are contained in the Green paper Modemising local 
government - improving local services through best value. Under Best NI alue. 
CCT will be replaced with a statutory requirement on local authorities to look 
for continuous improvements in quality and costs. Whilst the compulsory 
tendering of services has been withdrawn, the emphasis on competition betweeii 
public and private provision is retained. Under Best Value standards of 
performance will be set for all council services either nationally or locally. 
Local authorities will be compared against each other and private service 
provision. Auditors will maintain the adherence of local authorities to Best 
Value and central govermnent will have powers to intervene where authorities 
fall short of acceptable standards. 
Best Value is underpinned by the long term plans of the New Labour 
government to stay within the stringent public sector spending limits set by the 
previous government. This is despite the remonstration of the unions that 
public sector pay and conditions are falling further behind those in the private 
sector (Denny 1998). Travers (1998) has therefore argued that, although the 
faces and the vendetta may have changed, the agenda looks remarkably similar: 
Labour has clearly decided to use its first term to sort out local 
government. Never again will councils bring the Labour party into 
disrepute. In many ways this is Thatcher's early-1980s agenda... 
(ibid: 1998) 
In support of this argument the New Labour government also targeted local 
government funding. A major review was announced by the Department of the 
I just 
two m Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in July 1997, * onths 
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after taking power (Gibson 1998). Local government budget difficulties have 
given rise to internal departmental conflict as struggling authorities attempt to 
'pay Peter by robbing Paul'. Education departments have been particularly 
sensitive to what they view as the siphoning of school budgets and regional 
disparities have led the head teacher's union NAHT to lobby the government to 
introduce a tighter national funding formula (Gadher 1999). In response the 
goverm-nent has introduced "Fair Funding" regulations taking effect in April 
1999 which aim to make local authorities 'more accountable', thus removing 
even more financial discretion and autonomy. 
Similarly the extension of the Public Finance Initiative (PH) into local 
government and the creation of Educational Action Zones by the New Labour 
governinent have sanctioned the search for private funds for public services 
initiated by their predecessors. Furthermore the endorsement of the Office for 
Standards in Education (OFSTED). feared and hated by teachers, and the 
extended contract of its equally unpopular figurehead Chris Woodhead, the 
chief inspector of schools, has done little to convince teachers and their unions 
that the 'witch hunt' is over (Carvel 1998). 
The historic relationship between the Labour Party and the trade union 
movement has also been called into question by the refocusing of New Labour. 
There have been repeated assertions by the Labour leadership that there will be 
no return to 'beer and sandwiches at Number Ten' in reference to the famous 
quote that has come to typity the corporatist arrangements of the 60s and 70s. 
Public sector unions are still faced with pay re-view bodies and the limitation of 
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collective bargaining this entails. Furthermore. although the trade union 
movement has largely welcomed ERA 1999 and the statutory provision of a 
wide range of employment rights. the minimum wage legislation demonstrated 
the continuing contradictions between the state as legislator and as employer. 
As Thorriley and Coffey (1999) illustrate, setting the minimum wage at f 15 0 
excluded the majority of public sector workers from benefiting from the 
legislation. They cite evidence from the report of the Low Pay Commission, 
which indicates that the number of public sector workers affected by minimum 
wage legislation would rise exponentially at a rate between E3.5 0 and f'). 70. 
Thornley and Coffey conclude: 'The government has thus been saved any majoi- 
embarrassment or expense in its role as employer. ' (1999: 532). 
Patterns of continuity between Conservative governments since 1979 and the 
New Labour government are clearly evident in the policies outlined above. The 
response of the public sector trade unions is covered fully in chapter seven, but 
in short it has been subdued. One explanation for a restrained response is that, 
in line with the TUC, the public sector unions favour moves towards 'social 
partnership'. 
As, as Heery (1999: 2) notes, social partnership is an imprecise term, Which can 
occur at a number of levels in the relationship between trade unions, the state 
and employers. The term is, however, associated with conciliatory rather than 
adversarial relations and the election of a Labour Government has revived this 
possibility at the level of the state. The problem this approach conjures for 
public sector trade unions is that any criticism of the state, be it of legislator oi- 
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employer, could j eopardise tentative social partnership arrangements or, more 
importantly, the return of a Labour government at the next election. 
Furthermore, the concern for preserving cordial relations at a national level has 
a number of implications following public sector restructuring. Decentralisation 
and the related moves towards managerialism have altered the nature of the 
employment relations within the public sector generally and local government 
and schools specifically. Therefore, whilst national trade union organisation is 
seeking to return to centralised relations, the structures to support this no longer 
exist. The following section examines the implications of this dichotomy in 
relation to temporary labour. 
Public Employers and New Public Managers 
In the light of what has already been discussed it is not surprising that when, 
during this research, local employers were asked the question: -Why do local 
authorities and schools employ so many temporary workers? " the blame was 
placed firmly at the door of central government. The empirical findings of the 
research support this view but they also reveal how the centrally imposed 
burdens of local government re-organisation, LMS and budget cuts mask and 
provide opportunities for restructuring initiatives and political objectives at a 
local level. This has arisen largely because within the vision of the enabling 
authority and the locally managed school, emphasis is placed on the ability to 
manage in what has been termed the 'new public management' (NPM). 
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NPM, as a concept, is ill-defined (Farnham and Horton 1996: Ferlie et al. 
1996). Ferlie et al. (ibid. ) suggest that there are at least four identifiable models 
of NPM: (i) The Efficiency Drive; (ii) Downsizing and Decentralisation. (111) In 
Search of Excellence and (iv) Public Service Orientation (pgs. 10- 14). 
However what Ferlie et al. describe as individual models of NPM may only 
represent divisions between political and managerial rhetoric which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. As Pollitt (1990: 49) states: 
Better management provides a label under which private-sector 
disciplines can be introduced into the public services, political control 
can be strengthened, budgets trimmed, professional autonomy reduced, 
public service unions weakened and a quasi -competitive framework 
erected to flush out the natural 'Inefficiencies' of bureaucracy. 
Notwithstanding difficulties of definition, NPM has clearly been based on 
eroding the traditional differences between private and public sector 
management. Key aspects of putting the vision into operation have been moves 
to decentralise decision-making and devolve budgets whilst retaining overall 
control within highly centralised financial frameworks. The concepts of 
decentralisation and devolvement have been main themes of central government 
policy since 1979 (Thompson 1992). They represent the primary ways in which 
private sector organisation has been used as a template for public sector reform. 
Devolved financial management was first prescribed for local government by 
the Audit Commission (1988). The report was critical of existing centralised 
local government financial arrangements for depriving local managers of the 
powers to enable them to strive for 'value for money'. The prescription was 
that local managers should be the budget holders for all costs under their 
control. Therefore. based on the once popular concept of the 'NI-Forrn' 
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(Williamson et al. 1975) or multi-divisional organisation. the rationale was that 
devolved decision making and financial responsibility ensure that local 
managers become 'market-driven' and therefore pay greater attention to cost 
effectiveness. The principle is that, in this way. public managers can be forced 
to manage and public spending can be contained: 
Give managers and staff control over resources, make them accoulitable 
for balancing the books, add a framework of performance targets, and 
perhaps a few core values and mission statements, finally add a dash of 
competition and there you have it -a disaggregated, self-regulating form 
of public service production (Hoggett 1994: 45). 
Fostering the concept of NPM therefore represents another political solution to 
what is perceived as inefficient and self-interested public administration. 
However, a direct transition to market principles has been problematic. Tonoe 
and Horton (1996: 78) argue that a key ftinction of NPM, measuring 
performance, has been one such problematic area: 
Measuring and evaluating effectiveness is difficult especially where the 
goals are ambiguous or not clear, or where the activity is an intermediate 
one, such as giving advice. This often results in an undue emphasis 
being placed on economy and efficiency. 
However, Walsh (1995) argued that the adoption of private sector styles of 
management had become the driving force in the public sector precisely 
because efficiency is difficult to define in terms of profit. 
In a study of local government in the 1970s Cynthia Cockburn (1977) 
demonstrates how imported management techniques have previously found 
fertile ground in local government. What is fascinating about reflecting on this 
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study is the realisation that, although the macro-pressures exerted on local 
government have changed remarkably little, the management techniques 
enlisted to ameliorate the strain have gone though cycles of periodic flux. As 
Cockburn states 'The moment when a new style of management is looked for is 
the moment when existing means of control are under pressure' (1977: 7). 
Cockburn shows how 'corporate management", the text-book novelty of the 
1960s, filtered from the business schools into local government to stem what 
was already considered to be a crisis in financial management. Local authority 
expenditure as a percentage of all government expenditure had risen from 23% 
in 1954 to 31% in 1974 and by this time employed no less than I I% of total 
workforce and the fastest growing sector of state expenditure was social 
services (1977: 62). The uptake of corporate management was encouraged by 
central government following the Maud Report in 1967 in the belief that it 
would make local authorities 'more directly responsive to the centre, more 
intrinsically geared to national economic and political priorities, and provide 
them with the skilled financial planning and resource management that could 
make centrally imposed cuts and incentives effective' (ibid: 66). 
Cockburn argues that, before the changes brought about by corporate 
management, local government had been traditionally organised into semi- 
autonomous departments or services, each dominated by a particular profession. 
However, the management ethos of the time meant that departmentalism and 
competitive professionalism were strongly criticised by the Maud Report. 
Therefore, in response to what were paradoxically considered to be the 
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inefficiencies of decentralisation and competition. corporate managernentwas, 
introduced. The centralisation at the centre of the model of corporate 
management implemented following the Report represents the complete 
transverse of the rationale behind NPM showing that, in less than two decades, 
the management pendulum appears to have swung between two extremes. 
Looking back on Cockburn's study and comparing it to more recent state 
restructuring, it is possible to identify a number of continuities in the pressures 
and forces in operation on the welfare state generally and in local government 
specifically. It is also possible to observe how the 'sticking plaster' of one 
management technique is exchanged for another as the wound stubborrily 
refuses to heal. It would seem that even these changes have a repetiti%, e cycle 
that lurches between a limited repertoire of levels of control. The repetition 
stems from the confined options available to state managers. The options lie 
between reducing the 'social wage'; cuts in services as Cockburn demonstrates 
and reducing the cost of the state labour which produces those services. The 
compromise has usually involved a combination of both. However, further 
overt cuts in services have become politically dangerous for governments 
seeking re-election. State labour on the other hand has been increasingly 
viewed as culpable and a legitimate target for 'new' management initiatives. 
Contractual Control in the Public Services 
Numerical flexibility in the form of temporary work is one amongst a raft of 
human resource methods adopted by public employers in their quest to provide 
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4value for money' and a precondition of labour market flexibll ity is that labour 
must be considered as a commodity (Muckenberger 1989). As argued in 
chapter one, numerical flexibility, rather than representing a neutral indicator of 
organisational efficiency, is largely a method of control used for extracting 
surplus value. The obscured nature of key concepts such as surplus value and 
profit have made the labour process of state employees difficult to analyse at an 
abstract level (Cockburn 1977; Cousins 1987; Fairbrother 1994a; Carter 1997) 
At a concrete level conflict clearly exists between state employers and state 
workers. This is evident at a collective level in public sector strike records 
(Lyddon 1998) and the resilience of public sector trade union membership in a 
period of otherwise general decline (Cully and Woodland 1998). The frequent 
appearance of public employers as defendants at industrial tribunal proceedings 
confirms it at an individual level. 
Conflict arises from the growing instability of the welfare state within 
capitalism, which places the emphasis not on the need for increased profitability 
as in the private sector, but on an imperative of reduced public spending. At a 
central level this has resulted in state managers attempting to contain costs by 
demanding productivity and efficiency gains under the aegis of 'value for 
money or more recently 'Best Value'. In the labour intensive arena of public 
services, decentralistation is therefore aimed at making local managers act as 
though they are required to extract surplus value. Consequently processes of 
control have shifted from largely hierarchical forms to more managerialist 
approaches. One outcome as Fairbrother (1994: 66) argues in relation to the 
civil service is that: 
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With the shift during the 1980s to more devolved forms of management 
it has been evident that local managers have begun to exploit the 
'flexible' margins of their workforces. This involved a consideration of 
forms of numerical flexibility... 
Furthermore, as Cousins notes, 'state managers are not just constrained to act as 
capitalists but are also subject to a non-market rationality which does have 
consequences for state managers and workers' (1987: 53). In relation to 
numerical flexibility the result has been that its use in the public sector has far 
outstripped the private sector. As Walsh notes 'if care is not taken, the public 
sector,, not for the first time, will be finding itself adopting approaches to 
management precisely at the time they are being abandoned as effective by the 
private sector' (1995: 30). These comments seem to be particularly relevant 
when considering Cockburn's (1977) account of corporate management in local 
govermuent. 
By utilising an analysis that couples legal and labour process literatures, chapter 
one identified the links between managerial control and the employment 
contract. However the analytical bias of labour process theorists in favour of the 
private manufacturing sector has hindered the accurate location of the public 
sector within the typologies they have proposed. Furthermore, labour process 
theories that have sought to classify strategies of control have been heavily 
criticised (e. g. Storey, 1985; Littler and Salaman, 1982; Child, 1985). It has 
been argued that surplus value can be extracted in a number of ways that do not 
entail the direct control of labour. Littler and Salaman (1982) contend that asset 
stripping, pricing policy and market speculation are all ways in which surplus 
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value can be realised. Similarly Kelly (1985) points to circuits of capital' in 
which surplus value is also realised through the sale of commodities. Like the 
original theories, many of these criticisms have been cast in relation to the 
private sector. While it is possible to debate the technicalities of surplus value 
and its relation to the labour process, the arguments of Littler. Salaman and 
Kelly are not easily applicable to the public services and do not often represent 
viable options for 'non-trading' public sector managers. 
Furthermore most public sector professionals have not been susceptible to the 
crude market principles evoked by CCT. As noted by Foster (1998): 
... 
logistics in professional and technical public-sector services were 
very different, and mandatory tendering proved inappropriate to 
transform such work for several reasons. The nature of service qualm, 
in white-collar work was difficult to ascertain and rarely susceptible to 
ascription of crude output measures. Similar definitional and calibration 
problems pervaded the character of professional expertise itself, 
especially in occupations requiring high levels of conceptual or 
interpersonal skills. (1998: 130-3 1) 
Similarly Ironside and Seifert (1995: 116) argue that it is the nature as well as 
the costs of teaching that makes control imperative: 
The teacher workforce is a major preoccupation of the government for 
two main reasons. First is the state's interest in the outcome of school 
education, and second is its cost. Both the nature of the work that 
teachers do, and the size and composition of the teacher workforce, are 
issues that the government has an interest in seeking to control. From 
the teachers' point of view this need to control teacher labour represents 
a threat to their job security, to their status and to their autonomy. 
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In this respect Ironside and Seifert recognise the importance of weakened job 
security to methods of control. which when accompanied by the difficulty of 
direct job control, raises the likelihood of contractual control. 
Control strategies that seek to lower labour costs and increase productivity are 
therefore likely to differ in public services. Fixed-term and temporary contracts 
consequently represent a discerning form of control in occupations that have 
been notoriously resistant to more direct approaches. The statistical dominance 
of fixed-term contracts amongst professional occupations identified in the 
previous chapter supports this hypothesis. 
By acknowledging the specific context of public sector employment it is 
possible to apply labour process theories to an analysis of temporary work in 
public services. In addition to the indirect economic forces capitalism exerts on 
public services, these services have remained largely labour intensive. A 
particular culture or 'public service ethos' that has at its centre the concepts of 
professionalism and autonomy has accompanied this emphasis on labour. 
Therefore technical control (Edwards, 1979) would not on the whole be easily 
attainable. Largely because of these characteristics Edwards' 'bureaucratic 
control' typology has seemed the closest fit. In this model the allegiance and 
duty of workers is sought in return for a *career' which offers job security and 
opportunities for promotion and training. Power and control are 
institutionalised in 'objective' sets of company rules and procedures that are 
considered to legitimise managerial authority bY removing arbitrary 
punishments. 
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However, the basis of the bureaucratic control model is incompatible ývvith 
public choice theory, the ideological comerstone of a neo-liberal state approach 
to public services as outlined above. Public choice theory, NN-hen applied to 
public services, views bureaucracies as inherently wasteful and public sector 
workers are identified as being the key cause of inefficiency (Niskanen 197 1. 
Bacon and Eltis 1976; Henney 1984). It is considered that "public services will 
be wasteful because it is in the interests of public servants not to work harder 
than they have to because they are able to act without effective supervision .. 
(Walsh 1995). In this vein public choice theorists provided a focus for much of 
the previous govemment's policy aimed at re-organising the public sector bý- 
dictating a change of emphasis from professional to managerially supervised 
market-based accountability. Therefore the clearer wage relationship 
established by state restructuring means that typologies of control developed to 
explain early capitalism could now ironically be applied to the public sector. 
Returning to Edwards' typologies of control it would appear that, as a result of 
decentralisation, temporary workers in local government are subjected to a form 
of control that most approximates what Edwards calls hierarchical control: 
Hierarchical control was based on the concept that each boss - whether 
a foreman, supervisor or manager - would create in his (sic) shop the 
situation of the capitalist under entrepreneurial control ... each boss 
would have the right to fire and hire. intervene in production, direct 
workers as to what to do and what not to do, evaluate and promote or 
demote, discipline workers, arrange rewards, and so on; in short each 
boss would be able to act in the same arbitrary, idiosyncratic, 
unencumbered way that the entrepreneurs had acted. (1979: 33 1) 
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Edwards argues that control was achieved because supervisors directly held the 
power to dismiss and punish workers. A power that was made all the more 
apparent by its arbitrary use and the organisation of work in ways which sought 
to minimise workers opportunities for resistance. Interestingly Edwards also 
describes that, although budgets were not directly devolved under hierarchical 
supervision, ýa system of appropriation' acted as a book-keeping device which 
gave supervisors power over the earnings of workers and provided supervisors 
with some benefits if they did not use it all. There are some clear comparisons 
with devolved budgets in local government departments. Departmental 
managers have little control over the size of their budget but they have control 
over the way in which it is allocated within the department. And, whilst 
managers do not directly determine the pay rates of temporary workers, the), do 
have control over the allocation of work and payment for holidays and sickness 
absence. Lastly, whilst managers do not profit directly from budget savings, 
their performance is judged on how well they manage their budget. Devolved 
budgets therefore contain a double control function. They allow employers to 
exert control over managers by forcing them to manage. However, for 
managerialism to be more easily accomplished, the position of workers must be 
insecure and vulnerable - precisely the conditions created by contractual 
control. Therefore the job insecurity inherent in temporary contracts provides a 
tool by which managers can exert control over workers. 
The links between the heightened powers of local managers and job insecurity 
have been related to increases in the level of workplace bullying. In an article 
in the Independent on Sunday a number of sources Nvere cited that indicated that 
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'job insecurity has left workers vulnerable - and emploN ers are taking, 
advantage' (Streeter 1996). Interestingly head teachers are singled out for 
particular scrutiny: 
Teachers are among the worst affected by bullies. as boards of 
governors and head teachers acquire more power. (ibid. ) 
It is therefore not surprising that more recent research (Gardiner and Oswald, 
1999) has found 'teachers are Britain's unhappiest workers' (cited in Elliot. 
1999). This is an aspect of workplace control that had not gone unmissed by 
Edwards: 
Through these powers, supervisors effectively rule over all aspects of 
factory life. Getting on the foreman Is good side means much; being on 
his bad side tends to make life miserable. (1979: 5). 
Fostered by public choice theorists, ingrained ideological contempt for 
bureaucracies has been blind to the positive principles on which they were 
founded. Although Edward's work emphasises the control aspects, 
bureaucracies did provide impersonal boundaries fenced by rules and 
procedures designed to promote even-handed and fair treatment by avoiding 
arbitrary favouritism. By ignoring these points Du Gay (1993: 647) argues that 
proponents of NPM come "perilously close to sanctioning the practice of 
corruption". The 'new public management' has been based on undermining 
public service ethos by subjecting many local government workers to a 
deterioration in job security. worsening career prospects, work intensification 
and a growing inequality of treatment between permanent and temporary 
workers (Stoney and Anderson 1996). From these perspectives there is cleariv 
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nothing 'new' about the *new public management*. When stripped of its 
rhetoric, NPM may represent nothing more than a retrograde move to a less 
sophisticated form of worker control predicated on the elemental inequality of 
the employment relationship. 
Establishing Research Questions 
The review of literature and secondary analysis of empirical data contained in 
chapters one to three has identified a number of issues that are central to an 
understanding of the nature of temporary work. The primary component of the 
analysis, and the focus of this chapter, is the significance of the public sector, 
specifically local govermnent and education. In exploring which characteristics 
of these areas may have given rise to this phenomenon, a number of factors 
have been identified. These have been used to establish a set of research 
questions to guide an empirical exploration of temporary labour in the public 
sector. 
Research questions offer broad areas of academic enquiry, which should be 
applied within a relevant research design and methodology. The research 
questions detailed below have been explored using a case study design. Details 
of research design decisions are contained in appendix one. 
1. What is the origin, extent and pattern of temporary work in the case study 
authorities? As identified, temporary employment is a feature of social 
services and education departments. In restructuring these areas of public 
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service, decisions have been made to recompose the balance beVN-een 
permanent and temporary employment contracts. 'with unspecified 
consequences. 
2. How and why did public sector managers focus on temporary work as a 
preferred mode of employment? The decisions to implement temporary 
employment policies were taken at different levels of management \N-ithin 
the context of public sector restructuring during the 1990s. These processes 
are complex and relatively opaque. 
3. What is the composition of temporary employment in terms of gender, 
ethnicity and age? How does this relate to restructuring and with what 
impact? The review in chapters one to three points to the importance of 
focussing on the gendered nature of temporary employment. It may also be 
the case that questions relating to ethnicity and age are raised by these 
developments. 
4. What role have public sector trade unions played in articulating and 
representing the concerns of temporary workers? Historically. public sector 
trade unionism has developed to represent permanent workers. With 
increasing numbers of temporary workers, they may find difficulty in 
meeting the challenge of representing these workers. 
The research questions were operationallsed in interview schedules developed 
to investigate these issues from the perspectives of various respondents. Copies 
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of the main schedules used are contained in appendix two. Chapters five to nine 
have likewise been divided to encompass the perspectives obtained by using 
this format. The following chapter introduces the case study authorities and 
provides important contextual information necessary for a ftill appreciation of 
the events and analysis contained in the remaining chapters. 
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4. Introducing City and County 
The previous chapter detailed the general pressures placed on local governnient 
by state restructuring in the 1980s and 90s. By using this analysis in 
conjunction with the theoretical debates concerning temporary work, a number 
of research questions have been developed. These questions have been tested 
empirically by applying them to the experiences of two local authorities and the 
main responses and analysis are contained in chapters five to nine. HoxveN-er, 
the previous chapter also emphasises the heterogeneous nature and the N, arying 
experiences of local authorities. Therefore, whilst at one level the pressures 
towards the increased use of temporary work can be generalised, locallý, they 
are likely to be mediated through diverse circumstances, histories and traditions. 
The two case study authorities, City and County, differed along a number of 
dimensions (see appendix one for a summary analysis), some of which were 
crucial to the way temporary work had been used and developed in each 
authority. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to elucidate the relevant 
factors in order to place the main empirical findings into a clearer context. As 
with most local authorities, the largest departments in City and County were 
social services and education. The research discussed in chapter two identifies 
these departments as likely to be major users of temporary work in local 
government generally. The empirical focus of the research is therefore 
narrowed to these departments in Citý, and County. 
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city 
City is a large, metropolitan council serving a population of almost one million. 
Essentially a product of the industrial revolution. much of City's history is 
rooted in the manufacture and transport of industrial goods and materials. 
Previously at the centre of the 18 th and 1 gth century canal system, City has 
continued to exploit these traditions more recently in the development of 
extensive road and rail networks. Like many industrial centres in the UK, Citý' 
has suffered the dismantling of much of its manufacturing industry. However 
City also has a thriving commercial centre which has supported a continued 
expansion of its population. The community served by the council is multi- 
racial and City is a 'high profile' authority trying to live down a reputation for 
poor race relations in the 1980s. The obvious social unrest in City during this 
time has led some commentators to suggest that central government funding, 
although still tightly controlled, has been more generous for City than some of 
the less conspicuous authorities. 
The council chambers are housed in an imposing Victorian building at the heart 
of the city, which is regaled by oak staircases, polished wooden floors and 
portraits of long dead councillors; all giving the air of grand institutionalism. In 
1998 the authority was Labour controlled with 85 of the 115 councillors being 
members of the Labour Party, whilst 17 were Liberal Democrat and 13 
Conservative. The overall political stance of the authority could be described as 
'left of centre'. The authority employed approximately 52.000 workers in 1998 
with an almost equal distribution between the sexes. Approximately 34% of the 
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authority's employees were part-time. 86% of -\, vhom were women. Authority- 
wide policy and decision making was conducted via a committee sý-stem 
containing 18 main committees. including a Personnel Committee, and a 
number of sub-committees all of which were chaired and vice-chaired by 
Labour councillors. 
The 1996/1997 annual budget was fl, 925 million but the Director of Finance 
claimed this represented a cut in real terms of f42 million on the previous N-eai-. 
The budget shortfall in the authority's yearbook was described as being met by 
ýefficiency gains' and the 'reduction' of 409 council employees. Interestingly 
however, a senior regional negotiating officer for Unison claimed that although 
budget deficits had led to fears of compulsory redundancy, the situation had 
greatly improved following a more generous than expected standard spending 
assessment for City after the election of the Labour government in 1997. 
Expenditure on social services totalled E236 million in 1996/7, amounting to the 
third largest budgetary depletion. The department was the second largest, after 
education and employed approximately 6,000 people almost 2,500 of whom 
were part-time. Approximately 85% of the department's employees were 
women. The department was divided into eight directorates but the main 
operational divisions were between children's and adult's services, which 
covered 61 children's service units and 107 adult's services units respectively. 
At f5 52 million in 1996/97, the expenditure for education was the single larg est 
depletion of City's budget. In 1997 the department employed 20-500 people, 
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8,700 of whom were part-time. These people ývere maInly employed in the 
authority's 467 (332 primary; 63 secondary: 40 'special': 322 nursery) schools. 
There were 16,291 teaching staff with less than 500 employed directly in the 
LEA. Seventy eight percent of the teaching staff were -ýN-ornen. A high profile 
chief education officer, who has been outspoken about many of the edLication 
reforms, headed the LEA in City and, at the time of the research. the LEA was 
undergoing OFSTED inspection. The methodological implications of these 
circumstances are discussed in appendix one. 
One outcome of the racial unrest of the 1980s was that the authority had made 
attempts to be innovative, particularly in terms of equal opportunities (EO) 
initiatives. However, there was some suggestion that budgetary fears had put 
these under some strain. Although City had an EO policy they did not have a 
separate committee. There had been a women's unit which was disbanded, it 
was claimed, because of cost. In 1998 City was in the process of putting 
together an EO unit as a subsidiary of the Personnel and Organisation 
department. However, the plan was to employ two people when previously 
there had been six. In addition it was planned that the new unit would 
incorporate race equality. Race was an extremely important issue in its own 
right in City and a report conducted by an independent body had recently 
concluded that ethnic minorities were underrepresented amongst council 
employees - particularly in higher paid positions 
2. In line -with a policy of 
decentralisation, each department had some responsibility for EO monitoring. 
However, trade union officials felt that this often meant little more than 
2 To maintain the anonymity of City it is not possible to reference this report. 
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designating someone, usually with very little training. as the departmental EO II- 
officer. 
The authority was largely structured on a departmental basis with 12 of the 13 
departments reflecting functional specialisms, which were headed by the chief 
executive's department. Because of the size of the authority and the 
geographical dispersal of the departmental offices, departments operated fairly 
autonomously. Each department had its own personnel function and. certainly 
in social services, there seemed to be some friction between this and the central 
personnel department. Statistics were collected on a departmental rather than 
authority-wide basis and departments made use of a number of different 
methods. Some departments were more thorough than others with the outcome 
that City could not collate consistent or accurate authority-wide details of its 
employees. 
Since 1984, City had embarked on a number of decentralisation programmes in 
response to criticisms of central government that local government was 
'divorced' from its service users. The aim of this response was to establish a 
number of 'neighbourhood offices' for each of the main services departments. 
but this had been confined largely to the housing department. These initiatives 
were accompanied by moves in all departments to devolve managerial 
responsibilitY including the creation of a number of budget-holding centres. In 
other areas City had resisted central govemment pressures and notably I 
privatisation via CCT had resulted in only one outside contract being awarded. 
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At an authority level, decision-making structures in C itv v, ere formal and 
elected members played an active role. The leader of the council was 
considered to be particularly charismatic and powerful. As a lead branch trade 
union negotiator commented: 
... 
if she says jump they all jump - there's no argument about it. (Unison 
branch secretary, City 23.5.97) 
Although there had been some past conflicts between executive officers and 
elected members these had been resolved. Trade union officials considered that 
the current chief executive, who had previously been a Labour councillor in 
City, facilitated resolution. As a result therev, -ere Nvell -established formal lines 
of communication between councillors, chief officers and the unions via a 
longstanding Joint Consultative Committee (JCC). Therefore, whilst there had 
been a move towards decentralisation in City, these factors were influential ii-i 
gaining the compliance of executive officers and departmental managers. 
A regional Unison negotiator felt the situation had started to change and 
provided another perspective: 
... the council 
leader frankly appears to have lost touch v., -ith reality and 
she will be challenged in May [next council elections] for the leadership 
there is no question about that. She has Previously been subject from a 
half-hearted challenge from the right. The challenge is going to come 
from the centre and the left this time. She appears to be manipulated by 
the chief executive and by the current director of personnel and she 
doesn't move without an officer's say so at the moment. What that 
means is that there is a lack of political input in to most things but 
particularly industrial relations and so you can't get a balance in what 
you are dealing with. It is effectively the political preconceptions of 
senior officials within the city council. (Unison senior regional officer, 
City 6.1.98) 
The officer further complained that the new director of personnel had been 
recruited from a public body that had experienced extensive pri'vatisation in w 
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which he felt she had played a major role. He was suspicious that her brief was 
to achieve the same results in City. 
In summary, City was a large bureaucratic organisation that controlled a multi- 
million pound budget. The size of the bureaucracy meant that e-ven individual 
departments had sizeable budgets and clecentralisation had given them a large 
amount of autonomy in how the funds were allocated. However the authoritv 
was also characterised by the strong leadership of Labour Party politicians. 
This meant that, in the past, the autonomy of non-elected officials was, to some 
extent, curtailed. At the time of undertaking fieldwork for this research the 
status quo was under challenge. One example of this history was that EO 
policies had previously received considerable support from elected members, 
which appeared to be under threat. Another was that industrial relations in City 
were in flux. 
Industrial Relations in City 
The (non-teaching) trade unions recognised within City were Unison, T&GWU, 
GMB, AEEU and UCATT. Created from the merger of NALGO, NUPE and 
COHSE in 1993, Unison is the largest public sector trade union nationally. 
Unison, with around 18,000 members also, had the largest membership base in 
City. However, Unison appeared to have the same number of seats at the 
formal bargaining table as the T&GWU. GMB and the AEEU, -with each of 
these unions being represented by two negotiating officers. UCATT had only 
one negotiating officer. but he was the chair of the Joint Trade Union Forum 
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(JTUF) and played a particularly active part in the negotiations. All of the 
negotiating officers were white and only one, Betty. was a'kvoman who. along 
with a male colleague, represented members from the T&G%VU. Although 
Betty attended every meeting she did not speak once. Her colleague, on the 
other hand, was quite vocal. The Unison negotiating officers , N-ere the branch 
secretary and EO officer. The branch secretary was active in the negotiations. 
whilst the EO officer did not contribute to the discussions. 
The main forum for negotiations was the consultation and negotiations sub- 
committee meeting (CANS) -a sub-committee of the personnel committee. 
The chair of the CANS group was the only black council member on the 
committee. He was considered to be on the left of the Labour Party, but trade 
union officials felt that he had been given this responsibility largely as an 
attempt by council leaders to dampen his militancy: 
I think they thought it was better to have him on the inside pissing out 
than on the outside pissing in (Unison regional officer, City 10.12.97). 
The remaining employer representatives consisted of three other elected 
members, two of whom were women and the director of personnel, also a 
woman. The authority's chief clerk also attended to advise on constitutional 
points and to take minutes, but did not have a voting role. 
The CANS meetings took place bi-monthly and were preceded on both sides by 
a separate 'pre-meeting' where employer representatives and trade union 
officials from each of the unions respectively agreed on a united course of 
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action. Unison regional officials occasionally attended these meetings but I 
usually only if there was a threat of industrial action. Inter-union relations were 
carried out prior to the meetings via the JTUF, which consisted of the 
negotiating officers of all the recognised unions. The secretary of the JTLIF was 
the branch secretary of Unison whilst the chair was the UCATT branch 
secretary. Both of these positions were particularly influential in the CANS 
meetings as they in effect acted as the combined trade union voice. However 
the working relationship between these two officers was not close and, in an 
informal interview, the UCATT officer was scathing about the tactics (see 
chapter nine ) of the Unison officer. 
Communications between employers and trade union officials at the meetings 
took on the rhetoric of an 'open and inclusive exchange of facts'. However this 
was usually delivered in the form of managerially oriented presentations 
designed to confuse and 'blind with science'. Trade union officials complained 
that there had been a history of executive officers and departmental managers 
by-passing union representatives. As a result information was often gained via 
politically sympathetic council members. It was therefore interesting to note as 
an observer at a number of these meetings that the preferred strategy of the 
JTUF secretary (also Unison branch secretary) was to by-pass wherever 
possible the executive officers by appealing directly to the elected members. 
Council leaders in City were actively involved in industrial relations and 
negotiations. Channels of communication between councillors and trade union 
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officials were generally considered open and accessible. The authoritý- retained 
an incremental and traditionally pluralist approach to industrial relations: 
They [the trade unions] are listened to at least by the councillors who are 
sympathetic... But here members [councillors] do have a strong say so 
in the way the organisation runs. In some authorities Councillors are 
just there to essentially rubber stamp stuff. That doesn't happen in 
[City] and they are very, very interested and there are some very high 
calibre councillors. And their affiliation has traditionally been the 
Labour movement and there are good contacts there. And I think the 
contacts are used very wisely on occasions [laughs], but it has taken 
time to see that. But certainly they [the trade unions] have 
communication networks through to the highest levels and they are 
listened to. Even if someone comes in with the view that they are not 
going to listen to the unions, they would never get away withý that. 
(Principal personnel officer, City social services, 29.7.97) 
One result of this relationship was that, although reorganisation and 
restructuring had taken place, the 'new right' agenda had largely been resisted. 
Illustrative of this was the authority's resistance to CCT and its amenability to 
retaining services 'in-house'. Similarly there was a 'no compulsory 
redundancy' agreement in operation in City which was taken very seriously by 
both employers and trade unionists. However, budget cuts had put this under 
strain and the subject was tentatively broached in times of particular pressure. 
The industrial relations climate had become particularly strained during the 
course of the research because of the authority's intention to unilaterally change 
the pay date of monthly paid staff. The dispute escalated to the point where 
strike action was planned and certain union members balloted. Rifts between 
unions and within the factions of Unison meant the action ý, vas postponed, 
eventually lost momentum and the support of even the members who had been 
initially enthusiastic. 
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The decline in industrial relations in City had been exacerbated by the 
appointment of the new director of personnel. She ývas disliked by all of the I 
trade union officials who were interviewed, most of whom felt she was 
attempting to import 'right-wing' employment policies from her previous posts. 
I have told the director of personnel in this room as it happens that I 
don't trust her. That I feel that she is working to her own agenda. I ha-,,, e 
never said that to a personnel officer before. It is that bad... [The 
director of personnel] is probably Tory. She would never tell anybody 
that but it is probably true and she comes from a background of working) 
with a Tory controlled authority (Unison regional officer, City, 6.1.98). 
This sentiment was echoed by the UCATT branch secretary (also the chair of 
the JTUF) who felt that the director of personnel was using the pay date issue to 
force declining industrial relations in City to a head. He felt that the pluralistic 
approach to industrial relations generally adopted by council leaders 'was not 
her style'. It was also rumoured amongst trade union officials that her 
appointment had widened existing splits amongst council officials and officers 
and that the chair of the CANS group had expressed particular difficulties in 
working with her. This was confirmed to some extent by observations of 
CANS meetings in which the director of personnel clearly became exasperated 
by the deference often shown by the chair of the personnel committee to leading 
trade union negotiators. 
As is usual in most local authorities, industrial relations in schools between the 
teaching unions and employers were not carried out via the authority-wide 
channels described above, but directly between the unions and the LEA. 'Non- 
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teaching staff in schools in City are largely represented bý, Unison whilst 
teaching staff were mostly represented by the National Union of teachers (--N L'T) 
and National Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers 
(NASUWT) with a small number belonging to Association of Teachers and 
Lecturers (ATL). The Professional Association of Teachers (PAT) was not 
recognised by the authority. Due to the limited information that could be gained 
from the LEA it was difficult to assess their position, but trade union officials 
considered the LEA had input on policy and procedures such as sickness and 
absence,, competency, grievance and disciplinary issues. Regional officials, who 
were in a position to make comparisons between different LEAs, felt that 
schools in City retained close links with the LEA and still relied upon them to a 
great extent. 
However, union officials felt that the introduction of LMS had distanced the 
LEA from industrial relations in schools. One NUT regional officer felt that 
although LEA officials in City were normally receptive to trade union 
arguments, particularly when they concerned aspects of discrimination, they had 
been resistant to any trade union restrictions on the use of temporary contracts. 
An NUT association official considered that the LEA was reluctant to get 
involved with schools that were 'in trouble' and that the union had to threaten 
industrial action to get them to become involved. He felt that this was a 
symptom of the decentralisation inherent in LMS and the increased power this 
bestowed on school managers, particularly head teachers: 
The problem is that teachers and heads don't take complaints to the 
chief education officer. so on the surface everything looks ros. y... He [the 
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chief education officer] wants to make sure that whatever head teachers 
ask for head teachers get. That is xhy [City] has devolved and 
delegated more of the budget than it really needs to [92% as opposed to 
the statutory minimum of 85% at that time]. That is because head 
teachers in [City] have asked for that. Well of course head teachers 
want their budgets devolved. Of course as far as they are concerned the 
bigger their budget the better. But that has a knock-on effect for LEA 
services. (NUT association official. City 5.3.98) 
The same branch official detailed the impact this had on workplace industrial 
relations for teachers: 
There used to be a system that every school had reps and when there 
was a problem the rep would go to the head and the head would 
recognise that the rep was simply acting for the union. Whereas now 
people feel that heads see reps as individual troublemakers. In the old 
days when we felt that reps were being treated like that we would take it 
to the LEA and the LEA would step in and sort it out. Now the LEA 
won't because it is governors who run schools and the heads know that 
the LEA can't come in and tell them off or threaten to discipline them, 
because they can't do that any more. Only governors can discipline 
head teachers. And so head teachers feel perfectly safe in their little 
castle (NUT association official, City 5.3.98. ). 
Throughout the 1990s there had been a process of devolving industrial relations 
to a school level, with implications for trade unions. 
Temporary Employment in City 
Officials at City had recently been made aware of the increasing numbers of 
temporary workers by union protests and the installation in certain departments 
of a new computerised payroll system that was able to deliver detailed 
personnel information. There was also concern over the embarrassment caused 
by a number of industrial tribunal cases that implicated the council in poor 
employment practices. Lastly there was some suggestion that councillors were 
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uneasy about the uncertainty in the wages bill created by temporary workers. 
As a result City councillors gave backing to a union initiative which called for 
the reassessment of the contracts of temporary Nvorkers and for the issue of 
permanent contracts where possible. 
Because of the difficulty of collecting authority-wide staffing details. City,,, vas 
unable to state with any certainty how many workers it employed let alone hoNA, - 
many of those were subject to temporary contracts. The personnel officer for the 
social services department in City did provide figures for temporary workers in 
that department which stood at 406 casual workers and 179 temporary and 
fixed-term contracts. Out of a workforce of approximately 6,000 this 
represented a total of 9.8%. Of the employees on temporary and fixed-term 
contracts, 117 or 65.4% were women but no gender breakdown was available 
for employees working on casual contracts. 
Figures for temporary workers in the education department were provided for 
'salaried' employees on fixed-term or temporary contracts covering teaching, 
support and unqualified staff. They are detailed in Table 4.1 below: 
Table 4.1 
Numbers of fixed term and temporary contracts amongst 'salaried' 
employees in 'City' LEA as at 3 rd March 1998 
Total Temporary % 
Male 3976 308 7.7 
Female 12615 2083 16.5 
Source: Education Officer, City. correspondence 3.3.98 
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These figures represented an overall total of 14.4%. However. as City LEA put 
the number of temporary contracts at 17%, it can be assumed that temporary 
contracts were also a feature of non-salaried employment. By referring only to 
fixed-term and temporary contracts, the figures do not take account of supply 
and agency teachers. The outstanding characteristic of the above statistics is the 
high number of women employed on temporary contracts in comparison to 
men. They reveal that 87% of temporary salaried staff were women. Statistical 
information contained in a recent LGMB report (LGMB 1998) reveal that the 
percentage of temporary workers in social services (9.8%) and education (17%) 
departments in City is far greater than the regional average of 6%. 
County 
County is one of the oldest rural counties in the UK and occupied an important 
position in feudal Britain. The county was largely by-passed by the industrial 
revolution with one outcome being that the county council had become the 
largest employer in the area. Outside this, most local jobs were found in 
tourism, retail and a small proportion in agriculture. The landscape in County 
was picturesque and had attracted a number of older, retired residents. The 
population numbers in County were fairly static. The authority served a largelý- 
white, ageing, relatively wealthy community. There were also large pockets of 
poor housing containing low-income families, making relative deprivation a 
very real concept in County. 
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Belying County's historical heritage, the council chambers were housed in an 
uninspiring 1960s building on the residential edges of its medieval County 
Town. The building was functional. displaying none of the institutional 
grandeur of City and was, on the whole, rather shabby. During the period of the 
research the authority reluctantly underwent local government reorganisation 
(LGR). This entailed the separation of the largest of the six associated district 
councils to form a new 'unitary' authority. Prior to LGR County comprised 66 
elected members but, with the establishment of the new unitary authontý'. 22 
constituencies were lost. Politically the council was a "hung" council made up 
of a Lib/Lab coalition with the Conservatives making up the largest single 
group. The political complexion of the authority was fairly volatile, and before 
the 1996 elections the Labour group led the coalition. At the time of the 
research the council leadership changed, passing to the leader of the Liberal 
Democrat group. 
LGR further affected the political balance as the loss of urban seats meant the 
county was even more rural and therefore tended to be more Conservative. The 
council was arranged around six committees: Education; Community and 
Economic Development; Environment; Planning and Transportation; Policy and 
Resources; Public Protection; Social Services. There was no separate personnel 
committee; major employment decisions were dealt with by the Policy and 
Resources committee whilst day-to-day control of personnel issues fell to a 
Resource and Management sub-committee. During the LGR process the LGR 
advisory committee also dealt with relevant personnel issues. There , vere six 
non-elected officers: Chief Executive, County Education Officer; Director of 
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Community Services; Director of Environmental Services: Director of Central 
Support Services: Director of Social Services. 
Before LGR, County served a total population of 431.120 in an area of 348.767 
hectares. This gave the county a population density much lower than the 
average of the other Shire counties. The importance of this factor was that 
officials in County considered that the authority had suffered particularly 
unfairly in past revenue support grant (RSG) settlements mainly because of its 
rural and sparsely populated geography. 
Geography greatly affected the financial position of County in a number of 
ways. Firstly low numbers of inhabitants meant Council Tax receipts Nvere loxv. 
Similarly the relatively small numbers of business and commercial properties 
reduced receipts from the Business Rate. Secondly, financial difficulties in 
County were considerably exacerbated by the central government formula for 
calculating the RSG. Reductions were made for sparsely populated areas, 
although budget reports in County claimed that providing services in isolated 
regions was actually more costly. In addition, the RSG was reduced by area cost 
adjustments, which required local authorities to take account of local pay levels 
when employing staff. Wages in rural areas were considerably lower than in 
cities, which was confirmed in County by figures that rated male earnings at 
13% less than the national average and female earnings 16% below the average 
-8 Oth out of 83 counties and London Boroughs. This had a particular impact on 
County, as 75% of its employees were women. The situation was set to worsen 
for County after LGR as the new unitarý- coLincil contained the most denselv 
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populated districts. After LGR the population covered by County dropped by 
35% to 280,000 whilst the geographical area covered by the county fell by onlý- 
8.3% to 320,000 hectares. 
County had a 1996/97 total expenditure of f, 253,246,000. However this has 
been reduced following LGR to f 172 million for 1998/99. The first RSG 
settlement of the Labour administration was received with particular dismay as 
it left County with afI Orn budget shortfall as opposed to the f 8m reduction that 
was anticipated. In a press release following the announcement of the RSG 
settlements County officials noted that: 
The Government's settlement gives [County] one of the lowest level 
increases of any county authority in the country - at a time when 
funding for its services is under the greatest pressure because of local 
government reorganisation. (Documentary records) 
The annual reports were conspicuous by their lack of information directly 
relating to personnel issues. Unlike City, numbers of employees were not 
indicated and labour costs were not noted separately from other expenditure. 
The 'corporate' personnel officer stated that, before local govemment 
reorganisation, there were 12,000 employees dispersed over 500 workplaces. 
He considered that this would be reduced by one third following LGR to 
approximately 8,000. A budget update circular issued to the public in 1998 
following LGR put the figure at 7,379. 
All of the non-elected officers were white males, as was the corporate personnel 
officer. Although the authority advertised itself as *xvorkina- towai, ds equality'. 
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equality issues were generally given a low profile and equal opportunities 
policies were not advanced to any significant extent. In the past County had 
advertised itself as 'an equal opportunities employer'. Following a number of 
successful discrimination claims by employees the council had changed this 
phrase to 'Working Towards Equal Opportunities' (Documentary records) 
The non-elected officers had a major input into the decision-making process in 
County and the elected members played a far less active roll when compared 
with City. One trade union official felt the politics of executive officers had 
impacted on the overriding political complexion of the authority: 
Although we have had a Labour council here I think we have suffered 
severely here with very Tory chief officers. And they are saying to the 
councillors this is the story, this is how it's got to go, this is how you 
have got to do it. And the councillors don't know enough to be able to 
say we are not going to do that; we are going to go this way. So they are 
having to take the officers' view point who happen to be extreme Tories. 
(Unison Branch Secretary, County 19.5.97) 
Personnel issues were particularly affected in this respect and the situation had 
been exacerbated by the lack of a designated Personnel committee. The 
corporate personnel officer described major personnel decisions in relation to 
LGR as being drawn up by executive officers and "rubber stamped by the 
advisory committee process" (12.11.97). This reflected the more general 
position that personnel decisions in County were largely decentralised to 
individual departments and then in turn devolved within departments to service 
areas. The corporate personnel officer viewed the central personnel function as 
offering specialist, mostly legal advice. However it was clear that, during LGR, 
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many personnel decisions. including the compulsory recruitment of all new staft' 
on temporary contracts, had overridden the authority of local managers. 
Notwithstanding LGR, executive officers retained a great deal of power and in 
some respects worked closely together. One outcome was that the authoriti, 
was committed to the rhetoric of becoming an 'enabling authority' ývith the 
result that,, although CCT was suspended for the duration of LGR, a 
considerable number of public services and internal administration functions 
had been 'externalised' without even being subject to voluntary competitive 
tendering (VCT). Social services were particularly effected in this respect with 
the most recent loss of eight residential homes for the elderly to private 
contractors. Furthermore, decentralisation had resulted in large variations 
between departments in respect of personnel issues, which clearly caused the 
corporate personnel manager some concern. 
I mean the more personnel management is, and it is devolved here, the 
more difficult it is to ensure every manager on each occasion follows the 
same process and the same logic. And at the end of the day you can't 
ensure that. The way you ensure that is by having a very tightly 
prescribed central system and central administrative system. Now that 
has its advantages but it has considerable disadvantages in terms of the 
style and the way the local authority works. And most local authorities 
have gone away from that if they were ever that type of administration 
and gone down the devolved path. So the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages, but there is an issue. (Corporate Personnel Manager, 
County 9.7.96) 
The social services department was restructured following LGR and it was 
feared that the 1997/8 budget cuts would result in the loss of 100 jobs in social 
services. The new structure covered five diN-isions with, like City, the main 
operational division between adult's and children's services. However. unlike 
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City, adult services in County were subject to a pronounced 'purchaser/provider 
split' as 60% of adult's services were 'bought 1' from external sources. Th' is 
accounted for approximately f 15 million of the f 51.3 million social services 
budget. Divisions in children's services, by comparison, were made betxN-een 
resource centres, effectively residential establishments, foster care and adoption 
services. In 1998 approximately 2,000 people worked in the department. In 
addition, the personnel officer for social services considered that the department 
employed large numbers of 'sessional' or casual hourly paid workers NN-ho \vere 
not included in that figure. 
The 1997/8 education budget in County was f 15 5.8 million, accounting for the 
authority's largest single expenditure. It was generally felt that education had 
been shielded to some extent from budget cuts. However the severity of the 
financial crises meant that the department was also now facing the prospect of 
job losses. In 1998 the LEA employed 3060 teaching staff, of whom 450 were 
part-time. Most of these were employed in the authority's 245 schools (209 
primary; 29 secondary and 7 special needs). The education department could 
provide neither a gender nor racial breakdown of staffing figures. 
Local Government Reorganisation 
County was scheduled to complete LGR by 1" April 1998 but procedures to 
comply with the requirements of LGR were drawn up two years prior to this 
date. The personnel procedures were based on guidelines produced by the 
central government Staffing Commission and comprised a complex system of 
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rating jobs to determine how they would be allocated post-LGR. Certain jobs. 
roughly those that necessitated direct contact with the public. ývere protected bý- 
a statutory transfer order to one or other of the authorities. Other. largely 
administrative posts, were subject to a series of 'jobs rounds' in which available 
jobs were advertised. Staff who had not secured a statutory transfer-order post 
were, in accordance with a number of provisos, allowed to apply for these posts. 
Staff employed on a temporary contract with less than 2 years service as at 31 st 
March 1998 were not eligible to apply for any post until the final round; that is 
for jobs that permanent staff had not applied for in the earlier rounds. 
Initially, at the outset of the LGR process, there appeared to be a relationship of 
trust and co-operation between the two authorities and, with some reservations, 
the trade unions. As the budget was to be split on a 35/65 basis between the 
two authorities, it was similarly decided County would take 65% of the non- 
statutory transferred posts and the new unitary authority would take the 
remaining 35%. However by 1997 relations had deteriorated between the two 
authorities and trade unions had started to become more cynical about the 
process. This was largely triggered by the realisation that both authorities were 
using LGR as an opportunity to restructure. In County this meant trimming 
budgets and changing job descriptions with accusations from the union that the 
process had been used to selectively oust certain people - usually trade union 
activists. In the new unitary authority it meant a reluctance to take on the 35% 
of workers County was trying to shed. These developments were described by 
a County personnel official in the following way: 
I ý-) 
The other county gets a third of the money and ,, N-e keep two thirds but 
the other county has designed their staffing structure and we have 
redesigned our staffing structure. So ... a 
lot of people are statutorily 
transferred - they are easy - they are the direct service people and there 
are about three thousand of those. The ones where it is much more 
complicated are the ones providing indirect services. administration. 
payroll, finance, I. T., all those things, personnel. clerical and admin. 
where there isn't an automatic transfer. The other authority desiLTned 
their structure. We will reduce our structure and we are then trvincy to fit 
people into our fewer jobs and therefore into the other authority' s jobs. 
Now you might think on paper that's easy isn't it. You just put the third 
into the expanded other authority but its not as easy as that ... In 
numerical terms there are more jobs but when you actually look at all 
the different types of work and specialisms around there isn't an easv 
match. (Corporate personnel officer, County 19.5.97) 
More detail was provided by union officials, who drew attention to a process of 
down-grading in the context of re-organisation. As noted: 
Restructuring has been used as a way of cutting budgets. Departments 
have been told to provide the same service with a lot less money. This 
has resulted in a cut in the number of jobs and in some cases they know 
the new structures aren't going to work ... In my old 
department they 
actually restructured the jobs, downgraded all the jobs without either the 
old or the new job description. The new job description was written 
some two or three weeks after they had downgraded all the posts. So 
they had obviously drawn up the job description to fit the story ... they have altered the job descriptions, they have altered the goal posts, they 
have moved them,, they have jumbled things about and its been 
absolutely horrendous. Some departments have prepared person 
specifications, which have been very prescriptive and have kept their 
own people ring-fenced basically. And other departments have 
purposely opened them up to get chances to get other people in so they 
can get their own people out. (Unison, full-time branch officer, County, 
12.11.97). 
Although there was a national 'no redundancy' agreement in place covering 
LGR, officials in County had not adopted this and, by the end of the process, 
there were 35 permanent employees still unplaced and facing redundancý'. 
Furthermore there had been no firm agreement that the use of temporary 
contracts would revert to pre-LGR levels. 
I ý-, 
There was also some retrospective concern on behalf of the union that LGR had 
been a very costly exercise that had merely succeeding in duplicating the I 
numbers of high ranking officials at the expense of those lower down the scale 
and the provision of public services: 
I was concerned at one stage that they would over-kill on the down 
sizing so that when they got to be the new authority they would be able 
to say look what a wonderful authority. We are going to do this. we are 
going to do that. But in actual fact they did their figures N-,, -rono and we 
have actually got an 8 million budget deficit so we are in real, real 
trouble now before we even get into the new authority ... But we were 
told right at the very beginning that LGR would cost the best part of 16 
million... Well you have got two heads of education for a start you see. 
That's why I say that I can't see that there has been a saving in it at all 
because if you turn it into two unitaries then we would have lost five 
chief executives. We have now got seven chief executives and two chief 
education officers instead of one and two heads of social services where 
we only had one. So, on that end of the scale, it has definitely doubled 
up. But when they have come down in to the other part of it they have 
definitely compressed it much more and they have got a flatter 
management structure just below the director... You wouldn't believe 
all the rest of the cuts. There is virtually total closure of school meals in 
rural parts. Four hundred thousand off a 1.4 million budget for youth 
service in the county, mainly in the rural areas again they are going to be 
shutting the projects... (Unison full-time branch official, County 
12.1197). 
Industrial Relations in County 
The (non- teaching) unions recognised in County were Unison, MPO, FBU, 
T&MW and GMB. However one of the features of County councils was that 
many of the 'blue-collar' occupations which had traditionally provided 
membership to T&GWU and GMB were contained within the associated 
district councils. Therefore, in County, by far the largest union and as such the 
lead union in all negotiations -ývas Unison. Following the national merger the 
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Unison branch in County had recently merged its one ex-NALGO and vývo ex- 
NUPE branches. 
The extensive externalisation in County confronted the newly merged branch. 
formerly exclusive to the public sector, with the predicament of multi-employei- 
negotiations. The branch was particularly ill suited to this task for a number of 
reasons. Firstly the branch had a tradition of largely informal, unstructured 
negotiations between the branch organiser and individual executive and 
departmental officers. This had led to the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) 
and shop stewards committees being largely redundant until eventually they 
were not convened. The vulnerability of this arrangement was sharply 
illustrated when stress-related illness led to the long-term absence and eventual 
retirement of the branch organiser. This left the branch in considerable disarray 
at a time when, under the aegis of LGR, considerable erosion of terms and 
conditions for the majority of workers in County was taking place. 
Secondly the heavy reliance on support from regional officers and the weakened 
position of the branch following the loss of the branch organiser reinforced 
dependence. This was further bolstered by the belief of the regional officer 
assigned to County that the shop stewards were generally poorly placed to act as 
representatives: 
I think the problem is that they [shop stewards] are not becoming 
involved... because of the complexities, because of the difficulties and 
because of their inexperience [they] don't see the problems and 
therefore let things go. (Unison regional officer. 19.7.96) 
1,; ý 
Inevitably trade union involvement became increasingly distanced from the 
workplace with the result that already waning branch and workplace activism 
virtually disintegrated. One consequence was that workplace issues were not 
dealt with at source and local managers, strengthened by devolved powers. 
could easily by-pass the union. This had the effect of further undermiMng the 
confidence of the remaining few active shop stewards: 
If you have a branch organiser going into a meeting the management 
will respect that person because they see that as their full-time post and 
basically that's what they are there to do [but] they probably . N-ouldn*t 
get as much respect as a regional officer. I have actually seen it. it ,s 
unreal. And there is this thing - its almost like oh you, you are a 
secondee. (Unison shop steward, County social services 12.11.97) 
Some departmental and local managers took full advantage of the situation with 
the outcome that treatment of stewards across departments was variable with 
access to resources and facility time largely dependent on the attitude of 
individual managers. 
Ironically the union action against budget cuts fostered the perception of 
common ground between employers and trade unions. Such a view directed 
attention away from the restructuring that was taking place masked by LGR. 
This had progressed to the extent that the corporate personnel officer had come 
to view the branch as source of assistance during the LGR process: 
... they [Unison] 
have been working with us to set up agreements, to 
work through agreements and deal with the many issues that have 
arisen. (Corporate personnel officer, Countý' 10.7.97) 
The following passage also indicates that the branch had accepted this role: 
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... the personnel officer is annoyed because he only seconded me here to help the branch organiser and he is saying that he 
ýIidn't do that to 
replace a full-time Unison officer. And he wants the same sen-ice as 
when there was two of us here. (Unison branch officer. County 
12.11.97) 
However LGR began to create tensions between the branch and departmental 
managers as it became apparent that some branch officials were possibly facing 
redundancy. The branch had responded by threatening to press claims to 
industrial tribunal on the grounds of discrimination against trade union activitv. 
This proved to be unnecessary as the individuals in question were all eventually 
re-deployed. 
The LEA in county recognised Unison for non-teaching staff and the NUT, 
NASUWT, ATL and the head teacher's unions NAHT and SHA for teaching 
staff. Consultation and negotiations between the unions and County were still 
largely carried out at the level of the LEA. The focal point of negotiations was 
the personnel handbook, which the governing bodies of all the schools in 
County had adopted. In this respect LMS did not appear to have had a great 
impact. However both NUT and NASUWT officials reported a number of 
changes in the way local industrial relations had been conducted since LMS. 
Firstly, although the majority of negotiations still concerned local terms and 
conditions, divisional and federation officials were now caught up in 
redundancy negotiations. This had rarely been a feature of their role prior to 
LMS and was therefore somewhat uncharted territory. The teaching unions 
handled this issue differently with the NASUWT divisional secretary playing a 
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more direct role and the NUT divisional secretary tending to pass more of the 
casework to regional officials. One official stated that: 
Local negotiations are mostly about local terms and conditions. 
Although I do spend, specially at this time of year, a lot of time 
negotiating with governing bodies over redundancies. And none of the 
other unions in the county bother doing much about that but I don't 
know why... So then we go down into the school and it is my job to try 
and persuade the governing body not to make people redundant - N), -hich 
isn't always easy. (NASUWT negotiations secretary. County, 10.2.98) 
Both NASUWT and NUT lay officials considered that the relationship between 
the LEA and individual schools was greatly changed by LMS. The NASUWT 
official felt this had a pragmatic basis: 
Pre-LMS I used to think there was a degree of impartiality with LEA 
officers. There isn't any more because, if it wasn't for schools buying 
into their personnel services, they wouldn't have ajob. So if a head says 
I want this to happen then the head of the education department says 
'yes Miss' and it will happen because otherwise they will miss out on all 
that money. (NASUWT federation secretary, County, 10.2.98) 
It was considered that, although the LEA had managed to retain a semblance of 
control over personnel issues by persuading governing bodies to adopt the 
personnel handbook, many school managers paid only lip service to putting its 
policies into practice. Head teachers were considered to be particularly 
'selective' in their use of the procedures. As a result the NUT divisional 
secretary was aware that, since LMS, a rift had started to appear: 
... because 
in between working with people who are in the LEA and out 
in the schools, what the LEA belieN, es happens in schools and what 
actually happens in schools, I don't think quite matches. (NUT 
divisional secretary, County. 22.2.98) 
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Like City, the introduction of LMS had begun to impact upon industrial 
relations and thus trade union issues. 
Temporary Employment in County 
Although numbers were not formally provided, LGR was cited as the reason for 
the increased use of temporary contracts in County. When asked how many 
people were employed on temporary contracts the corporate personnel manager 
replied 'oh hundreds'. When pressed he expanded upon this stating: 
... until six months ago the proportion of 
fixed term contracts would be 
very small. It would certainly be less than five percent and probablý' 
much less than that actually in some areas. What we have now got to 
cope with is local government reorganisation which will happen in this 
county on I st April 98. That means we have in the last few months had 
to look to using more fixed term contracts for those staff that are most at 
risk. (Corporate personnel officer, County, 9.7.96) 
However, in a interview the following day, the Unison full-time branch officer 
said figures had been produced at a recent meeting about LGR (at that point 2 
years before the vesting date) which suggested that as many as 4,000 of the 
authorities 12,000 employees were already employed on temporary contracts. 
Throughout the course of the research no accurate authority-wide figure was 
volunteered although it was clear that centralised personnel records were 
computerised and could be accessed with relative ease. To illustrate, the social 
services personnel officer produced a report for that department during the 
course of an interview, the results of which are displayed in Table 4.2 below: 
159 
Table 4.2 
Numbers and (%) of Temporary Employment Contracts in the Social 
Services Department of County as at 15-12-97 
Full-Time Part-Time Total 
Female 
Male 
Total 
48(2.4) 89(4.45) 1 -17 (6.85) 
18(0.9) 20(1.0) 3380.9) 
66(3.3) 109(5.45) 175 (8.75) 
Source: Social Services Personnel Officer, County, correspondence, 17.12.97 
These figures represented 8.75% of the total workforce in this department. 
However, the figures do not include casual or sessional workers whom, as lt has 
already been stated, were considered by the social services personnel officer to 
be used in large numbers. The above figures further demonstrate the links 
between temporary and part-time employment, particularly for women. 
Teaching is classed as a statutory transfer order post and therefore is unaffected 
by LGR. In education, the departmental personnel officer, claiming they were 
'not readily available', initially withheld figures for temporary contracts. This 
is despite the fact that the figures must be collected and returned on an annual 
basis to the Department for Employment and Education (DfEE) in a report 
known as '618G'. When this was pointed out, he provided the name of the 
LEA official who collected the statistics for 618G andwho provided Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 below 
3. 
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Table 4.3 
Numbers of Full-Time Permanent and Temporary Teaching Staff in 
County as at 31.1-98 
All Full-Time % 
Full-Time Temporary 
Secondary 1199 171 14.3 
Primary 1411 91 6.4 
Total 2610 262 10.0 
Source: Education Officer, County, telephone conversation, 26.11.98 
Table 4.4 
Numbers of Part-Time Permanent and Temporary Teaching Staff 
in County as at 31.1.98 
All Part-Time % 
Part-Time Temporary 
Secondary 256 212 82.8 
Primary 194 77 40.0 
Total 450 289 64.2 
Source: Education Officer, County, telephone conversation, 26.11.98 
An overall percentage of the number of temporary teaching staff in County was 
18.2%. Gender and ethnicity information was not required for the 618G return 
and this information was not collected separately by County. Therefore a 
comparison in this respect cannot be made with figures from City. However, 
like the figures for social services in Table 4.2 above, what is striking about the 
above figures are the very high percentages of temporary contracts amongst 
I These figures were collected prior to LGR and therefore include teaching staff in both 
authorities. The figures do not include teaching staff in Special Needs schools. 1: > 
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part-time teachers. This gives some indication of the possible connections with 
gender if not ethnicity. Like City, the statistical information contained in a 
recent LGMB report (LGMB 1998) reveal that the percentage of temporary 
workers in County was far greater than the regional average of 6%. 
Summary 
It is worth summarising the main points of this chapter, as many of the issues 
that have been introduced here are important contextual factors in the following 
chapters. The following analysis also re-empasises the centrality of themes 
identified in previous chapters. Both City and County have experienced an 
extensive use of temporary labour. The greatest numbers of temporary workers 
were in social services and education, the departments that employed the largest 
percentage of women workers and/or part-time workers. However, whilst the 
edicts of central government have had generally similar impacts on the staffing 
policies of local government, these were mediated by a number of local factors. 
City had obviously fared better than County in the allocation of centrally 
controlled funds. This did not prevent officials in City from using the threat of 
budget cuts to justify restructuring and put pressure on the unions. County, by 
comparison, had suffered years of chronic under-funding -a situation that did 
not seem set to improve following the election of the Labour government. The 
effects of general under-funding had been exacerbated by the costs of local 
goveniment re-organistion, with the prospect that the neNN- structure would be 
less rather than more efficient in the use of resources. Although LGR was cited 
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as the driving force behind the increased use of temporary labour in Countý,. the 
evidence suggests that prolonged budgetary difficulties had initiated the process 
quite some time before LGR. 
In both authorities under-funding and LGR (in the case of County) v, -ere used to 
a large extent as a smoke screen for the locally initiated restructuring which 
gave rise to increases in the use of temporary labour. Yet these initiatives were 
again transmitted via quite different local circumstances and structures. 
In City the strength, stability and politics of the elected officials clearly had 
some impact on the authority's employment policies. The pluralist tradition of 
industrial relations had been maintained and personnel issues were given a high 
profile. Furthermore councillors were sensitive to adverse publicity from 
industrial tribunals, particularly in relation to EO issues. The outcome was that 
EO policies were given some import, the externalisation of services via CCT 
had largely been avoided and there had been some attempt to monitor and 
reduce the use of temporary labour when pushed by the unions. However there 
was some evidence to suggest that the grip of elected officers had begun to 
weaken largely because power had been held by a few charismatic leaders who 
had become susceptible to the challenge of a new and equally charismatic 
Director of Personnel. 
The grip of elected officers was also considerably weakened by the extensive 
decentralisation that had taken place in City. This meant that EO 
responsibilities were devolved to individual departments and dispersion had led 
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to a reduced profile and considerable inconsistency. SImilarly the personnel 
function had become divided and friction had arisen bet-, veen the centralised and 
departmental levels. This had a particular impact on policies concerning 
temporary work as recruitment of temporary staff was largely the remit of 
departmental officials and local managers. Furthermore statistics on temporary 
work were collected inconsistently, making it difficult for central policymakers 
to gauge the extent and trends in its use. This appeared to be a deliberate 
attempt on the part of departmental personnel officers to cloud the issue in ordei- 
to prevent centralised interference rather than administrative incompetence. 
By comparison, the situation in County was almost reversed. Elected officers in 
County were weakened by the instability of Party politics and control in the 
authority, whilst the dominance of the non-elected officers was bolstered by the 
maintenance of a 'corporate, centralised system of policy and decision-making. 
One result was that personnel issues were downplayed, a factor that was clearly 
illustrated in the lack of a separate personnel committee. Unlike councillors in 
City, councillors in County had not resisted the tendering of services and a 
number of services were 'externalised' -a euphemism for being sold to private 
or voluntary sector organisations. Similarly, barely a nod was made in the 
direction of EO policy, a factor that was again clearly evident in the lack of 
monitoring of relevent statistics. One similarity with City was the lack of 
detailed statistical information made available on temporary work. While it was 
felt that this information was almost certainly collected and could be easily 
accessible, the authority preferred to withhold it ,, N, -herever possible. 
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In County although decentralisation appeared to have occurred, LGR had been 
used to reassert centralised decision-making by executive officers. In 
particular, LGR had been used as an excuse to restructure employment in the 
authority. Centrally imposed LGR was used to justify the partisan shuffling, of 
jobs and to veil the selective use of redundancy. 
The differences in the modus operandi in the two authorities were accompanied 
by divergent industrial relations environments. In both authorities the lead 
union was Unison. However the collective power of the other unions in City 
a meant that Unison could not dominate collective negotiations. It was clear from 
observations of negotiations and the existence of an active joint trade union 
body, that the combined strength of other unions did not allow Unison to have a 
free hand in the conduct of trade union dealings with employers. By 
comparison, the dispersion in County of 'blue-collar' jobs to the district 
councils meant that Unison virtually stood alone. However a common feature 
in both City and County was that, apart from one largely inactive white female 
officer, all the negotiating officers were white males. 
In City the maintenance of a pluralist tradition encouraged the unions to adopt a 
combination of co-operation and conflict in their negotiations. This divergent 
approach was in some part the result of differences between the unions and 
factions that existed within Unison (see chapter eight). Furthermore. whilst co- 
operation was encouraged by councillors via informal channels of 
communication. conflict appeared to be preferred by executive officers, if only 
because they could not be excluded from formal industrial action. 
16-7, 
Industrial relations in County were conducted on a predominantly informal 
basis and had been dependent to a great extent on the relationships between the 
branch organiser and individual executive officers. This tradition had arisen 
largely because of the dominance of Unison, particularly at a regional level. The 
weaknesses of this arrangement became clear,,, N-hen the retirement of the branch 
organiser plunged the branch into chaos. Initially Unison took part in what was 
portrayed as a united front against budget cuts and the costs of LGR. But, this 
amounted to little more than the incorporation of union officials into the 
restructuring process. The result was that internal restructuring under the aegis 
of LGR went virtually unchallenged. The only spark of resistance occurred 
when, well into the restructuring process, some branch officers were faced with 
redundancy themselves. 
The experiences of the education departments in the two authorities were more 
clearly matched as the introduction of LMS had drastically altered the 
relationship between unions and the LEA in both City and County. The 
weakening of the LEA under LMS has marginallsed teaching union 
associations. In both authorities the teaching unions felt that the LEA had a 
survival interest in placating school managers with the result that negotiations at 
the level of the LEA were now largely superfluous. In County there was still 
some evidence of local negotiations with the LEA. But this had been restricted 
mainly to redundancy issues. The day-to-day staffing decisions, particularly in 
relation to temporary staff, are now taken at the level of the school and, as ý'et. 
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there is little evidence that the teaching unions have regrouped in order to 
redress the change. 
This chapter has outlined the general context in which decisions concerning 
temporary workers in City and County were made. In both authorities it has 
been identified that centralised pressures, both from Whitehall and local 
politicians provided only part of the account of how decisions concerning 
temporary workers are influenced. In education and social services departments 
of both authorities local managers provided considerable input into the himig 
and firing of temporary labour. Overall, these developments point to a 
complicated process of decision-making and negotiation over restructuring in 
general and the employment of temporary workers in particular. To explore 
these issues in greater detail, the following chapters examine aspects of the 
temporary employment relationship by presenting and analysing the 
perspectives of employers, temporary workers and trade unions respectively. In 
this way the detail of temporary workers' experience, the scale and scope of 
temporary employment and attempts at organised resistance are revealed. 
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5. Employers 
Despite the impetus behind the reforms of the previous government, local 
authorities remain bureaucratic and complex organisations. As the previous 
chapter has highlighted, local govermuent is heterogeneous, displaying political. 
geographical and organisational diversity between authorities. There is no set 
pattern to the decision-making processes of individual authorities and this 
includes decisions on personnel matters (Kessler 1991, Colling 1993a). 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the previous government's aversion to 
bureaucracy and the attendant logic behind NPM, decentralising management 
functions and devolving budgets to lower echelons within authorities has 
merely succeeded in adding to complexity by feeding the different and often 
competing motivations of various levels of line managers. 
The issue of temporary work offers a prime example of this variation in City 
and County and this chapter examines how structural and organisational 
characteristics of the two authorities identified in the previous chapter promoted 
or restricted the use of temporary workers in each. This is done separately for 
City and County in respect of social services to reflect the individual 
circumstances faced by the authorities and the different organisational 
arrangements through which they were mediated. By comparison, the 
combined analysis of these factors for the education departments of both 
authorities reflects the homogenising effect of legislation on the structure and 
organisation of LEAs and schools. 
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city 
As a Labour controlled authority with close links , N-ith the unions. the elected 
members and executive committee in City found themselves confronting 
diametrically opposed pressures. On the one hand was the ever-present threat 
of budget shortfalls and on the other a politically sensitive ýno compulsorý- 
redundancy' collective agreement. One councillor suggested that the increased 
use of temporary workers relieved this pressure, as the shedding of temporary 
workers in times of budgetary difficulty did not constitute redundancy. In this 
way jobs could be lost without breaking the redundancy agreement. Similarly, 
part of the agreement was an assurance of re-deployment for all permanent 
council employees should it be necessary to make their current position 
redundant. However this had become difficult to implement as devolved 
budgetary restraint meant that local managers were reluctant to offer permanent 
jobs for re-deployment. Again temporary work offered a solution, as no such 
assurances of redeployment were necessary for temporary workers and no 
requirement of a commitment was expected from local managers. 
One outcome of decentralisation in City was that, although recruitment and 
selection decisions had been devolved to social services unit managers, the 
recruitment of temporary workers was indirectly fostered by the blanket 
imposition of periodic recruitment and over-time bans on departments. Unit 
managers, particularly in children's and adult's services, faced with the closure 
of their units if sufficient staffing levels were not maintained, often had little 
choice but to take on casual and temporary staff to avoid breaking the bans. 
However, although authority-wide policies limited the decision-making 
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capacities at a departmental level. it was clear that devolved authoritN, and 
budgets gave local managers a high level of discretion. This was particularly 
apparent in the treatment of temporary workers, as their working arrangements 
were often ad hoc and informal. Temporary workers were mostl)- recruited 
from small, localised pools known only to respective unit managers and there 
were complaints from staff that this practice often resulted in a great deal of 
favouritism and patronage. 
The terms and conditions of temporary workers, particularly casual staff, varied 
widely between units within social services. Some unit managers paid holidaý, 
and sick pay whilst others did not. In one unit, the manager gave permanent 
staff separate casual contracts for work that normally would have been classed 
as over-time. However the rate of pay was well below what they would have 
received as over-time premia. When another unit manager in the same 
department was questioned about this practice (11.5.98), she said that she had 
not used temporary work in this way as the personnel director had expressly 
forbidden it. In another unit, staff complained that part-time staff, all women, 
were only ever given temporary contracts regardless of the nature of the 
position. 
Not surprisingly, there was some concern amongst central and departmental 
personnel specialists that local managers did not appreciate the legal intricacies 
of temporary contracts and might lay the authority open to expensive and 
embarrassing tribunal rulings. It was also clear that the informal approach to 
the use of temporary workers by-passed equal opportunities policies xvith a high 
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probability that arbitrary decision making would allow discriminatory practices. 
As a staunch Labour council in a multi-racial, inner-city area this NA-as a 
particularly sensitive issue for the officials at City. This. coupled with some 
suggestion that councillors were uneasy about the uncertainty in the Nvages bill 
created by temporary workers and the quality of the staff that were being 
recruited, had led to attempts to take tighter control over the use and recruitment 
of temporary workers. In social services this involved creating a centralised 
(casual pool' of workers that had been recruited by personnel specialists and 
team leaders (middle managers). The allocation of these workers was also 
controlled at a centralised level which allowed tighter monitoring. 
These policies proved to be highly unpopular with unit managers with the result 
that the central pool was effectively boycotted. The departmental personnel 
manager told how unit managers had persisted in contacting favoured casuals 
directly and steps had been taken to prevent this development. However he 
further stated that the onus for making sure that casuals were booked centrally 
had been placed on the casuals themselves. Casuals who accepted work, which 
had not been booked via the central pool, were threatened with loss of pay. 
When questioned as to what punishment unit managers received for ignoring 
the new procedures he replied that "managers always have a number of excuses 
when confronted with breaking procedure" (departmental personnel manager, 
City, 1997). 
Following pressure from trade unions, officials in City also agreed to a 
reassessment of the contracts of existing temporary employees. The process 
171 
involved assessing, on a departmental basis. the numbers of temporary workers 
in employment. The 'worst offending' departments were then subject to a case- 
by-case review with a view to making some temporary workers permanent. 
Social services was the second department on the list. However the review was 
only conducted after the imposition of a number of criteria had produced 
extensive screening which successively reduced the amount of temporary 
workers who were eligible for conversion to permanent status. Finally, only 
employees who had worked at least ten hours per week for a two-year period or 
more with no more than four breaks were considered eligible. These criteria 
would clearly adversely affect women with childcare responsibilities. HowcN, er 
neither employers nor trade union negotiators noted this and EO monitoring of 
the procedure did not take place. As a result of applying these criteria, after 
starting with a total of 405 casual workers, only 7 were offered permanent 
contracts. 
Applying the criteria also meant the process was extremely time consuming for 
the department; a feature that was exacerbated at an executive level by a 
considerable 'dragging of feet' by councillors and chief executives. Firstly, 
there was a general lethargy in bringing the issue to negotiation and, even when 
this had been achieved, allowing it frequently to fall off the agenda. Secondly. 
once an agreement had been reached to monitor the use of temporary workers, 
meetings to discuss the details of the operation were set weeks and sometimes 
months apart and even then often postponed and rearranged. Further tactics at 
this level involved failure to agree to the request of the joint trade union group 
for a collective agreement which by-passed the existing lengthy and unfruitful 
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review process by transferring all ternporarýý ernploý, ees to perrnanent status 
after two years service. In one departmental meeting, the suggestion of a 
collective agreement caused the usually conciliatory personnel manager to 
refuse, point blank, to discuss the issue further. Throughout the process it 
became clear that, although the trade unions had been involved. the eventual 
decisions would be made individually on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, 
there seemed to be no mechanism in place to continually revie,, N- the use of 
temporary workers, meaning that the current arduous process was likely to need 
repeating at some stage in the future when and if the trade unions again raised 
some opposition. 
County 
In County the pressures exerted by central government were overt and 
immediate as impending local government re-organisation (LGR) coupled with 
a severe budgetary crisis were the engine behind much of the authority's 
personnel decisions. In this respect central government also provided part of 
the 'solution'. The Staffing Commission sanctioned and encouraged the use of 
FTCs as a way of reducing the uncertainty of restructuring and protecting 
permanent employees from redundancy during LGR (LGMB 1998) and, no 
doubt, shielding the authority from costly redundancy awards. 
As 'corporate' decision-making structures within County were devolved to non- 
elected officers, the decision to use FTCs to fill posts until LGR has been 
completed was essentially the decision of the corporate personnel manager. 
"rubber stamped" by the elected members and with limited constiltation with 
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unions. In principle the day-to-day staffing of individual social sen-ices 
establishments was devolved to unit managers. Ho-wever. authoritý--,,, N-ide 
policies put in place to meet LGR took precedence. Therefore. in the two-year 
period prior to the vesting date of the new unitary authority, all neý\- 
appointments in County were made on a temporary basis. The express intention 
was that these workers could be cheaply and easily shed, if necessary, once the 
split had been completed. 
Centrally imposed local government re-organisation was therefore portrayed as 
the main culprit for the increase of temporary workers in County. However 
during the course of the research it emerged that at the outset of the two-Year 
period prior to the split, approximately 4,000 of County's 12,000 work force 
were already employed on temporary contracts. Furthermore, towards the end 
of the process, it was clear that the re-organisation would still result in a number 
of redundancies amongst permanent staff with no firm assurance that the use of 
temporary contracts would be reduced. Employees and trade union officials felt 
that LGR had been used as a smoke screen for an already excessive use of 
temporary labour and a fundamental internal re-organisation of individual 
departments. 
As in City, devolved recruitment and selection of temporary workers gave local 
managers a high level of discretion. Although LGR meant that a choice 
between permanent and temporary workers was not an option, local managers 
still had discretion over selection and length of contract for temporary workers. 
Differences between departments made management decisions hard to justifv 
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and the reality of inequality more apparent. However, there had been no EO 
monitoring of the policies put in place to manage LGR. Trade union officials 
had not used EO as a platform to resist restructuring. but felt that union lay 
activists ad been unfairly treated during re-organisation. with certain key 
officials facing redundancy. Accusations of victimisation and threats to take 
cases to industrial tribunal on the grounds of trade union discrimination Nvere 
enough to ensure that the individuals in question were all re-deployed. 
In parallel to these features it was considered by both managers and unions alike 
that the organisational culture of County, like many local authorities, had 
undergone a dramatic change over the past ten or so years. The overarching 
feeling was that the job security traditionally associated with public service was 
now a thing of the past. The constant threat of budget cuts and legislative 
pressures which forced local government to seek out alternative and tisually 
uncertain sources of funding meant the threat of job losses was always present. 
Trade union officials felt that, to a large extent, insecurity had been used by 
managers to intimidate workers and extend management prerogative. 
Some clear indicators of this consolidation of management control were 
apparent from the interview data. Firstly, it was felt that the balance between 
the numbers of grievance and disciplinary procedures that had been invoked 
were greatly altered in favour of the latter. A trade union official in County felt 
that the numbers of grievances brought by workers had dwindled dramatically 
over the last ten years as job security had become a major concern. Howeverhe 
felt the reverse was true of the disciplinary procedures aiid. as managers becanie 
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more confident, the number of disciplinan- proceedings had increased (Unisoii 
Regional Official, 19.7.96). These observations 'were confirmed bý' the 
corporate personnel manager in County who described the grievance procedui-es I 
as a 'non-issue' because they were used so infrequently (12.11.97). 
Other indicators identified by union representatives were the amount of unpaid 
over-time that it was felt was being worked and the tightening of absence 
procedures that occurred in both authorities. One union official expressed the 
sentiment that the tightening of sickness procedures particularly affected 
women employees (Unsion Branch Official, County, 12.11.97). In the past 
sickness leave for local authority workers had been generous and was often 
used for child-care commitments. The greatly changed working relationships 
between local government workers and their employers meant this was not now 
possible. 
Summary 
The use of temporary workers in both City and County was clearly an 
established part of employment policies. Although budgetary considerations 
played a leading role in both authorities, the pressures to use temporary workers 
emanated from varying sources and decisions to use temporary workers were 
clearly mediated through different organisational structures and relationships. 
In City the leading role taken by the elected members and their relatively close 
relationship with the unions had some bearing on how temporary workers Nvere 
used in the authority. By comparison, in County. the leading role was taken by 
the executive officers with the result that the trade unions were effectivek 
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marginalised and temporary work, under the aegis of LGR. was delivered as a 
fait accompli. 
In both authorities the use of temporary work gave rise to EO issues and, 
despite the higher profile of EO in City, temporary work in both authorities was 
not EO monitored or pursued as an equalities issue. An important factor in 
many of the inequalities associated with temporary work in both authorities Nvas 
the devolved management of the recruitment of temporary workers. Devolved 
decisions concerning temporary workers were largely informal and therefore 
fell outside centralised EO policy. Informality resulted in arbitrary decisions býý 
local managers with the outcome that disparities were apparent in the terms and 
conditions of temporary workers in different departments. 
LEAs and Education 
Under the 1988 Education Reform Act,, devolved budgets and the 
decentralisation of decision-making in relation to personnel issues has been 
uniform and more clearly delineated in schools. Discretion for the contractual 
arrangements of staff now falls to the head teacher and governing body with the 
role of the LEA relegated largely to that of administrator. This did not prevent 
LEA officials in both County and City from holding rather ambivalent 
perspectives on the use of temporary employment contracts. Various 
contractual arrangements had been encouraged by the LEAs as part of what was 
considered to be the flexible and prudent financial management of schools. One 
LEA personnel officer in County considered that all schools should have at least 
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one teacher employed on a temporary contract in case of a "financial 
emergency" (15.1.98). 
However during the same interview the officer said that the LEA had become 
increasingly uneasy about the high numbers of temporary contracts that Nvere 
being issued and the way in which they were being used. Of particular concern 
in City was the growing number of newly qualified teachers (NQTs) who ,, vere 
employed on temporary contracts. However, rather paradoxically. the LEAs in 
both authorities maintained a 'pool' of NQTs who were available for schools to 
recruit on a temporary basis, which emanated largely from a preference of head 
teachers. One head teacher explained that he preferred to hire teachers from the 
pool rather than use teachers from an agency as he felt he had more control over 
which teachers he could use: 
... it [the NQT pool] gives you more of a say in choosing who is actually 
suitable for the school. Supply, because it is generally for a limited 
period, you have little or no control although there are teachers who you 
are well aware are very capable and you tend to ask for those. But you 
can't always guarantee that you will get them. (Head teacher, City, 
2.6.98) 
Growing concern had led LEA officials in both authorities to draw up 
guidelines on the use of temporary contracts in their respective personnel 
handbooks. The guidelines in both stressed the legal necessity for the correct 
use of temporary contracts but did not, however, emphasise the damaging 
effects on equal opportunities policy. Furthermore, although most schools 
adopted these procedures, under LMS there was no obligation for them to do so 
and no remit for the LEA to enforce them. The only recourse the LEA would 
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have, should an industrial tribunal award be made against the authority, would 
be to deduct this from the offending school's budget. Since the upper limit for 
discrimination awards has been lifted. the effect should this be enforced. could 
be disastrous. 
Most of the school managers interviewed considered that the LEA impinged 
very little on the day-to-day personnel issues of their schools and this included 
decisions on using temporary employment contracts. Similarly. in most 
instances,, school governors played a very minor role in such decisions: 
For somebody just to fill in as this temporary contract will be,, then [the 
head teacher] is left to his own judgement on that. And that is what we 
allow him to do because if he sees somebody that he likes and he knows 
how good they are he wants to have them before another school snaps 
them up. So we give him the leeway to pick and choose who he wants. 
(Governor, City, 10.7.98) 
Of the five governors interviewed, none were aware of the legal or equal 
opportunities issues concerning temporary contracts. Neither were they aware 
of LEA policy guidelines concerning the use of temporary contracts for 
teachers. As a result head teachers and other school managers had almost total 
autonomy in the recruitment of staff and enjoyed a considerable amount of 
power over their contractual fate. 
Devolved control of school finances means that 'all is driven by the budget' as a 
head teacher in County succinctly remarked (23.6.98) and legislation, notably 
the Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988, has ensured that school budgets are 
fraught with uncertainty. Most of the money that eventually ends up in LMS 
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school coffers starts life as part of grants made to authorities. The political 
pressures that determine grant allocation have already been discussed. 
Following ERA, individual schools were allocated budgets by the LEA of at 
least 85% of their total expenditure. Under the Act LEAs are also required to 
use predetermined formulae to ascertain the amount each school will be 
allocated. At least 75% of the amount is determined by pupil numbers or 
number on roll (NOR). In a number of the schools visited, head teachers 
stressed that the uncertainty in the school budget created by fluctuating NOR 
was a major pressure in deciding to use temporary contracts for staff. 
The fluctuation of NOR was exacerbated in both authorities for quite different 
reasons. In County there were a number of small rural schools in which the loss 
of only one or two pupils has an impact on the school budget. By comparison 
City, with a large number of inner city schools, served a different socio- 
economic group. One head teacher in City explained that most of the children 
in that school lived in rented accommodation and it was quite coninion for 
families to move to different properties in order to secure better living 
standards. He gave the example of one six-year-old child in the school who had 
already attended four different schools in the authority (21.5.98). 4 
Secondary schools also faced the added pressure on numbers created by the 
curriculum options of pupils: 
4 In addition to this, although numbers were not provided, head teachers felt that schools in Cit\ 
served relatively high numbers of 'traveller' or 'mobile' children who XN ere often at the school 
for no longer than a tenn or so. 
180 
Well it basically revolves around our budget. you know and it is also 
driven by the student's options. So if the students want psychologý- one 
year then we have to employ somebody ... It 
depends what the 
curriculum is, it is driven by the curriculum you see. For example if 
psychology in the sixth form is very big one year and then it dips then 
obviously you have to let that colleague go. (Deputy Head teacher. 
County, 5.5.98) 
However, as this interview progressed, it was clear that the use of fixed-term 
contracts to cover for student number fluctuations created by curriculum options 
was more of a cautionary measure than a real necessity: 
Q. - How often does it happen that you have to let a teacher go because of 
a drop in course numbers? 
A. - Well luckily not very often because our numbers are growing, very 
slowly, but they are growing. But we still have to maintain that 
flexibility. (ibid. ) 
Infant's schools, on the other hand, have the uncertainty of not knowing how 
many children will be received into reception classes until almost the day that 
school begins. One infant's school head teacher explained how increasing 
options for parental choice had exacerbated this problem and how difficult 
planning was as a result: 
With an infant's school it is the uncertainty of not knowing how many 
children are going to materialise in reception. You see if you are a 
junior school, then you know because those children are already 
somewhere in the system whereas in an infant's school they are not. 
And that is quite an issue for us, looking at numbers and trying to 
project ahead. We have made plans to appoint a teacher for example for 
the summer term but if then the numbers haven't materialised, well we 
can't afford that teacher and the children just have to join the existing 
classes, making them bigger. So all the plans go out of the window. I 
think it is very difficult for a school that is just key stage one because 
until you have got the child in school. you are not Paid for them. And 
with parental choice, parents do look around and make choices eNýeii up 
until quite the last moment and I have found from experience that they 
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have probably got the child's name down at about three schools. which 
doesn't help. So right up until the last minute o, -e don't know exactly 
how many children are going to come in to reception. (Head teacher. 
County, 23.6.98) 
Another head teacher in County explained how a number of variables 
influenced parental decisions and how this in turn influenced how he perceived 
his roll: 
Some parents just look at pure statistics and move their kids awaý'... 
There is a market out there of four-year-olds and parents are ver), 
discerning now. They go and look round before they start and see what 
the quality of the fabric, decor, teachers, you name it and then they go 
away and make their mind up about it ... Now we have to meet the needs 
of the customer. Now we have to maintain bums on seats to make sure 
that we can maintain our present provision of staffing ... 
It is a pure 
business now. I don't regard myself as head teacher at all. I regard 
myself as the person who controls this business, which is educating 
children... It is no good being good out there with curriculum and all 
that when the roof is falling in and the place is tatty. You have got to 
have a balance. (29.6.98) 
Tight budgets meant that schools were increasingly expected to seek funds from 
additional sources. The proposal to set up 'Education Action Zones' was the 
latest example of this. The reliance of schools on specific grants has long been 
a feature of funding in education. Section II of the Home Office Act (1965) 
allowed local authorities to apply for additional funds to support the special, 
usually educational, needs of 'children of the new commonwealth'. The rules 
governing Section II funding have undergone numerous changes. What 
remained unchanged was that funding was secured for a fixed period, usually 
three years, and therefore the posts funded by it were also often for a fixed- 
tenn. This raises an interesting issue, because, whilst the grant was not 
provided to specifically employ teachers from ethnic groups, the funds were 
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usually required for language integration. Therefore teachers employed under 
these schemes were often from ethnic groups. This may go some wav to 
explaining why higher numbers of teachers from ethnic groups Nvere emploý-ed 
5 
on temporary contracts . 
The extremely tenuous nature of time limited funding is expressed in the 
following short history of the funding of one such post: 
I identified the need for developing community out-reach work and 
working with parents in partnership, so we put in a bid to a schools 
agency and were successful to get some money. So we appointed 
somebody for twelve months from the money we got from that. He 
works in classrooms to support targeted youngsters and he works with 
their parents and he has set up a family literacy project. We have got to 
the end of the first year's contract and we haven't got money in the 
school budget so we are putting in a CRB bid, civic regeneration budget 
for part of the inner city here and many of our youngsters come from the 
inner city so we made a bid to the community that those youngsters live 
in and we were successful. So we have now extended his contract for a 
second year and in twelve months time we will either be going back to 
the government or trying to find other funds that we can bid for. (Head 
Teacher, City, 19.5.98) 
The same head teacher also stated that all three of the school's technicians were 
employed on temporary contracts. At least one of these technicians was funded 
from external sources as a result of an equal opportunities programme run by 
the city council to encourage employing units to consider people with 
disabilities for vacant posts, but again the insubstantial nature of the funds were 
evident: 
Equal opportunities in the City is offering work placement opportunities 
for people with disabilities. So we have put in a bid to have somebod\- 
here on one of those placements ... we were successful NA-ith that 
bid and 
5 This was supported by the research findings as both the teachers from Asian ethnic groups 
who were interviewed were employed for temporary language integration posts. Z: ý Zý- 
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we made an appointment of a partially sighted technician in the 
technology department. He was with us for a year andxve very 
successfully supported him and so the City said that they would pay half 
his salary for a further ýýear and the technology department are going to 
put in a bid to see if they will fund his post full-time permanentlý-. But 
that depends on the funds coming in from the government. because we 
are a very expensive staff in that the age profile is high. There are 
people who have taught here since the beginning of their career so that 
makes them very expensive and so we haven't got many margins 
beyond staffing costs. So although we want him, we are reall,, r looking 
to external sources to be able to keep him. (ibid. ). 
Budgetary considerations also determined the type of temporary teacher sought 4--) 
by schools. Most of the school managers expressed that fixed-term and direct 
temporary contracts were preferable to the use of agency teachers- particularlý- 
if cover was required for any length of time. A number of issues regarding 
quality and control over supply drove this preference, although budgetary 
considerations were also at the forefront as indicated by a school governor in 
City: 
Basically when it comes to this three months notice that teachers have to 
give and the amount of time it take to advertise, interview and select 
well then that kind of contract is very useful because without being able 
to do that we would have a teacher short. Then rather than having a 
teacher being paid a normal wage on a temporary contract, we would 
have to have supply teachers and their wage is normally quite a bit 
higher. So without the temporary contract I suppose that would be quite 
expensive for the school and money is always at a premium. (10.7.98) 
A number of head teachers said that agency teachers were only used in an 
absolute emergency when informal supplies had been exhausted. One head 
teacher also said that if he was sent an agency teacher who he considered to be 
of high quality, he would consider offering them a temporary contract even 
though he realised this would constitute a break- in the terms of the agency 
agreement (City, 21.5.98). 
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School budget considerations were not the only motivation behind the decisions 
of head teachers and governors to use temporary contracts. Firstly. in Countý- 
there is an authority-wide policy of admitting infants in the term in ý, vhich their 
fifth birthday falls. This is done essentially to save costs at the LEA IeN-el as it 
means there are three 'reception' intakes each school year and money does not 
have to be allocated to the school until the term that children are admitted. As a 
result, a reception teacher is usually employed on a temporary basis at the 
beginning of each term to cover each new intake. Therefore by the end of the 
year there are three reception teachers but there will only be one reception class 
in the September of the new school year. A difficult situation ensues for head 
teachers and the teachers involved, as it is clear that only one of the three 
teachers will be taken on for the following year as the routine rolls over (see 
chapter seven). 
Secondly, during the course of the research it became apparent that teachers 
employed on temporary contracts fell into clearly defined groups. Newly 
qualified teachers (NQTs) seemed to be particularly affected. All the teachers 
interviewed (and some head teachers) considered that it was an unwritten policy 
that a new teacher's first appointment would be on a temporary basis. The main 
reasoning behind this is simple: head teachers and governors considered that an 
initial appointment on a temporary basis provided a good way of trying out 
NQTs without making a commitment: 
It's a strange job education. You don't knoxv what you are getting 
sometimes. For example when you get people out of universities, %, ei*x 
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often they go onto a temporary contract for at least a year. I have had 
one, two, three in the last two years on temporary contracts. vý-hich I 
have now made permanent because they are worth their weight in 
gold... I would say that normally if they are any good that I NN-111 emploý- 
them. I had one on temporary contract and I gave them the sack before 
the twelve months were up because they NA-ere no good. And that ýN-as an 
NQT. (Head teacher, County, 29.6.98) 
Prior to the Education Act (1994) there was a national requirement for a 
probationary period for all NQTs. The probationary period had a number of 
stages at which the performance of NQTs was assessed. It also contained a 
number of requirements of head teachers to assist NQTs who were considered 
to be failing. After the abolition of the national probationary requirement, a 
number of LEAs set up similar local schemes - City being one. However it was 
suggested by a number of trade union officials that head teachers found the 
requirements of the procedure too onerous and that it was far easier to dismiss 
an NQT who did not perform as expected if they were employed on a temporary 
contract. The weakening of the power and the role of the LEA in relation to 
school personnel matters has meant that school managers have been able to 
circumvent LEA recommendations as the following discourse illustrates: 
Head teacher: ... I see that too many schools are using too many 
temporary contracts. The advice from the LEA is not to, but there are 
still one or two schools that continue to have a series of temporary 
contracts. 
Q: Why do you think that is the case? 
A: To cover their backs. 
Q: In a budgetary sense? 
A: No, if you get somebody in and they can't actuallý- deliver then, if 
they are on a temporary contract, when their contract comes to an end 
you can readvertise the post and get somebody else. And I know that is 
done widely in the citý'- 
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Q: So it is like an unofficial probationary period? 
A: Yes I think it has become that. But it is strongly. strongly suggested 
by the LEA that schools shouldn't do that. So if the LEA 
ieep 
saying 
don't do that they must knwv that some schools are. (Head teacher, 
6it", 
19.5.98) 
It was also suggested by a number of trade union officials that employing a 
different NQT each year avoided having to pay an increment and also avoided 
at least one member of staff ever accruing employment rights. This may not be 
as cynical as it sounds for Her Majesty's Inspectorate of schools found that 
LMS had resulted in the appointment of younger and less experienced staff 
(HMI 1992: 16 cited in Ironside and Seifert, 1995: 135). Similarly Ironside and 
Seifert note that the replacement of expensive experienced teachers by cheaper. 
newly qualified teachers had become commonplace since LMS (ibid. ). 
Other strategies that increased the number of temporary contracts in schools 
involved covering posts that had been left vacant at 'difficult' periods in the 
school year. As one governor explained: 
... the other thing is that if somebody 
is leaving and it is the wrong time 
of year and you think you are not going to get a wide range of 
applicants. There are certain times of the year when you think that all 
the best ones have gone and you might be better to wait until later on. 
(City, 9.7.98). 
Similarly it was felt that senior posts that became temporarilý, ,,, acant due to 
secondment were often filled internally by a process of 'acting up' as the 
likelihood of filling a senior position externally on a short-term temporary basis 
was remote. However this created a 'trickle-down' effect until the vacancy 
occurred at a level low enough to be considered suitable for cover b\- an 
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external temporary contract. These strategies highlight the perceived low status 
of temporary employment, a feature that is discussed at greater length later. 
Although the use of partial temporary contracts for purposes of 'acting up' is 
not a direct form of temporary work and was not studied as a primary source in 
this research, the indications were that their use was extensive and raised a 
number of other issues. Firstly, although the original job and pay of the 
employee involved remains secure, the portion of the pay and conditions 
covered by the temporary contract are insecure. A number of teachers 
interviewed expressed that if the acting-up position had been held for any length 
of time (and this could sometimes mean years if the post was difficult to fill), 
the extra salary was included in their personal budgets and therefore relied 
upon. If the extent of this practice is mirrored in other areas of public 
employment, the insecure aspects of public sector workers' pay are likely to be 
far wider than performance related pay as singled out by Heery (1998). 
The 1992 HMI report noted an increase in the number of part-time staff in 
schools and the statistical evidence presented in chapter four highlights the link 
between part-time and temporary work in the case study LEAs. A number of 
researchers have also noted the link between temporary and part-time 
employment (eg. Dex and McCulloch 1995, Dickens and Hall 1995; Gottfried 
and Hayashi-Kato 1998) and point out the detrimental effects this has on 
women s employment. It became clear throughout the course of this research 
that the overlap was so great that employers in both social services and 
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education often did not distinguish between the two and the equalities issues 
involved had largely gone unnoticed. 
In City, during the review of temporary workers in social services, the initial 
procedure included screening out workers who were not considered suitable for 
transfer to permanent status. The criteria immediately ruled out all those who 
worked less than ten hours per week without considering the adverse impact 
this would have on women workers. Furthermore , in at 
least one social services 
unit in City, the link between part-time and temporary contracts appeared to 
have become informal policy. Similarly a teacher in City recounted how her 
head teacher had planned to transfer all part-time staff onto temporary contracts 
until it was pointed out by the LEA that this was highly discriminatory and 
certainly illegal. However it was clear that many of the teaching staff newlý,, 
recruited into temporary positions were part-time. Temporary staff were also 
widely used to cover maternity leave. The links between labour market 
segregation and segmentation highlighted in chapter one mean that temporary 
workers covering maternity leave are almost always women. These two factors 
are likely to account for some of the higher proportion of women found in 
temporary employment. 
Summary 
This chapter has sought to draw together the arguments put forward in previous 
chapters. By showing how central government pressures towards restructuring 
have been mediated at an authority level by the organisational characteristics 
peculiar to each of the case study authorities, the research data supports the 
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arguments set up in chapters three and four. This chapter has identified clear 
links between central government policies and ternporarý, Axork in local 
government. However. although pressures towards temporary work emanated 
from these sources in County and City, employer policy in both authorities was 
influenced by power relationships between elected members, executive officers 
and the trade unions. Following LMS, such power bases in education are less 
opaque. LEAs in both authorities have been clearly less effective at 
influencing the use of temporary workers as a result of the statutory devolution 
of power to school managers. 
The next chapter takes a complementary perspective by utilising an analysis of 
the impact of structural factors on management practice and the outcomes of 
this at the level of the workplace. A leading structural factor was the legal 
relationship between employers and temporary workers. Therefore a close 
analysis is made of how this influences other aspects of the employment 
relationship by further enhancing the power imbalance in favour of the 
employer. In doing this, further empirical evidence to support the theoretical 
analysis of contractual control developed in chapters one to three is offered. 
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6. Managing Temporary Workers 
The previous chapter detailed the interplay at a number of levels between 
employer policy and practice in the use of temporary workers in both the case 
study authorities. Although pressures to use temporary ý, vorkers are mediated 
through different organisational structures and relationships with trade unions. 
one key feature to emerge from this analysis is the importance of devolved 
decision-making in relation to temporary work. The aim of this chapter is to 
therefore scrutinize aspects of temporary employment that influence the nature 
of the relationship between local managers and temporary workers. 
The locus of influence was the vulnerability created by the job insecurity 
inherent in temporary work. A number of respondents commented that, as job 
insecurity was largely the engine of change, its effects were magnified for 
temporary workers. This was summed up by a regional trade union official for 
County: 
The word on the street is that nobody') s job is safe and if you rock the 
boat and you are a temporary worker then your name is first on the list. 
(19.7.96) 
This general sentiment was underpinned by a number of formal and informal 
mechanisms which, for temporary workers, revolve not only around the fear of 
job loss but also the hope that a temporary contract will be renewed or become 
permanent. A Unison branch officer in County described this as both a 'carrot 
and a stick rolled into one' (11.7.96). The 'carrot' of a renewed or even 
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permanent contract rested on the need of temporary workers to create a izood 
impression, which was fostered by local managers in an informal sý-stem of 
favoured temporary workers. Although this was an informal practice its 
existence was well known by senior personnel officials, who noted in a council 
meeting in City that some 'favoured casuals had become semi full-time' 
(13.5.97). As the discussion proceeded the same personnel manager suggested 
that perhaps 'good hard core temps' should be given permanent annualised 
hours contracts rather than temporary contracts. Another departmental 
personnel manager in City supported these observations. He bemoaned the fact 
that unit managers had been disrupting the newly created centralised 'pool' of 
casual workers by offering their favourite casuals permanent contracts in order 
to keep them in their establishment. 
The criterion for becoming a favoured temporary was described by a number of 
workers in terms of their 'face having to fit' (1.3.98; 11.5.98). In relation to this 
point it is interesting to note that in Atkinson's model of the flexible firm. one 
explicit assumption is that flexibility is used as a management device to be 
selective and to get the 'right sort of worker' (1985: 3 1). It was clear that 
workers in both case studies felt that fitting this mould meant, in some part, 
being compliant. An NQT in City felt that acquiescence was more important 
than doing a good job. 
If you are not prepared to creep around her [head teacher] and do what 
she wants or if she just doesn't like your face then that's it. (L-3'. 98) 
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The NQTs also felt that their head teacher* s preferences were fickle and 
arbitrary. An NQT in City, described this and offered an explanation: 
It keeps you on the edge. You never know how they are feeling about 
you. It is as if they are keeping you in your place in a Nva. y. (1.3.98) 
Trade union officials had also commented upon management preferences and 
how they impacted upon the labour process. One inteirviewee emphasised the 
role of temporary contracts and job insecurity as a method of control: 
[Temporary contracts] are used to manage people in the way managers 
want to manage them. In other words to cut down sick leave and to 
force people to work harder and longer hours or whatever because they 
are frightened of not getting it renewed. (Unison branch official, County 
11.7.96) 
The same official went on to note the selective nature of managers in relation to 
temporary workers: 
[Managers] have done their own thing to make sure they don't employ 
anybody who is in the union, don't employ people who don't agree with 
them and don't employ people who are liable to rock the boat. They get 
what they want and have their own agenda (ibid. ) 
Another official highlighted the importance of the informal methods used to 
hire and fire temporary workers to secure a compliant workforce and undermine 
union influence: 
Management use them [temporary contracts] as a tool to get compliance 
and as a tool to get more work and as a tool to, if you like. have people 
breaching agreements that have been reached. Because if you are only 
an 'as and when' and somebody asks you to do something then ý-ou are 
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going to do it because if ý, ou don't you are not going to be called in 
again. (Unison regional officer. County, 19.7.96) 
The above statements associate contractual control with changes to work 
organisation and procedures. Work intensification. absence control and 
grievance and disciplinary procedures were specifically raised and are now 
considered in greater detail. 
Work Intensification and Temporary Work 
Case studies have identified higher levels of stress and fatigue related to woi-k 
intensity amongst temporary workers (Buchtemann and Quack 1989; Marshall 
1989). Some indication of why this may be so can be deduced from the LGMB 
employer's guide to using fixed-term and temporary contracts. The publication 
lists work intensification as one of the advantages of using temporary contracts 
stating: 
There may be a greater incentive for the employee to perform well in 
order to secure the renewal of the contract (LGMB, 1992: 15) 
Work intensification for temporary workers displays a number of facets. Long 
hours of work seemed to be a particular feature of employment for some 
temporary workers. Katy, an NQT in City. complained: 
She [head teacher] is going to get her blood out of us and make us work 
as hard as we can. I mean we are there from half past seven until at least 
half five or six o'clock every night. She just likes it - its her power. She 
gets a kick out of it, I don't know. She just likes us there. On the first 
day of term I got in at 8 o'clock, which I thought was a reasonable time,, 
and she said to me *problems ,, vith the traffic Katy? ` ... and she said 'oh 
part-timer are weT when I left once at half four. (1.3.98) 
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However Katy had also noted that this had merely resulted in what has been 
called a 'presentee' culture which did not necessarily mean that any more work 
was actually being done -just that it was now more visible. 
Sometimes people just stay at school for the sake of staying at school. if 
you now what I mean. I mean I could quite easily leave at half three... 
and do everything that I do at school at home. But you don't because 
you know it won't be looked upon favourably. (ibid. ) 
A trade union representative in County described how casual workers in social 
services did not appear on the official work rota and it therefore became 
convenient for the unit manager to 'forget' how many hours they had worked in 
a week. She went on to say that casual workers accepted this situation firstly 
because they needed the money as they were unsure if they would get work in 
the following weeks but also because casual workers who refuse work are 
pushed to the bottom of the list. In City it was reported that one of the 
motivating forces behind setting up a monitored centralised pool of casual staff 
was the realisation that many casual workers worked hours that would 
contravene the working hours directive 6. 
The extra hours worked by temporary workers were also considered to represent 
a considerable cost saving for managers as casual workers are often paid on the 
lowest rate and are rarely paid over-time premia. It also accounted for some of 
the overlap between part-time and casual work as part-time workers often 
6 The Working Time Directive specifies minimum daily and weekly rest periods; rest breaks; 
annual paid holidays; a limit of 48 hours per week on the average time which employees can be 
required to work unless otherwise agreed; and restrictions on hours worked at night. 
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supplement their income with casual work at a number of establishments. In a 
number of instances it was pointed out that part-time qualified social workers 
were working additional hours as casual care assistants for less than half their 
qualified rate. Another aspect of temporary work in social sen-ices is the 
expectation that workers will take the shifts and the duties that permanent 
workers resist. This often involves moving between establishments more ofteii 
than their permanent counterparts. As a temporary care assistant in City stated: 
Temporary workers are shoved here, there and eN, 'erywhere - unless your 
face fits. Sometimes I feel like the Martini girl - you kno,, x - anytime, 
anywhere, anything. All I need is a tray and a pair of skates! (11.5.98) 
Similarly in schools a number of school managers expressed how they 
considered the extra effort required of temporary teachers to be one of the main 
benefits of issuing temporary contracts: 
... 
it concentrates their minds, to demonstrate their competence - no 
question about that (deputy head teacher, City, interview 5.5.98) 
Overall there is extensive evidence that temporary work is associated with 
intensified work patterns and procedures. 
Absence Control and Temporary Work 
Absence control has become a major issue in public sector industrial relations 
(IDS 1998). An LGMB report (1997) notes that although sickness absence rates 
have been falling in local goverment, they are still higher than in the private 
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sector. The report also notes that rates tend to be higher for women. 7 The 
suggestion that sickness absence rates are an employment issue in the public 
sector raises interesting questions as to the relationship between managerial 
policy on sickness absence and temporary employment. 
A survey of 200 branches including local government conducted by Unison 
(1997) found that two thirds of employers had recently changed their sickness 
procedures. The report found that the new practices are often linked to 
disciplinary procedures and sickness records are used when selecting for 
redundancy. The report argues that as such sickness policies are clearly 
instruments of control and are often inconsistent and arbitrary. The empirical 
evidence from this research supports that view and indicates the added lever 
provided by the insecurity of temporary employment. 
Absence control was clearly an issue for both City and County. In City the 
implementation of what were described by the unions as 'draconian' sickness 
procedures almost brought them to the point of industrial action. In County 
'counselling' workers after a period of sickness had been added to the 
procedures. A Labour councillor described this by saying: 
Absenteeism has been a problem but now we take a strong line - partlý- 
a bit of pressure on people, partly a bit of understanding. (23.7.96) 
Paradoxically the councillor went on to say that much of the absence was stress 
related due to long hours and hard work. 
7 However this finding needs to be qualified as only 14 of the 14-3' authorities studied proý ided a 
gender breakdown. 
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A teacher in City had been employed on a series of temporary contracts for a 
total of twelve years. When asked about sickness she said she had not taken 
one day's sick leave in all of that time. 
Because I am part-time [and temporary] I tend to think that I dare not 
have a day off ... 
it would be 'well part-time, short-term contract - time 
off? We can do without that'. So really I never take time off. NEVER' 
(9.7.98) 
Temporary workers, particularly if they are regarded as casual, faced a number 
of dilemmas in relation to sickness absence. Casual workers face the twin 
pressures of being unable to turn down work if they are sick for fear of being 
removed from the casual list and the penalty that those who take sick leave 
during a period of employment are not paid sick pay. Similarly, for workers on 
temporary or fixed-term contracts, taking time off sick was considered to 
seriously damage the prospects of getting the contract renewed. Max, a 
residential social worker (RSW) in City, highlighted both of these dilemmas: 
Basically you don't take time off sick if you are a casual because you 
know if you go sick you won't get paid... and temporary contract, you 
know that it is performance oriented really so if you go sick your 
contract might not be renewed again. (11.5.98) 
Similarly, a temporary RSW in City described how she had been warned by her 
colleagues not to take sick leave if she wanted her contract to be renewed. The 
Unison branch secretary in County told of a case he had dealt with in which a 
secretary who had developed RSI whilst working on a temporary contract had 
not had her contract renewed. He added that if she had been a permanent 
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employee the authority would have had a duty to re-deploy her. Maternity 
leave also seems to be particularly sensitive for temporary v, -orkers. Union 
officials in both authorities felt that this was an issue that had to be monitored 
very carefully. 
Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures and Temporary Work 
The fate of most temporary workers is ultimately sealed by their reluctance to 
complain either about the situation they face as temporary workers or an), other 
problems they encounter at work. A care assistant in City voiced this: 
I always feel as if I have to work twice as hard as the permanent staff - 
as though I always need to impress the managers. If there is any hint of 
dissent the contract is raised and things that I would otherwise question 
are let go. (11.5.98) 
This issue had not gone unmissed by personnel managers in both County and 
City. In County there was a stark acceptance of this as the corporate personnel 
manager expressed: 
Most of them want another contract. So there is the dilemma. There is 
the natural hesitancy to bang on the door and ask for this and that 
because people are nervous about how they will be seen. (10.7.97) 
However a social services personnel manager in City who had taken charge of 
the casual pool was worried by the implications raised by the hesitancy 
temporary workers experienced when expressing legitimate concerns to their 
managers: 
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... we had a number of casuals on induction. It was Interesting because 
when one or two of them were speaking there, ýý-as an indication that 
something wasn't quite right where they were working. but they weren't 
very clear in what they were saying. And I attempted to tease out some 
of what the issues were. And what you pick up from a lot of casuals is 
that they feel reluctant to make any complaints because they say if they 
do they are taken off the casual list or that they might not be allowed to 
work back at that home again. And they feel they are going to be made 
to pay a price for making a complaint. But this hasn't been lost. What 
we are attempting to do is to work towards some way of ai,,, ln, -y the 
casuals the opportunities to make complaints but not feel vulnerable for 
doing it. This is where we are at the moment but we have got some way 
to go. (30.9.97) 
The personnel officer went on to give examples of instances where casual 
workers had confronted unit managers and subsequently found they were being 
used less and less. In most cases he felt that unit managers take a *personal 
grudge' against workers who complain and, in the case of temporary workers, 
managers have the power to stop allocating work. Union officials had also 
noted this tendency among management: 
Because if you take a grievance out yeah, and the manager would say 
(oh yeah you are taking a grievance out on me' and you don't get the 
phone call no more. It's like biting the hand that feeds you. (Unison 
steward, City, 11.6.97). 
Another union representative also noted the pressure on temporary workers to 
avoid challenging management policies and practices: 
If somebody is a casual employee and they are good and keep their nose 
clean they can have as much work as they want. As soon as they show 
any semblance of being able to think for themselves or Nvant to 
challenge the employers, they find that they are not being offered the 
work and somebody else is. (Unison Joint Chief Ste,, vard, City 9.7.97) 
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Casual workers in City face an added barrier when wishing to raise a complaint 
in that they are formally excluded from the grievance and disciplinary 
procedures. The Unison branch secretary in City pointed out that workers have 
to be considered employees to take advantage of the procedures. He felt that 
casuals are not regarded as employees and therefore by-pass the procedures by 
being denied recourse to a disciplinary hearing. A regional official added to 
this by saying that even though workers on fixed-term and temporarý, contracts 
formally have access to the grievance and disciplinary procedures in reality theý- 
were 'unlikely to be employed by the time the matter is resolved' (23.5.97). A 
steward in City confirmed this and noted the discrepancies between how 
permanent and temporary workers were treated: 
Because what happens when they get suspended, if you are a normal 
[permanent] worker and you get suspended, you get suspended without 
prejudice on full pay. But if you are casual worker they just don't use 
you. (11.6.97) 
A personnel officer in City was keen to point out that although casual workers 
are formally denied access to the grievance and disciplinary procedures they can 
instigate a complaint concerning sexual or racial harassment. However when 
she was questioned more closely about how they would initiate this when they 
do not have access to other procedures she became vague. Finally she 
explained that the two were separate procedures and in a case of sexual or racial 
harassment a complaint should be made in the first instance to their immediate 
line manager or, if he or she was the cause of the complaint, to their line 
manager (Central Personnel Officer, City, 28.10.97). Interestingly a Unison 
shop steward in City related a case he had dealt with in xvIuch a temporary 
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worker had raised a sexual harassment complaint. He considered that after the 
allegation the managers involved 'closed ranks' and began victimizing the 
woman. Eventually her work was seen to be 'failing' and her contract was not 
renewed (11.6.97). 
The Unison City branch service and conditions officer considered that double 
standards were applied in excluding casual workers from the grievance and 
disciplinary machinery. She argued that casuals were formally subjected to the 
disciplinary procedure when to do so was 'politically convenient'. She related a 
case in which a casual worker had been disciplined because a permanent ,, vorker 
had also been involved in the incident and in order to dismiss the permanent 
worker it was necessary to implement the disciplinary procedures. A personnel 
officer in City had also alluded to this position in saying that casual workers 
may not be excluded from all the stages of a disciplinary hearing, but may just 
be excluded from the final right of appeal to councillors. A personnel manager 
in City social services summed this up neatly by saying: 
Managers are quick to put pen to paper - casuals aren't. (28.10.97) 
The forgoing analysis had identified that the basis of contractual control is job 
insecurity. However, the insecure position of temporary workers is effectively 
heightened by the arbitrary, informal and personalised practices that have 
developed from decentralised managerial relations. The effect has been to 
emphasise the power imbalance between temporary workers and their managers 
thereby providing the essence of contractual control. This has materialised in 
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management practices which lean towards , vork intensification. absence control 
and exclusion from grievance and disciplinary procedures. Working from a 
heightened basis of power, local managers have secured contractual control by 
exploiting a number of the characteristics of temporary employment, which are 
described more fully in the following section. 
Securing Contractual Control 
Work intensification, absence control and lack of recourse to grievance and 
disciplinary procedures are all the outcomes of contractual control. There are a 
number of mechanisms adopted by managers that help to ensure these 
outcomes. The general extension of management prerogative underpinned by 
threats of job insecurity and budgetary crises has already been considered. 
However there were a number of additional formal and informal approaches 
adopted by managers that tighten the 'knot' in the contractual 'noose'. 
Formal strategies usually revolved around legal devices that make the position 
of temporary employees even more precarious. In the case of workers 
employed on longer fixed-term and temporary contracts (in excess of one year) 
it was common to attach a waiver clause in which the employee has to waive all 
rights to claims of redundancy and unfair dismissal. 8 In County it was also 
policy to insert a notice period into all temporary and fixed-term contracts so 
the authority was not bound by the duration of even a temporary arrangement. 
However5 the preference was for faIrly short duratIon 'rolling' contracts usuallY 
8This has been amended by the 'Fairness at Work' legislation. Rights to unfair dismissal can 
no longer be waived. 
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between three and six months. This had the effect of keeping the tentative 
contractual arrangement sharply in focus. A preference for verý- short-ten-n 
contracts has been a general trend in the growth of precarious employment 
(Rodgers 1989). 
In City additional tactics included attempts to blur the employment status of 
casual workers. Although casuals were issued with a contract, which indicated 
that they had employee status, the words of the contract stated that they Nvere 
under no obligation to accept work and the authority was under no obligation to 
provide work. Mutuality of obligation has been one of the deciding legal 
factors the courts have used in finding against casual workers on the grounds of 
their lack of employee status (O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte [ 1984, Q. B. 90]). 
However, as has already been noted, this is an area of employment law that is 
far from clear and there have been a number of conflicting rulings particularly 
concerning the use of the waiver clause. 
Informal strategies employed by managers to enforce their position in relation 
to temporary workers revolved around resisting any attempts to dilute their 
power in the workplace. This was most clearly evident in City in reaction to the 
centralisation of the casual pool. Prior to a middle management decision to 
monitor the use of casual workers in social services more closely at a 
department level, unit managers had maintained their own informal supply of 
casual staff. When questioned about the reaction of unit managers to the 
centralised system, a departmental personnel manager stated: 
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Quite a lot of them are livid. They don't like the idea that it is 
centralised because it has taken a lot of their power away to contact 
casuals and to call who they want when they want. (27.4.98) 
Similarly in schools a number of school managers expressed a preference for 
the use of informal supply teachers rather than agency teachers largely because 
of the increased control this offered. 
I would never use an agency teacher. I know my own people around 
and about... I have got a little stack of teachers who are dying to come 
in. (Head teacher, County, 29.6.98) 
As identified in the previous section, the coercion and manipulation of 
temporary workers rested to a large degree on the arbitrary use of managerial 
power that ensured a system of favourites. This in turn was dependent on 
devolved powers of recruitment and work allocation. This was most clearly 
expressed by the Unison branch secretary in City: 
I mean if it is a casual job you can employ who you want and if there is 
a few extra hours this week you can give it to the ones you like and not 
the ones you don't like. Decentralisation means that local managers can 
make these types of decisions without fear of reprisals from the City 
Council. (23.5.97) 
The powerful position of managers in relation to temporary workers was further 
enhanced by emphasising the weak position and perceived low status of the 
latter. In County this was best illustrated in relation to LGR. The allocation of 
jobs leading up to the vesting date followed a strict timetable. In relation to 
temporary workers appointed in the two-year period leading up to the creation 
of the unitary council the County personnel officer stated: 
-) 0ý 
The people appointed know that they haven't got much [of a] place in 
the queue for a permanent job ... they are right at the end of the queue 
and they know that. (12.11.97) 
The existence of a hierarchy had not gone unnoticed by a Unison shop steward 
in social services who added some further dimensions stating: 
Relief [temporary] staff are treated like second-class citizens. They are 
classed in with the cooks and the cleaners as opposed to the RSNN's 
[residential social workers] who are the same as them. Because they 
seem to be at the beck and call of managers the other staff treat them 
like domestics. (19.5.97) 
A similar hierarchy existed in schools: 
What we tend to do is, we tend to have a look at colleagues for a year, I 
mean we do this with secretarial staff too. We quite often put [newly 
qualified] teachers and secretarial staff on a one year contract to have a 
look at them and see if we are happy with them and if they are happy 
with us. (Deputy head teacher, City, 5.5.98) 
The perceived inferiority of temporary work was emphasised by its association 
with cooks, cleaners, domestics and secretarial staff who were considered to be 
vulnerable to the whims of management. In City, despite the creation of a 
centralised casual pool and recognition of the powerless position of casual 
workers, temporary care staff took the brunt of sanctions when unit managers 
began to resist the dilution of their powers. This in turn determined the 
reactions of the permanent staff who, as a result, drew a distinction between 
themselves and temporary staff. This raises interesting questions about the 
class and gender identity associated with temporary work and the divisions it 
has created between workers. In relation to this point Ironside and Seifert 
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(1995: 12) have noted how ' ... skillfull employers and governments can use 
divisions to further divide and weaken the teachers as a whole. ' 
Parallels can also be drawn with the confusion and blurring of distinctions 
between temporary and part-time work. Temporary workers were frequently 
referred to as 'part-timers' by both social services and school managers. This 
reflects both the perceived gendered nature of temporary work and the 
prejudiced belief that temporary workers and part-timers are united in their lack 
of status and commitment. A deputy head teacher revealed confusion between 
temporary and part-time contracts. When asked which type of temporary 
contracts were used in the school he replied: 
Just a normal fixed-term temporary contract, sometimes for 0.6 of a 
week or 0.8. So they may not be more than two days a week. (City, 
5.5.98) 
In another school in County the confusion between the two types of contract 
resulted in the head teacher arranging an interview for this research with a 
'temporary' teacher who was in fact employed on a permanent part-time 
contract. School governors also held this confused perception. Those 
interviewed talked about temporary and part-time work interchangeably and 
considered the opposite of temporary work to be full-time work. 
A hierarchy also existed between temporary workers, with the added dimension 
of clear material difference. Personnel managers in both social services 
departments were fond of pointing out that even the executive officers were 
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employed on temporary contracts. Hoxý ever even a cursorý- examinatioii 9 of 
their terms and conditions revealed substantial differences in form. The 
highest-ranking officers in local goverment are often given five-year fixed- 
term contracts. They receive a substantial enhancement to 'buý- out' their job 
security and neither a waiver clause nor a notice period is included in the 
contract. The significance of the latter omission meant that, should such an 
official be required to leave, the remaining period of the contract would also 
have to be remunerated; a 'golden handshake' would be in order. Holiday and 
pension arrangements were individually negotiated as were other aspects of the 
'package'. 
These privileges steadily diminished with descending rank. Officers of PO 
(Principal Officer) 10 grade and above received an enhancement for accepting a 
fixed-term contract of usually three years. Although there was no waiver clause 
attached, the notice period usual for that grade was included. Holiday and 
pension arrangements were those fixed for that particular grade. Officers below 
PO 10 employed on fixed-term contracts were not paid an enhancement and the 
duration of the contact varied between three years and one month, with the 
required notice period. Salary was paid on the spinal point commensurate with 
the duties involved and again holiday and pension arrangements were those 
fixed for that particular grade. Temporary workers who were classed as casual. 
although some had worked continually for the authority for extensive periods 
(fifteen years in one case), did not receive holiday or sick pay. were not entitled 
to a notice period and were not entitled to join the pension scheme. They were 
9 Only a cursory examination Nvas possible as the precise terms and conditions of senior officials 
are closely guarded 
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usually paid on the lowest manual rate for that particular job. did not receive 
increments and are not included in the Single Status Agreement. 
Rodgers (1989) has also noted a tendency to 'bi-modality in atypical work' and 
points out the gendered features of the duality: 
in any atypical category a small but significant percentage will be ... in 
relatively skilled, well paid work, even if the majority is precarious - 
and the characteristics of the better off group will be different: more 
often male, older, better educated. (p. 9) 
This was certainly the case in City and County as all the directors and assistant 
directors of social services and education were white males. 
In teaching a contractual hierarchy was less clearly defined, as senior teaching z: 1 
posts were not normally filled on fixed-term or temporary contracts. However, 
as previously stated, it was common to temporarily fill senior teaching posts on 
a seconded or 'acting up' basis. Entirely temporary and fixed-term contracts 
were only usually found within the newly qualified teaching grades, part-time 
teachers and instructors. Teachers and instructors employed on temporary 
contracts were entitled to join the occupational pension scheme and receive sick 
pay and holiday pay. Agency and supply staff did not receive these benefits. 
Holiday pay for temporary teachers was determined by a complex formula 
based on pro rata days of service. Trade union officials and temporary teachers 
expressed some concern that contracts were being concluded in a ,, vay that 
deprived teachers of their full holiday entitlement. Research data confirmed 
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this and revealed it seemed to be particularly true for temporary teachers. all 
women, who were covering maternity leave. The bulk of the research in 
schools was carried out shortly before the summer break. In two of the schools 
researched, temporary teachers were covering for matemity leave and unusually 
seemed to be concluding their contracts a few weeks short of the end of term. 
When this was examined in greater detail it was clear that the maternity leave of 
the previous job holder was coming to an end and, in order to receive holiday 
pay for the long summer break, would have to return before the end of term. 
However, if the temporary teacher worked past a certain date, they too would be 
entitled to holiday pay for that period. Therefore, in order to avoid paying 
holiday pay to both teachers, the contract of the temporary teacher was 
shortened. 
Finally, there was some evidence to suggest that temporary workers were 
discouraged from joining a union. In both authorities the main way in which 
new entrants were recruited by the union was via a list provided on a regular 
basis by the employer. However there was doubt as to whether temporary 
workers were included on the list. In both City and County the general feeling 
was that casual workers and temporary contracts of short duration were unlikely 
to be included. There was also some evidence of direct discouragement from 
local managers. The Unison branch secretary in City had received reports of 
casual workers being told 'you have no rights anyway so why bother joining 
the union' (23.5.97). Similarly a temporary RSW in City told how she had been 
warned not to involve the union by her line manager when she said she was 
considering raising a complaint. However when trade union officials were 
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questioned about the threat of union exclusion via the use of temporary workers 
there was a mixed response. Whilst the lay officers and representatives did 
perceive a direct threat, regional officials were more reticent: 
Temps and casuals are not well organised because local managers have 
not regarded casuals as employees and have tended to discourage them 
from joining the union. They want casuals to keep a low profile so that 
the unions don't get wind of how they are being used. (Unison branch 
secretary, City, 23.5.97) 
I don't think it is a deliberate form of union exclusion... Reduction in 
unionism is probably seen as a bonus rather than the driving force. 
(Unison Regional Officer, County, 19.7.96) 
However both full-time officers and lay officials were united in their belief that. 
even if temporary workers do join a union, they are unlikely to become 
activists. 
To some extent it was what we were talking about before in terms of 
people in insecure employment being less likely to join a union. 
Stewards in those circumstances are less likely to come forward. And 
where you have got a manager who is using them as a mechanism to get 
more work out of the workforce they are not going to have much truck 
with somebody who sticks their head above the parapet as a steward. 
And so you are less likely to get people in those circumstances coming 
forward and certainly temporary workers themselves are less likely to 
come forward. (ibid. ) 
Teachers, including temporary teachers, were more likely to be union members 
as recruitment begins in teacher training institutions, before NQTs embark on 
their school careers. However, as chapter eight discusses in more detail, school- 
based representation was traditionally weak and was marginalised even further 
with the onset of LMS. When head teachers were questioned about the 
involvement of trade union representatives in decisions concerning the 
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appointment of temporary teachers, it was clear that in none of the eight schools 
included in the research did this take place. 
Q. - Do you have trade union reps based at the school and do they 
become involved in discussions about contract issues? 
A. - Yes there are trade union reps but they do not become involved. 
professional association is the Secondary Heads Association and I migh I i-ht 
take advice from them... 
Q. - So the other unions don't get involved as representatives of other 
teachers? 
A: No, no. There is no mechanism really. (Deputy Head teacher, CitN', 
5.5.98) 
Similarly a school governor, when asked about trade union representation in 
personnel committee meetings, replied 'Certain governors, even when the 
unions are mentioned, turn pale! ' (City, 9.7.98). When questioned about this in 
more detail the governor explained that many of the other governors were local 
business people who were not sympathetic to the trade union movement. She 
further stated that they had little understanding or empathy with public sector 
traditions of consultation and negotiation and could see no reason why the 
running of schools was any different to running a small business. 
Summary 
The devolved decision-making in respect of recruitment and selection emerged 
as an important factor in the relationship between employers and temporary 
workers, providing empirical evidence for a number of the theoretical themes 
concerning contractual control and NPM raised in chapters one and three. 
Decentralised managerial relations have allowed arbitrary. informal and 
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personalised relations to dominate the employment of temporary , vorkers. One 
result has been that formal policies, particularly EO policies, have been by- 
passed with the likelihood that temporary work would predominate amongst 
disadvantaged groups. The clearest illustration of this was the confusion by 
managers between part-time and temporary work. providing one explanation 
why temporary jobs were more likely to be filled by women. 
Decentralised managerial prerogative over the hiring and firing of temporary 
workers has also allowed job insecurity to be used to bring the power imbalance 
in the employment relationship to the fore and to assert managerial control. The 
assertion of managerial control was materialised in work intensification, 
absence control and exclusion from grievance and disciplinary procedures for 
temporary workers. Furthermore the weak legal position of temporary workers 
has allowed local managers to exploit a number of mechanisms that secure 
control. As such there is considerable empirical evidence to support the 
proposition of contractual control put forward in chapter one. 
Heightened managerial control based on intensified job insecurity and 
discouragement from collective representation does not bode well for temporary 
workers. The following chapter examines the implications of contractual 
control for temporary workers by exploring their perspectives. In doing so, 
chapter seven also seeks to address the managerial bias of previous analyses 
identified in chapter one. 
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7. Temporary Workers 
The 'things that really matter' have not changed much over the years. People still want 
a steady job, decent pay, a healthy environment, personal freedom and somebodý to 
rely on if the going gets a bit tough. In short, they want security. But security Is the 
one thing that the modem system cannot deliver. Indeed, it seems almost proud of the 
fact that it cannot offer security. (Elliott and Atkinson 1998: 247) 
The previous chapter identified that the management of temporary work 
produces a specific and palpable form of employment relations, which is 
facilitated by contractual control. Much of the experience and the words of 
temporary workers have been used to highlight these issues in earlier chapters. 
The aim of this chapter is to focus on the experiences of temporary workers and 
assess the impact of contractual control upon their lives. As previous analysis 
has identified, many of the problems faced by temporary workers revolved, in 
some form or other, around their differentiated contractual status and the 
insecurity this engendered. The status of temporary workers is linked to 
demographic features such as age, gender, ethnicity and level (and in the case of 
NQTs, length) of professional qualification. For example, in teaching, 
temporary contractual status was clearly linked to NQTs, part-time teachers and 
instructors who did not hold the required teaching qualifications. For social 
services workers, temporary status was linked primarily to the lack of a social 
work qualification and part-time work. In both teaching and social services lack 
of qualification and training had a clear relationship to issues of ethnicity whilst 
part-time and temporary work was linked to gender. 
These features meant that facets of temporary work gave rise to differentiated 
experiences for the groups it affected. Therefore the relationships betxveen 
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temporary work, part-time work and ethnicity are examined separately before 
moving on to study the material and psychological impact of insecurity'. which 
provided a commonality of experience for temporary workers. Training issues 
also featured extensively in the concerns of the temporary workers inteniewed 
and are therefore examined in some detail. The chapter concludes NA-Ith an 
analysis of how temporary work affects the relationship between workers. 
The Experience of Temporary Work 
The experience of temporary work reflected the features of such work outlined 
in the previous chapter. It was insecure, intense and seemingly arbitrary. The 
effects of these conditions on the experience of groups of temporary workers 
are now examined. 
Part-Time Temporary Workers 
The joint relationship between temporary and part-time work and its perceived 
lower status was starkly emphasised by Sandra, a teacher in County who 
introduced herself at the beginning of our interview as a part-time, temporary 
teacher - 'the lowest of the low'. Pamela, an RSW who had worked on a series 
of part-time temporary and casual contracts for City for a total period of six 
years, expanded upon the differential status between temporary and permanent 
workers when asked if she thought they were given the same opportunities for 
promotion: 
I don't think so. I don't think people look at you in the same wav. If 
you are working on a full-time contract they seem to think that You have 
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made this commitment and that you have been working in the same 
place for x amount of years. And they take up my records and they say 
'you have been over there, you have been over here'. --I have heard the 
manager say this in passing 'Oh Pamela has been with us a long time 
now, but she has never really made that full commitment'. And I think 
that's a bloody cheek. If I have been working two years here and two 
years there, what is it! (11.5.98) 
Pamela also felt that people who were willing to work long hours and didn't 
specifically require part-time work were more likely to be offered permanent work. 
This was confirmed by Max, a colleague of Pamela's who had started work as a 
temporary worker at their establishment and had now secured a permanent position. 
Max stressed that he had been prepared to work the same hours and on the same basis 
(involving night shifts or 'sleep-ins') as the permanent members of staff. Pamela by 
comparison was constrained by childcare commitments to work limited hours. 
Fiona, a teaching instructor in City, had held a temporary contract for five years. Her 
job was advertised each year because she had been told the school really wanted a 
full-time fully qualified teacher to teach her class (dance) and another curriculum 
subject. So far they had been unable to attract such a teacher. Although Fiona's 
contract was renewed on a termly basis, she felt she had managed to keep her job for 
so long because it was part-time. Her fear was that if the hours of the dance class 
were increased she would lose her job: 
... because somebody would come 
for a permanent post full-time. 
Whereas the chances are that while I am part-time another qualified 
teacher wouldn't want to do just 0.5 and that is what I am. So that is 
why I have stayed longer because of the actual timetable I teach. 
(9.7.98) 
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Ironically Fiona was now seeking full-time work but because of her lack of a 
recognised school teacher qualification (she was a qualified dance instructor and field 
qualifications to teach adults) she would not be considered for the same post if it ýý cre 
full-time. Fiona felt that she was trapped in the position of instructor after taking time 
out to have children. She said she had been encouraged to return to college to take 
the necessary teaching qualifications but felt that she had not been encouraged early 
enough and was now too old. She felt this more acutely because she taught dance. 
which she perceived as having an age limited tenure. 
I need the income but what else will I do? Would I get another school to 
do at my age what I am doing? Or should I maybe look at going to 
college? But over 40 it is not easy to get a job. (9.7.9 8) 
A similar fate had befallen Sandra, a special needs teacher who had worked on a 
temporary part-time basis for eight years after leaving teaching full-time to have 
children. Whilst her children were young, Sandra had taken a series of casual and 
temporary teaching contracts. However she was now seeking full-time pemianent 
employment in teaching but was finding it difficult to secure a post. The main reason 
she felt was that, as an older experienced teacher, she was at the top of her pay scale 
and therefore 'expensive'. 
My mistake was not trying to get into a permanent position five or ten 
years ago. At the time it didn't seem so crucial. I didn't realise how 
difficult it was going to get. (1.7.98). 
The close links between temporary and part-time work were evident when Mr. Dep. a 
part-time, temporary instructor in Bengali, asked if it was commonly known who was 
and who wasn't on a temporary contract. 
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Everybody knows I am a temporary teacher because I am a part-time 
teacher as well (9.6.98) 
Part-time and temporary work are related by the belief that both facilitate the 
competing duties of women's paid work and their unpaid domestic 
commitments. These links are therefore essentially gendered. Underlying these 
observations are the assumptions that divided responsibility leads to a lack of 
commitment towards their paid work with the corollary that both part-time and 
temporary work are considered to be of less value. The devaluation of part-time 
and temporary work is personified in the perceived low status of the workers 
who undertake it in comparison to their full-time, permanent counter-parts. The 
perceived low status of temporary work is carried beyond simply gendered 
associations by incorporating other prejudiced and hierarchical assumptions. 
Newly Qualified Teachers 
The experience of 'low status' was especially acute amongst NQTs. Five NQTs 
were interviewed during the research (Karen, City, Katy, City; Ray, County; 
Samantha, County; Marie, County). All five had qualified at the same time and 
had been originally employed on temporary contracts of varying duration at the 
outset of their careers. They were all keen to secure permanent posts and at the 
time of the research, Karen, an NQT in City, had just received her first 
permanent contract - eighteen months after qualifiying and taking up her first 
post. In the twelve months following the interviews only one other, Ray an 
NQT in County, had been offered a permanent contract. The NQTs intervleýN ed 
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also gave similar responses to part-time teachers when asked the question if it 
was commonly known which teachers in a school were on temporary contracts: 
I mean people knew I was on a temporary contract because I Nvas a new 
teacher in the school ... 
I just accepted that is what happens as an NQT. 
(Samantha, County, 7.7.98) 
Similar comments were made by three other NQTs (Katy, Ray and Karen). 
Whilst all the NQTs had recognised the link between temporary work and their 
newly qualified status and to some extent had accepted this, there were different 
perspectives on the issue which were possibly linked to their experiences. 
Karen's view was that the link was related to levels of experience: 
I think it is difficult to distinguish between the issue of temporary 
contracts and the issue of experience. I think if we all started on 
permanent contracts but were NQTs we would still be treated the same. 
(interview, 1.3.98) 
Katy on the other hand had qualified at the same time as Karen but was facing 
the prospect of her latest contract not being renewed. Her perspective was more 
cynical: 
If they think you are good enough at the interview to have that job then 
why not make it permanent? It is just a power thing, especially at our 
school (interview, 1.3.98) 
Samantha and Ray were confident that their currently temporary contracts 
would be made permanent shortly. They thought it was acceptable to use 
probationary periods for NQTs as a way of determining quality before a 
commitment was made. Samantha expressed this clearly when stating: 
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If you employ an NQT who isn't ý-ery good then if they have got a 
permanent contract then there is no sort of option anymore. And I think 
that most NQTs are very good at their jobs but I am sure there are one or 
two who slip through the net who perhaps don't do a very good job. 
And I think it gives the employer and employee a chance to get used to 
each other for a year. (interview, 7.7.98) 
From the informal conversation that ensued following a group intervieýN- with 
Katy, Karen and Ray it was clear that the teachers were very committed to 
teaching and worked very hard. It was also clear that they have a number of 
concerns about the way things are done in their schools, but that they feel 
unable to challenge or even suggest alternatives because of their temporary 
status. This was most clearly put by Katy who said it was a shame that teachers 
didn't get a chance to put all the good practice they learn at college to use - 
largely because of overwork and imposition of teaching practice from their head 
teachers. 
Temporary work and ethnicity 
The links between temporary work and ethnicity were subtler and less obvious, 
but nonetheless present. The institutional financial mechanisms, particularly 
'Section IV grants which provide insecure sources of funding for language 
integration instructors have been detailed in earlier analysis. One such language 
instructor was Mr. Dep who was an instructor in Bengali working on a twelve- 
month temporary contract in a secondary school in City. This was Mr. Dep's 
first paid work since arriving in the UK from Bangladesh two years ago. Mr. 
Dep ,s contract was coming to an end and he was clearly very anxious about his 
future. He did not seem comfortable xvith the suggestion that his temporary 
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contractual status was anyway related to his minority ethnic status. He 
considered that the school had given him a valuable opportunity and was "very 
grateful' for the chance to have received work as a language instructor rather 
than in the catering jobs he considered the norm for people arriving from 
Bangladesh. 
There are so many Bengali people from Bangladesh who are living in 
this country. Most of them are doing restaurant jobs. And if yoti want 
to work for [a] restaurant you don't need to get any skill to get this job. 
You can get this job straight away and you can stay long by doing this 
work. But I didn't like to do restaurant work and my lack of 
communication skill, not only mine but other people from back home. 
lack of communication skill is why they couldn't get any other job other 
than restaurant jobs. And you can find most of the people working in 
restaurants. There isn't anything else because they didn't get any job 
skill from back home. When this job came up that is why it was very 
important to me. (9.6.98) 
Mr. Dep's experiences highlight the devaluation of the language skills 
possessed by minority ethnic workers in the UK and their segregation into 
stereotyped jobs as a result. In reality Mr. Dep's competency in the Bengali 
language was a scarce and valuable skill in the school in which he worked. 
However this was not reflected in his terms and conditions of work or in his 
own feelings of worth. 
Pamela, an RSW of Afro-Caribbean origin, illuminated some worrying 
paradoxes in equal opportunities policy and practice. Pamela's temporary 
contract was coming to an end but she had been informed that to be placed on a 
permanent contract for the same job she would have to go through the formal 
interview procedures required under equal opportunities. As identified in the 
earlier analysis, this was not a requirement for temporary contracts as theN, were 
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often used to cover the interim period between the lengthy appointment process 
and were often used to by-pass a city-wide recruitment freeze. Pamela Nvas 
rather apprehensive about going through this procedure for a number of reasoiis. 
Firstly, she considered that in her experience, under equal opportunities 
procedures, advertised jobs were rarely given to incumbent jobholders. as this 
appeared to be favouring 'insiders'. Secondly, Pamela considered that the r' 
introduction of written tests into interview procedures, again under equal 
opportunities, disadvantaged black workers. 
Because now sometime they give written tests or whatever and black 
workers put information down differently on paper. And the way I see 
white workers coming in and the way they write stuff down on paper is 
the way that you know they want it to be written, right. But the standard 
of education is totally different and, with this and the patois, you can see 
the difference in the way that it is written. And that works against you 
straight away. Yeah, I can see how they want you to do it, but probably 
your schooling or whatever they never taught you. (11.5.98) 
Again language skills, in this case Afro-Caribbean patolS, were undervalued. 
The majority of the children in the unit in which Pamela worked were Afro- 
Caribbean and used patois, which most white workers had difficulty in 
understanding. However, rather than being viewed as a skill, Pamela's 
proficiency in patois was viewed by her as a hindrance. As a black woman and 
a single parent, Pamela's experiences seem particularly poignant when 
considering equal opportunities philosophy and the people it is designed to 
protect. Pamela should be the model beneficiary of EO policy; instead as a 
temporary worker, she found herself its victim. In this instance it is clear that, 
in relation to the way temporary and permanent contracts , vere allocated. the 
letter of the procedures were out of touch, if not in direct contravention. Nvith 
the spirit of the policies. 
The above analysis identifies that the low status of temporary Nvork is 
differentially experienced according to the demographic features of the workers 
it affects. However many of the outcomes of the vulnerability and insecurity 
produced by temporary employment were found to be common across these 
groups. An exploration of these issues is contained in the following analysis. 
The Impact and Outcomes of Temporary Work 
After speaking to temporary workers it became apparent that their feelings of 
insecurity had a number of elements. These ranged from the concrete and 
practical, such as the financial implications of their situation and an inability to 
plan for the future, through to the psychological states provoked by this sense of 
insecurity. 
Financial insecurity 
All of the temporary workers interviewed said they would prefer a permanent 
contract and in the majority of cases the need for financial security was given as 
the main reason. Two of the teaching staff related how their career preferences 
had been subordinated to the need for financial security. Mr. Dep said that. 
although he would like to stay in his current school because he felt he had built 
up good relationships with his pupils. his first priority had to be to secure a 
permanent contract and financial security. Karen related how the need for 
financial security had driven her last career choice. She had been offered 
223 
another temporary contract at a school that she considered would have been a 
wise career move. but had also been offered a permanent position at a school 
where she knew teaching conditions were much harder. Hmvever Karen 
wanted to buy a house and needed a mortgage - something she knew would be 
difficult when employed on a temporary contract. Karen opted for the difficult 
school and the permanent contract. 
Marie, an NQT in County, had managed to get a mortgage Nvhilst working as an 
agency teacher as the agency had arranged it for her. However, she considered 
that she had been given little choice and she felt the mortgage was probably not 
on the most advantageous terms. She also considered that, having secured the 
mortgage, the repayments were a constant source of worry and had kept her 
locked into agency and temporary worklo. Marie also related how during the 
long summer break she had been forced to take work in a shoe shop because she 
had not received sufficient teaching work to secure a holiday payment. 
For most of the teachers working on temporary contracts a mortgage was out of 
the question. Even shorter-term borrowing had proved daunting and financial 
arrangements, which would seem uncomplicated for most permanent workers, 
were considered to be a coup for them. As Katy noted: 
I have been very lucky with the bank. I was in the position where mý' 
car was past it - it had had it. But I ust went into the bank, I Nvas doing i t: -- 
supply then, and I said 'you have got two choices. You can either have 
f285 a week coming in or you can have f40 coming in. ' and they gave . L- 
'0 The provision of financial services by employment agencies raises serious issues concerning 
conflicts of interest. Marie's experience highlights some of these dangers for temporarN 
workers. The NUT has noted similar concerns and is investigating related complaints bN some 
of their members. 
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me the money to get a new car. But I was just lucky. (Katv. NQT. Clt%" 
1.3-98). 
Even Samantha, at 22 the youngest of the NQTs interviewed, ýN-ho was quite 
happy to be free of financial restrictions, expressed some concern over financial 
issues: 
I am renting at the moment and I don't want to buy because I don't 
know where I am going to be in five years time. But I have managed to 
get a car loan from the bank as a post-graduate. But I do know people 
who have struggled to get a loan from the bank because they have not 
had a permanent contract. But if I'd have had any difficulty then I 
wouldn't have been able to get a car and that would have been a real 
problem. (County, 7.7.98) 
For Mr. Dep even a car loan was out of the question: 
The amount of money that I am getting makes it difficult to fulfil my 
requirements. After you fulfil your requirements, then you can start 
thinking about luxuries ... I can't think about holidays. My wife needs a 
car for work and every morning we have to worry about if it will start or 
if it is going to be stuck in the middle of the road. Every time I worry 
about it. If my job was permanent then I would be able to buy a better 
car than that. (City, 9.6.98) 
Fiona, a part-time dance instructor in City, raised an important issue about the 
longer-term financial implications raised by the vagaries of temporary 
employment. Fiona had taken out a pension scheme during her earlier periods 
of temporary employment with a previous LEA, but in the constant switching of 
contracts the paperwork for the pension had been mislaid and it had now lapsed. 
Fiona also pointed out how temporary workers are thwarted even ý, Nben they are 
attempting to be financially prudent: 
Somehow everything just got lost so I never bothered chasing it again. 
Simply again, because I didn't fit the masses, I ha, ý,, e fallen by the 
wayside. (City, 9.7.98) 
Pamela, an RSW in City and a lone parent. took a positive and pragmatic View 
of the financial restrictions created by her temporary contractual status. She 
claimed that the uncertainty of her financial situation prevented her from 
entering into credit arrangements: 
I don't put any trust in the contract ... it makes you more careful. (City. 11.5.98) 
However, even Pamela considered that 'mortgages are different. She said she 
had taken a permanent job (not in social services) to enable her to get a 
mortgage and that her current temporary work prevented her from moving 
because she thought she would probably not get another mortgage. This was 
despite her good repayment record during her temporary work. 
Interestingly Fiona and Sally, whose part-time temporary work had originally 
been the second wage in a dual income family, were now facing changed 
situations as both of their partners had been made redundant. Fiona expressed 
this concern when saying: 
I was not the main breadwinner in the household so part-time suited. 
But my circumstances have changed. My kids have gone to universitv 
and that is a major expense for us. My husband's circumstances have 
changed. Whereas before, I didn't have to work, now I am looking at an 
income albeit part-time I am looking towards it because that income is 
used now. (Fiona. City 9.7.98) 
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Thus, there are a variety of ways in which income insecurity becomes an issue. 
particularly in relation to housing and transport. Financial arrangements, which 
would be seen as standard by most of their permanent colleagues, were 
complicated by uncertainty for the temporary workers interviewed. Teaching 
and social work are usually considered to be pensioned positions. thereby 
securing the future retirement of workers in these fields. However. as Fiona's 
experience indicates, the future of temporary workers, even in traditionally 
pensioned occupations, is far from certain. Insecurity about the short-term also 
featured extensively in the concerns of temporary workers and is considered in 
greater detail below. 
Insecure futures 
A subject that frequently arose during conversations with temporary workers 
was their difficulty in seeing beyond the horizons of what were very often short- 
term contracts and a resultant inability to plan for the future. As Max, an RSW 
in City stated: 
If you have a family you can't plan long term. You can't plan a holiday, 
you can't plan what is going to happen six months down the road. You 
can't plan whether you are going to have a job tomorrow. Itisjusta 
nightmare. (11.5.98) 
Katy, although an NQT, had entered teaching as a mature student. She had 
given up many of the things that workers normally take for granted to return to 
higher education. Now qualified, her temporary status meant she was finding it 
difficult even to recoup the trappings of working life she had once taken for 
granted: 
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I can't do anything. I am in a no win^ situation. Now I can't Let a 
mortgage, I can't really do much because I know that I could be out of 
work at the beginning of September. If the worst came to the worst, I 
could get supply. I still wouldn't be able to get a mortgage but I could 
pay rent. But it does put you in a very weak position. (L' ). 98) 
Similarly Pamela considered that even taking her eight-year-old son on holiday 
was an extravagant venture: 
It is a little bit of a risk, but we still go. (11.5.98) 
One of Fiona's main concerns was the planning that was necessitated by her 
work. As a dance instructor part of her job was to organise 'productimis' for 
Christmas and Easter events at school. She felt this was difficult when her 
contract was renewed on a three-monthly basis and worried about the impact of 
this on her career. 
I think should I start this. Will I be able to see it through ... 
So it is the 
case that I do what I can whilst I am here. I can't foresee next year. It 
does really limit you and also your career prospects within the school. 
Regardless of how capable and efficient you can be at something, you 
just know that you may not be here tomorrow. So you hold back from 
working parties and things. (9.7.98) 
Fiona and some of the other temporary workers thought that much of the 
uncertainty could be avoided if they were kept informed of their contractual 
situation and had more warning about either the renewal or the termination of 
their contracts. Fiona stated that although she had been at her school for five 
years her contract had been renewed on a termly basis and, though the offer of a 
permanent contract would have been her preference, a twelve month contract 
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would have at least allowed her to plan her work more confidently. Fiona also 
felt that decisions about her contract were either taken at the last minute or not 
relayed to her until it would be difficult for her to get another post: 
If you are left in limbo, if you are waiting to find out -I have at times 
had to go and say 'look am I coming back in September. Do you want 
me back in September. ' When in actual fact I should have been told 
early enough so that I am then able to look out for a new post. (9.7.98) 
Pamela was in a similar situation in that her contract was renewed on a three 
monthly basis. However she had not worried about her contract until it was 
ý11 aDOUt to reach twenty-four months - the point at which temporary workers 
began to qualify for employment rights. She had noticed a distinct difference in 
the way the impending renewal date was being treated: 
What they are supposed to do is tell you after three months, but they 
don't tell you anything. You just keep working and they might say "oh 
your contract needs reviewing' but they don't do anything and you just 
keep working. But this time they are not saying to me 'your contract 
needs renewing' they are saying 'your contract is ending'. So I know 
that something must have been said ... 
but they prefer to keep you in the 
dark. (11.5.98) 
In contrast Samantha had commented that her satisfaction with her contract had 
stemmed largely from the way it had been handled and the fact that she had 
been kept informed and been given prompt information that might affect her 
situation. 
I know that my job is safe until this time next year ... as 
long as you are 
kept informed I don't think there is any problem with a temporary 
contract as long as you don't have huge financial 
commitments ... 
because I have been kept informed, I haven't had a 
problem with it. (7.7.98) 
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As analysis in the previous chapter has identified, the lot of the temporary 
worker is often sealed by their inability to complain. Their dependence on ofteii 
nothing more than the goodwill of their managers for the continuation of their 
contract, means that 'rocking the boat I is often not an option: 
It [the renewal of his contract] is entirely dependent on the authorities - 
if they want to keep me in the job. If they want to kick me out then they 
can. I have no say. I feel powerless. They are really good people so it 
is all right. If they were bad people they can kick me out at any time. If 
I wanted to argue about anything, for example if I need more materials 
but the school authorities are not providing them. If they don't then I 
couldn't do my job properly so it could be a problem between me and 
the authorities. They could sack me even though it wasn't anything that 
was my fault. Now they are good people and they are providing me 
with the materials I want. But if they don't, I can't do anything. (Mr. 
Dep, instructor, City 9.6.98) 
As previously stated, Mr. Dep considered himself very fortunate to have found 
ajob which allowed him to use his language skills. He was very grateful for 
what he considered to be the kind treatment he received from the managers of 
the school in which he worked and was therefore reluctant to say anything 
against them. However it was clear that he was aware of his vulnerable position 
and the necessity to keep on the good side of his employers. Karen's view of 
the situation was less opaque: 
You don't question it [the reason the contract is temporary rather than 
permanent] because you want a job. You know there aren't enough jobs 
for everybody so you take the job and hope that it is made permanent. 
(Karen, NQT, City, 1.3.98) 
This view quite clearly explains how the limited number of permanent jobs 
enhances the 'carrot' role of the temporary contract as an inducement to remain 
230 
compliant. Ray also expressed these sentiments and noted how the vulnerability 
of temporary teachers compares with the more powerftil position of their 
permanent counterparts. 
They [temporary teachers] have got a lot to lose, haven't they" I mean 
permanent teachers don't particularly want to address the head but theý' 
have got nothing to lose. They have got a permanent contract ... But at the end of the day you are thinking 'I want to stay here and I don't want 
another temporary contract. So you don't rock the boat do you. (Ray, 
NQT, City, 1.3.98) 
Katy, who felt badly used by her head teacher, had finally considered 
complaining when a personal comment was made about her appearance. The 
head teacher felt that Katy's appearance was not smart enough and had 
remarked, rather unprofessionally, that she looked more like a *dinner lady' 
than a teacher. Katy was furious and discussed the issue with her mentor. 
However Katy's mentor had advised her that 'it might not be a good idea' to 
confront the head teacher about it and eventually Katy decided to let the 
incident pass: 
When I calmed down enough, I thought it was probably best if I didn't 
complain. Especially in the position that I am in. You have to be so 
careful what you say. (1.3.98) 
When discussing this incident the NQT group felt that Katy's actions had been 
wise. They considered that Katy's feelings of resentment about her contract had 
not gone unmissed by her head teacher. As such the remarks were possibly 
designed to provoke a response from Katy, which would provide the head 
teacher with grounds to refuse to renew her contract. 
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Psychological impact 
The combination of insecurity and the lack of control over eveiits 
understandably took a psychological toll on most of the temporaryworkers 
interviewed. Two workers said they had become depressed after woM, ing 
about their contracts and during particular periods of uncertainty their ability to 
do their job had been substantially reduced. One of these workers. Mr. Dep. 
was recently married and he considered that the vulnerability of his position had 
put considerable strain on his marriage: 
I have been married for a year and you know married life is a 50: 50 
partnership. You have to share everything 50: 50 - financial, social life 
whatever. So now from this point of view, financial things, I am not 
able to play my 50% role. This is difficult in a new marriage. If I would 
like to buy a gift for my wife, I have to budget and think very carefully. 
(9.6.98) 
A number of workers related how because they felt ill informed, they were 
constantly looking out for signs that might affects the renewal of their contract. 
If there are any jobs coming up or if there are any changes in the 
department that I work in, then I am obviously the person that it really 
affects. Because I think if my timetable changes, if there is more time 
needed, then obviously I am a part-time person also, therefore I tend to 
feel that it indirectly affects me if there is a major change. (Fiona, City 
9.7.98) 
In a number of cases the temporary workers were optimistic, but this often led 
to even greater feelings of insecurity. passivity and fatalism when their 
contracts were not renewed. One interviewee saw her raised hopes as her oýý n 
problem. 
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It does affect you but it is only ý'ourself getting your hopes up. There is 
no one else to blame. (Marie, County 1.7.98) 
Another saw her temporary state as ongoing and again her own individual 
problem: 
I did hope that I would be taken on full-time ... That's our situation. It's 
not anybody's fault. (Sandra, County 1.7.98) 
Fiona saw insecurity in fatalistic terms: 
I have got to be prepared at anytime to say *well this is it'... no I feel no 
security in this school. (Fiona, City 9.7.98) 
The most striking aspect of these comments is the self-blame that accompanies 
them. The failure to get a contract renewed was often experienced as rejection 
and a number of workers expressed the impact this had made on their 
confidence levels: 
You have always got it hanging over your head. What am I going to tell 
my next employer - that I didn't get my contract renewed. What does 
that sound like? It sounds like you are no good at your job. (Katy, NQT. 
City 1.3.98) 
Max noted the cumulative impact on his confidence: 
... and it has a 
knock on effect because you can see your own managers 
covering their backs and using you, then your confidence has gone. 
(Max, RSW, City 11.5.98) 
Karen had considered the effects of temporary work in depth, and considered its 
impact was related to traits of character and individual confidence levels: 
--- 
It depends on the type of character -,., ou are and how strong you are. 
Because If I hadn't got a contract and they had said - you ýý-eren't up to 
it' I would have just sat there and thought -oh you are right'. Because if 
you are a strong character and you believe in yourself vou mlc-, ht fiLht 
back. But if you aren't quite as strong or confident you would just 
believe what they say to you. (Karen, '. 'ýNQT, City 1.3.98) 
Pamela had little faith in her ability to secure a permanent position and was 
additionally worried about the effect this would have on her confidence: 
If I have been doing the job for two years I don't see NA-hy I have to go 
and sit in an interview. Because if I was on a temporary contract and 
they didn't feel that I was good enough, why didn*t they break the 
contract after three months or whatever" So now I am in a position 
where I have done two years and they want me to sit through an 
interview and, with all these things, they may not give it to you at that 
point. And then you think how do you move after that. (11.5.98. ) 
One paradoxical finding of this research is that temporary teachers often had 
their confidence boosted after going through a successful OFSTED inspection. 
A number of teachers had expressed how this had given them the confidence to 
challenge the implicit and sometimes explicit assumption that they were not 
worthy of permanent status and were in many respects still 'on approval'. 
Training 
The above analysis has identified a number of ways in which the nature of 
temporary work had affected not only the personal aspects of the lives of the 
workers involved, but also their work performance. One of the issues that 
concerned temporary workers considerably was the lack of or inequality in 
training provision. This is particularly interesting because ,, N-hen managers were 
asked about access to training provision for temporary workers, the 
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overwhelming response was positive. However all except one of the workers 
interviewed considered their training to have been insufficient and a number 
identified the substandard nature of what had been described as training. 
The NQTs were divided about training. Two said that they had been giveii the 
statutorily required non-contact time for NQTs to allow some 'self-motivated' 
training. Another, Samantha, felt that she, as a NQT, had been given priority for 
training both in the provision of non-contact hours and also for external courses. 
However,, Mr Dep who, up until this issue was raised had been very positive 
about his school managers, described his disappointment with the training 
which had been supplied: 
We have staff training. We meet at half term or full term and just talk 
about the normal things, not about what is happening in the classroom or 
anything like that. Just general - you couldn't discuss it in a training 
sense. It is a meeting, you can't say it is a training session. We meet 
and just share about very basic problems, which is helpful, everything is 
helpful, but it isn't enough to develop myself as a teacher. (9.6.98) 
Katy identified a similar situation in her school and also added that cost was the 
influencing factor behind poor training provision: 
We are supposed to have training as NQTs but because there are six of 
us out of twelve staff that work there, what she [head teacher] did is that 
we had a two and a half hour staff meeting after school that was classed 
as NQT training, for the simple reason that she didn't want to have to 
pay for supply and our wages. She just wasn't going to do it and that is 
how she got around it. So we had two and a half hours after school. 
(1.3.98). 
The issue of costs and how this was now a prime concern for unit managers in 
social services and school managers in education were raised by a number of 
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the workers interviewed. A few also raised the issue of how this had 
particularly influenced the reluctance of managers to provide training for what 
was seen as a transient and 'common' resource. Sandra had not had any 
training in er eight years of temporary work even though, paradoxical ly. her 
temporary work had been largely at the same school. 
I didn't do any courses because it wasn't looked upon as an investment 
because I was only temporary (Sandra, 1.7.98) 
Similarly, in relation to social services in City, Max noted the elements of 
managerial control related to the issue of training: 
I suppose managers look at it as well you are a casual member of staff 
and you don't have an input into one particular unit so therefore money 
wise they don't want to have the expense of training casual members of 
staff when they know that that resource is going to be all over 
[City] ... You will 
find that the type of training that casuals get is very 
basic like instruction in restraint and basic first aid courses ... There is 
somebody up there, some 'fat controller' looking down and thinking 
'why should we spend x amount of pounds on training casuals when 
they don't stay in one particular place. It saves money and everybody 
has got the idea that they have to save, save, save. (11.5.98) 
Pamela, who also worked for City social services, noted the same issues of 
arbitrary control and the inequality of training provision. As a result, Pamela 
felt that she had not even been provided with the basic form of training for her 
work: 
... I think they say you 
have the same rights as other workers but ý, ou 
find that when they have got training or whatever because theý- saý, when 
the training comes up 'well you are only here for three months' and ý-ou 
don't seem to get the priority of the training like the permanent staff. 
And it is up to the managers whether you can go on this training. I haN-e 
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never been on training since I have been here. Not even first aid. I had 
to go and do first aid myself. (11.5-98) 
Two of the workers noted organisational problems in relation to training for 
temporary workers. The limited time horizons for planning experienced by 
temporary workers have already been noted and Marie felt that temporary staff 
missed out on many of the training courses because they had to be booked quite 
far in advance. Marie added that even if the courses were offered to temporary 
workers it might be impractical for them to commit themselves when they had 
very little confidence in what the future may hold. 
Max noted that the nature of one form of training in social services, termed 
supervision, militated against genuine input by temporary workers. Supervision 
is a form of training that requires workers to discuss with their line manager any 
difficulties they have experienced in their work with a view to initiating some 
joint problem solving exercises. In practice, supervision sessions take on an 
almost confessional context. Max felt that the vulnerable position of temporary 
staff prevented them from adequately identifying any shortcomings for fear this 
may lead to the non-renewal of their contract: 
Ok, everyone makes mistakes but most minor problems and most minor 
mistakes that you make, you can discuss it in supervision. But when 
you are on a temporary contract you are not really given that 
opportunity. (11.5.98) 
Two of the temporary workers also expressed the view that the lack of training 
had impacted upon their work. Mr. Dep complained that his classes -ývere so 
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short and fragmented that he wasn't given the opportunity to build up his skills 
through experience. Pamela also noted a lack of training and linked it to the way 
in which temporary workers were prevented from progressing: 
Without training we [temporary workers] will always be in this position. 
And then you get them [managers] saying 'such and such should have 
followed this and that procedure'. But my argument is that if we are not 
getting the training - they want us to function in certain ways, but if our 
minds are not opened to certain things, whatever, then ýve are not going 
to do it. And that means the kids are not getting it are they. Its alright 
for the managers knowing all the stuff and coming out of the office and 
saying well you should have done this and that when nobody is giving 
us the training. So when the managers move out and do their thing in 
the office, they are still leaving us. And we can do it if we are given the 
skills to cope with the situation ... 
but only certain people get the 
training. (11.5.98) 
Overall, the opportunity for training and related staff development was limited 
for temporary workers, which impacted on their ability to shift from temporary 
to permanent status. Temporary workers also raised major concerns about the 
quality of the service they were providing as a result of insufficient training. 
Relationships between Workers 
Chapter six revealed how managers had fostered divisions between temporary 
and permanent workers. Competition between temporary, especially newly 
qualified teachers, was also identified as an issue. These questions are now 
examined from the perspective of the workers themselves. 
23 8 
Temporary andpermanent workers 
In social services the divisions between temporary and permanent workers 
seemed to manifest itself largely in the way duties were allocated. , %, lax thought 
this was particularly noticeable when he had worked on a casual contract and 
considered this was related to the continual 'new kid on the block* status of 
casual staff- 
I mean take for instance if you are a casual worker and you go to a 
building for the first time. It's a new, different group dynamic. 
Different kids, different atmosphere, different feel, different ethos. 
Because you don't know the place you have to seek somebody to go 
round with or you are going to have to link up with somebody for them 
to show you the ropes. Now some full-time staff look at it as a power 
thing and they look down at temporary staff and they get them to do the 
menial jobs and keep them suppressed. Whereas if I work anywhere in 
the city I want to find out the group dynamic and get on with the job and 
I don't see why people have to look down on me just because I am a 
casual member of staff. I have my part to play within the staff group 
and I have my part to play with the care of the young people. (11.5.98) 
Max also related how this had serious implications for certain aspects of his job: 
Some of the kids will know that you are on a temporary contract because 
members of staff have let it be known so that you become a target. The 
kids know that you are on a temporary contract so they will make 
allegations very, very easily. And then because they have made 
allegations and social services like to deal with it quickly, you will find 
that they will suspend you at the drop of a hat which doesn't do you any 
good because once you are suspended its on your record whether it is 
proven true or not. So you have got that for the rest of your life. (ibid. ) 
Following a number of highly publicised cases of child abuse, residential 
childcare managers and staff were aware of the extremely sensitive nature of 
these issues. This is an issue that also has some resonance with the exclusion of 
temporary workers from grievance and disciplinary procedures identified in the 
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previous chapter. Max's comments raise the possibility that temporary 
contracts provide ease of dismissal with the minimum of investigation should 
allegations be made. 
The teachers also noted clear divisions in day-to-day interactions bet-ween 
permanent staff and supply and agency teachers: 
In the staff room you were told not to sit in that chair and things like 
that. It was a bit pathetic really. (Marie, NQT, County 1.7.98) 
Marie said that she disliked supply work because she had never had a chance to 
feel 'part of the team' and had very little contact with the permanent members 
of staff. In a very similar way to Max, Marie particularly disliked the 'nerve 
wracking' experience of not knowing what the situation she was about to enter 
would be. She related this to a constant reliving of the horrible first day of a 
new job 'when you don't know anything or anybody' (1.7.9 8). 
Resentment between temporary and permanent workers was also raised when 
temporary teachers were covering for maternity leave. This was partly related 
to the hope on the temporary teacher's behalf that the worker on maternity leave 
would choose not to return and therefore open the possibility of a permanent 
position. However it was also clear in relation to teaching staff that the 
allocation of holiday pay for the long summer break was a source of friction. 
Both Marie and Sandra were temporary teachers covering for maternity leave 
and both were facing a summer without holiday pay because the teachers they 
were replacing were returning from maternity leave early to ensure thev 
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continued to receive pay over the summer. This was not surprisingly the source 
of much indignation. First for Sandra: 
So she got her holiday money and I didn't, although I was coming back 
in September to do another temporary contract. But I got nothing for the 
holidays. (Sandra, County, 1.7.98) 
And also for Marie: 
It's not fair really - especially when you know they are coming back 
early (Marie, County, 1.7.98) 
Strained relationships between permanent and temporary staff did not alvvaý-s 
occur and there were indications that some permanent workers were supportive 
of temporary staff and sympathetic to their situation. In a residential children's 
home in City the permanent member of staff who greeted me on arrival to 
interview Pamela, a temporary RSW, told me that she thought it was about time 
Pamela's contract was sorted out and that she considered the way that Pamela 
had been treated by the council was disgraceful. This seemed particularly 
impressive when I later found out that she thought I was an official from the 
personnel department! In County a newly recruited Unison shop steward said 
that she had taken up the post because temporary workers in her department had 
a number of questions about LGR and the future of their jobs. She said she was 
persuaded to become a shop steward because she considered that temporary 
workers obviously needed someone in a less vulnerable position to raise issues 
on their behalf Similarly Karen, a NQT who had secured a permanent contract. 
arranged a number of interviews with temporary teachers for this research 
because she considered it was an issue that needed examination. 
241 
Competition between temporary workers 
Competition between temporary workers seemed to be a particular issue for 
NQTs. All the NQTs interviewed expressed this view and considered head 
teachers had particularly fostered it as a method of gaining extra Nvork and to 
keep temporary teachers feeling insecure. Ray was a NQT in CountN- and, 
because he taught reception children, had fallen foul of the multiple intake 
procedures detailed in chapter five: 
The problem with my job is that at the end of the academic year there is 
always going to be one extra teacher because of the way they stagger the 
reception classes ... and I don't know how they are going to resolve that. (1.3.98) 
Ray explained how this inevitably led to a great deal of competition between the 
teachers involved. However a forthcoming OFSTED inspection had again 
paradoxically provided Ray with a glimmer of hope. He explained how, to 
avoid OFSTED, three teachers from his school had left to take up positions in 
other schools. This exodus had created a number of vacant positions in the 
school, one of which he hoped to secure. ' 1 The possibility of permanent jobs 
had also reduced the need for the temporary teachers to compete. 
Katy, on the other hand, described how her head teacher had replaced six out of 
twelve teachers in her school with temporary NQTs. Katy explained that the 
head had made it clear that only four of the six NQTs would be kept on: 
" Ray had indeed secured a permanent position when I followed up his case tN%, el% e months 
after our meeting. At that time he Nvas the only worker I interý iexN-ed who had succeeded in 
securing a permanent position. 
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She [head teacher] has made us feel very insecure about our jobs. We 
were told just before Christmas that it would be a good idea to applý- to 
the pool again because she didn't know if she could keep us on. and that 
some of us might have to go. Which obviously leads to competition 
between the teachers... my classroom has got to look better than [that of 
other temporary teachers]. My books have to look better than theirs. I 
have got to be in before them and go home after them. (1. ). 98) 
However one development was that the temporary teachers in Katy's school had 
now begun to talk amongst themselves about their situation and possible xý-ays 
in which they could resist the pressure to compete. Katy felt the discussions 
had been tentative, but it was clear that anger was now at least building against 
the head teacher rather than being directed at other teachers. 
Summary 
The above analysis has identified that temporary work in public services is 
characterised by financial and psychological insecurity, lack of training, under- 
utilised skills, damaged confidence and discrimination. This stands in stark 
contrast to Robinson's vision of the 'typical temporary worker' as *much more 
likely to be a well-paid professional, employed on a fixed-term contract within 
the public sector' (1999: 89). Instead of emanating the rosy glow of glossy 
LGMB brochures, which portray flexibility as symbolising the 'Time of Our 
Lives' (1999), this analysis reflects what Rosenberg and Lapidus call the 'dark 
side of labour flexibility' (1999: 62). However, the concem of temporary 
workers for the quality of the service they provide and their commitment to 
theirjobs, despite family responsibilities, is not lacking as predicted by Hakim 
(1991). Furthermore, the women interviewed Nvere not content with the job 
insecurity they faced as a result of their temporary status and did not resemble 
24 31 
the 'grateful slaves' portrayed by Hakim (ibid. ) but their vulnerability did deter 
them from voicing their discontent to their employers. 
Temporary workers clearly have a lot to be agitated about and they were vocal 
in their dissent when provided a 'safe' environment to unload their concerns. 
However what is missing from the above analysis are any indications of 
concerted resistance. This is not an oversight - none were evident. This and 
the preceding chapter highlight that individually temporary workers are 
extremely vulnerable. The corollary is that they more than most workers need 
the collective support of their trade unions. Their un-organised discontent also 
offers opportunities for trade union renewal (Fairbrother 199 1; 1994a; 1994b, 
1996). The following chapter therefore assesses trade union representation of 
temporary workers, beginning with TUC policy initiatives followed by the 
national and local initiatives of Unison, NUT and NASUWT and ending with 
the perceptions of trade unionism from temporary workers themselves. 
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8. Trade Union Policy and Practice on Temporary Work 
The empirical focus of this thesis means that trade union responses to temporary 
work were examined largely at the level of the branch and region of Unison in 
social services and at the level of the division/association for teachers in the 
NASUWT and NUT. However trade unions are hierarchical organisations and 
to place these unions in the wider national context it is necessary to examine 
trade union policy and practice at this level. The analysis begins , N-ith an 
examination of TUC policy towards temporary workers which gives a flavour 
of the general position promoted by the trade union movement. Following this 
an analysis is made of national policies of Unison, NASUWT and the NUT 
before the chapter turns to local trade union organisation. An examination of 
how national and local policies are articulated provides the context for the 
following chapter in which the representation of temporary workers in the case 
study authorities is explored. 
TUC Policy 
In their campaign document "Job and Go! "(TUC 1998), the TUC declared a 
concern for the growing number of temporary workers. The report highlights 
that many temporary workers, in addition to suffering the job insecurity 
inherent in their employment situation. are often denied basic employment 
protection. The TUC considered the problems faced by temporary workers and 
their unions were essentially of a legal nature and their solution was therefore to 
lobby the Government for employment law reform: 
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This report shows how many workers lack employment protection. It 
goes on to look at existing law, how it applies and where the problems 
are. In conclusion, it suggests areas where the la,, N- could be changed so 
that all workers in the UK are afforded equal employment protection 
(ibid: 2) 
This position indicates a somewhat superficial understanding of the nature of 
temporary work and the issues that underpin it. The partial nature of legal 
arguments concerning temporary workers was identified in chapter one. 
However the largest flaw in the TUC approach was their failure to recognise the 
unequal distribution of temporary work either by industrial sector or by the 
demographic characteristics of the workers it is most likely to affect. 
There is little indication in TUC publications of the gendered, racial or age 
related nature of temporary work. The report 'Job and Go' (TUC 1998) does 
not contain any reference to the unequal demographic distribution of temporary 
work. A later report (TUC 1999), which focuses on agency workers, does 
recognise an unequal demographic distribution. However this point is not 
incorporated into the action plan or recommendations of the report. The 
omission is not the result of exclusion of these groups from TUC policy. the 
TUC have taken particular pains to address the exclusion of women trade 
unionists since producing its 'Charter for Equality for Women within Trade 
Unions' in 1979 and more recent campaigns have been aimed at minority ethnic 
groups and young people (EOC 1998: 5). However the TUC position on 
temporary workers illustrates what Howell (1996) has referred to as the 
paradigmatic approach by the British labour movement towards seeking to 
recruit and organise the growing female ,, N-orkforce. Hoývell explains this thus: 
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... for the British labor movement, working women 
have become the 
paradigmatic trade unionists because they predominate in the expanding 
areas of employment, not because they bring explicitly gendered 
questions to trade union practice. (1996: 512) 
The result has been that the TUC has preferred to treat the two issues separately. 
seeing temporary work as essentially poor work but gender, race and age neutral 
for policy purposes. 
Furthermore the TUC has not treated the issue of temporary work as an issue 
that particularly affects public sector workers. All but one of the case studies 
included in the TUC (1998) report are in the private sector and, although one 
exception recognises casualisation in education, the case study used to illustrate 
this point is further education (FE) colleges. This is significant because public 
sector restructuring has removed FE colleges from public ownership into the 
C non-profit making private sector' 
Chapter two identified that the largest single group of temporary workers is 
found in public administration, education and health. Therefore the preferred 
strategy of the TUC to seek legislative reform overlooks two main junctures. 
Firstly, as chapter three argues, the Government, as employer, cannot be viewed 
as a 'disinterested' or 'neutral' legislator. Secondly, deficiencies in 
employment legislation do not explain the difference between the public and 
private sectors, as the legislation is the same for both sets of workers. Therefore, 
as chapter three and six identify, temporary work has particular attractions for 
public employers. Taken further. these points raise the contention that 
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legislation designed to restructure public sen, ices and strengthen management 
authority has been used to facilitate rather than stem the groNýIh in temporar-ý- 
employment. For these reasons simply lobbying the government for legislative 
reform would seem a rhetorical and problematic approach to the representation 
of temporary workers. 
One explanation for their reticence to raise these issues could lie in their 
tentative relationship with the current Labour goverment and a wider agenda 
of social partnership that discourages any direct criticism of the state either as 
legislator or employer. The implications of this point are discussed further in 
the following chapter. Although, like the TUC, Unison, NUT and NASUW'I' 
are vocal in their rejection of temporary contracts and their inherent dilution of 
employment rights, unlike the TUC, they directly encounter employer polic), ý 
and practice. For the public sector trade unions this means that avoiding 
confronting the state as both employer and legislator is not an option. In 
addition although they are organised in hierarchical ways, all three unions strive 
to be democratic organisations and therefore face intra-union pressures. 
National Context 
This section examines the national responses of the relevant trade unions and 
draws out the different traditions of unionism involved and the specificity of the 
sectors they operate in. 
Unison 
Following the merger of NALGO, NUPE and COHSE in 1993, Unison, with 
over 1.3 million members, became the largest public sector trade union. 
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Although union density remained high in comparison to private sector Linions. it 
fell considerably in local government after 1979 from 78% to 46% (Waddingtoii 
and Kerr 1999). Unison covers a wide variety of workers within the public 
sector and, since the onset of privatisation of the utilities and CCT. many are 
now in the private sector. As a result, service group executives (SGEs). whose 
delegates represent members from various 'industries', increasingly deal ,, N-ith 
union business. Therefore, whilst there is no over-arching national policy on 
the use of temporary contracts, this is an issue for SGEs. 
In the local government section the issue was the subject of a national survey in 
1994 and made its way onto the national conference SGE agenda in 1996 and in 
1998. However the progress towards a coherent policy or plan of action was 
minimal. The results of the survey were not disseminated because they were 
considered "not competent [reliable] enough to publish" (Deputy Head of 
Local Government -Unison 19.1.98). An inspection of the questionnaire used 
for the 1994 survey confirms that it was drafted with a poor insight into the 
issues and practices which surround the use of temporary workers. A lack of 
definitions and clarity meant that it would have been difficult for workplace 
representatives (to whom it was distributed) to answer many of the questions. 
Further research into casualisation and temporary contracts was "shelved" in 
preference to issues pertaining to the Single Status Agreement (SSA). This 
point is reinforced by the fate of the motions raised at the national conference. 
The 1998 motion was raised because of "the lack of progress in implementhig, 
the 1996 Service Group Conference decision for a major campaign against the 
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casualisation in local government" (Motion 46 (iii)) (Unison 1998). The motion 
again called for a survey to determine the extent of casualisation and the 
implementation of negotiating guidelines for branches. Unfortunately the 
conference ran out of time at motion 32 and therefore motion 46 fell. 
The ambivalent stance of Unison and the public sector trade unions generally 
towards the use of temporary workers was perhaps best illustrated in a joint 
trade union/employer conference celebrating the finalisation of the Single Status 
Agreement (SSA). The SSA, which took effect from I" April 1997, was 
concluded between local government employers (Local Government 
Association, Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. Association of Local 
Authorities in Northern Ireland) and Unison, GMB and T&GWU. The SSA in 
its entirety is a complex document but its main aim was: 
... the 
implementation of the national employers and the trade unions a) 
to introduce a new national agreement in place of the APT&C handbook 
(purple book) and the manual handbook (regionally variable colours) 
and b) to merge the existing negotiating machinery for APT&C and 
manual workers. (Unison undated: 1) 
The inaugural conference, entitled "Single Status and Social Partnership -A 
New Framework for Flexibility and Security in Employment" had as its 
prevailing theme that "flexibility can be a friend" (Jack Dromey. T&GWU 
conference speaker "Single Status and Social Partnership" I 9th January 1998) 
and that social partnership between public employers and trade unions could 
ensure this possibility. It was contended that the SSA proclaimed local 
government as the I pioneers of social partnership' who would be careftilly 
watched by the other public sector unions. However it was interesting to note 
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that the united front of social partnership began to dissolve when the issue ot- 
numerical flexibility was raised. The SSA incorporated temporary but not 
casual workers and it was apparent that one of the many stumbling blocks in the 
agreement was the different perceptions between employers and unions as to 
what constituted a casual worker. Again, as in the attempts of Unison to 
research the position of temporary workers, it was clear that a lack of insight 
into the nature of and the blurred boundaries between temporary and casual 
work hindered the union position in the debate. 
NASUWT and NUT 
The issue of temporary contracts amongst teachers was raised at past national 
conferences of both the NASUWT and the NUT. In both unions motions on 
temporary contracts were supported and passed into national union policý'. 
However the two unions have adopted quite different approaches. An 
NASUWT motion raised at the 1998 conference mirrors the TUC position by 
calling for legislative reform and the introduction of regulations for agencies 
providing supply teachers. The NUT have advanced a more proactive approach 
which has included regular surveys in 1983,1990,1992, and most recently in 
1995 to assess the extent and implications of the use of fixed-term and 
temporary contracts amongst teachers. 
The findings of these surveys were used to formulate a national union policN, 
and to issue guidelines to prevent the abuse of non-permanent contracts. This 
document identified a number of strategies aimed at the workplace. The first 
25 1 
involved clarifying the legal position of teachers employed on temporary 
contracts and ensuring that head teachers and governors are fullý aware of 
employment rights. The second approach was to point out the equalitý- issues 
surrounding the use of temporary contracts and draw attention to the likelihood 
of 'unlawful indirect discrimination'. The last two strategies xvere aimed at 
outlawing the use of the waiver clause and the infonnal use of temporary 
contracts as probationary periods for NQTs. The document concluded by 
proposing measures at the workplace that would allow trade union 
representatives to monitor and question plans to use temporary contracts and to 
terminate existing contracts. 
The document was issued in 1995 and as yet has not been adopted by either 
County or City. However temporary teachers gained continued support in a 
conditions of service resolution passed at the 1998 national conference which 
called for a 'teacher's national contract'. The first of an eleven-point proposal 
demanded: 
... all teachers shall 
be employed on permanent contracts except where 
they are covering for the absence of permanent post-holders or where 
the school or service is being reorganised and the union is formally 
involved in the process. Fixed term contracts will not be used as a form 
of probation. (Documentary records) 
It is interesting to note from this statement that the NUT was willing to 
exchange an acceptance of temporary contracts for a seat at the bargaining 
table. However, from the rest of the document, it is clear that the NUT has 
gained some appreciation of the pressures that have resulted in the increased tise 
of temporary contracts. The resolution called for the organisation of a 
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"National Contract Week in the autumn term 1998 to dra,, v maximum attention 
to our campaign". 12 Furthermore the NUT has pursued the links between time 
limited specific grants and an increased use in fixed-term contracts. A national 
survey conducted in 1996 examined the use of such contracts for teachers 
employed under 'less assured sources of funding. The conclusions vvere: 
In recent years there have been significant changes to the systems bý' 
which funding is allocated to LEAs. Section II funding. in particular, 
has become a less assured source of funding for many LEAs. This 
uncertainty, together with the time limited nature of the funding ... has in the Union's view led to a clear increase in the use of fixed term 
contracts for teachers employed on work funded in this way. 
(Documentary records) 
However the union did not highlight the potentially discriminatory use of 
temporary contracts issued under section II funding discussed in chapter three. 
Local Context 
The paucity of policy at a national level concerning temporary workers and the 
effects of decentralisation have meant that action at the regional and branch 
level in Unison has been fragmented and variable. Similarly, although the 
teaching unions have been more proactive in central policy making, LMS 
severely limited the extent to which these have been effective locally. 
Therefore local responses have been driven largely by the circumstances 
prevailing in the authority/LEA serviced by the branch/association and the 
traditions of organising they have adopted. The following sections provide the 
12 The document also links the recruitment and retention problems in teaching to the use of non- 
permanent contracts. In relation to this issue it is interesting to note that Frank Dobson, 
Secretary of State for Health, has linked the shortage of nurses to the improper use of temporar% 
contracts. 
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general context for Unison, NASUWT and NUT in each of the authorities 
before moving on in chapter nine to show how it has been relevant to the 
specific representation of temporary workers. 
Unison 
Both City and County were served by the same regional office. which covei-ed 
six metropolitan authorities and four county councils. The regional office was 
divided into four 'specialisms' of which local government was the largest 
followed by health service, the utilities and higher education. The local 
government section covered about 80,000 members. 
City 
In 1998 City was covered by a team of three regional officers and one secretary 
amongst whom the work is divided according to departments within the 
authority. Unison was the largest trade union branch in City with a formal 
membership of 2 1,000. However it was considered that the actual membership 
stood at around 18,000 with about 1/3 in social services and 1/3 in education. 
This represented a density of approximately 69% of the eligible workforce. The 
branch covered workers who worked directly for the local authority, workers 
employed by the one outside contractor, a number of voluntary agencies and a 
number of workers at the local international airport. The ratio of steward 
coverage was approximately 1: 60, although this was uneven with some 
workplaces better represented than others. The steward network largely 
reflected departmental structures with the two 'lead' stewards for social services 
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who covered adult and children's services respectively. HoweN-er the dispersion 
of workforces in large and small work sites meant it was difficult to recruit 
stewards, particularly in smaller sites. One outcome was a variation in 
involvement, as indicated by one convenor in social services: 
some just pin notices up, others attend meetings and take on full duties 
(13.5.97). 
In principle, stewards and senior stewards undertake day-to-day negotiations. 
However in practice very little negotiation took place at a workplace level. 
Representation at this level was usually confined to individual representation on 
grievance and disciplinary issues and often these were passed to branch officials 
fairly early on in the proceedings. The branch committee comprised around 70 
people when all positions were filled and these 'lead' officers made the final 
decisions concerning branch matters. Only two officers were usually present at 
city-wide negotiations and, in theory, decisions and information were relayed to 
the branch, although in practice communication within the branch proved more 
complicated. 
The Unison branch in City was formed in 1996 following the national merger. 
Prior to the merger there was one NALGO branch, one COHSE branch and five 
NUPE branches in City. There had been a history of tension between the 
NALGO and NUPE branches resulting in the formation of one of the NUPE 
branches in the 1980s as a 'break away' from the main NALGO branch. 
Underlying this history were distinct perspectives reflected in different 
traditions of public sector trade unionism (Terry 1996). In the election for the 
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new branch executive, twenty posts were up for election and seVenteen Nvere 
contested. The merger was not a smooth process and had resulted in a great 
deal of political wrangling and vying for positions between former branch 
executive officers. 
Candidates standing for election to branch positions reflected three main camps. 
'The right' consisted mainly of the old NUPE officials. 'The broad left. seen as 
radical and mainly consisted of the old NALGO officers and a few radical 
NUPE officials. The third party described themselves as a kind of 'middle of 
the road party' which was disenchanted by the policies of both the *right' and 
the 'broad left'. The inaugural meeting of the new Unison branch was bitter 
and divided, which resulted in the national and regional officials taking control 
of the branch. Following the elections, the branch executive was divided 
between members of each of the factions but the leader of 'the right' won the 
most powerful position of branch secretary. 
The prevailing view of the merger was that it had resulted in a 'massive 
ideological clash' within the new branch executive that centred mainly around 
different views on how the branch and particularly negotiations should be 
conducted. A branch executive member from the 'broad left' complained: 
the right don't consult the membership and prefer to do their own 
wheeling and dealing ... We were asking our members to resist rather 
than haggle at the council door which is how I think old NALGO tends 
to see this particular branch secretary and how his former branch 
operates. So given the balance of power with *the right' at the moment I 
would say there is a fairly cosy relationship with the City council. 
(children's services lead steward, Unison. City 11.6.97) 
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Other complaints from the broad left were that information was withheld, 
resulting in a severe break down in communications. It was claimed that eight 
months after the merger only one newsletter had been issued. This had 
previously been a regular form of communication in the NALGO branch. The 
'broad left' felt the lack of communication was compounded by the manoeuvres 
of the new branch secretary to replace the 'rule-book officers' (negotiating 
committee) with ex-NUPE officials. This was further enforced by the new 
branch secretary also gaining the position of secretary to the joint trade union 
forum -a powerful position in city-wide negotiations. 
The implications of these discussions within the branch had marked 
consequences for the development of policies on temporary work. It was clear 
that the secretary did not pass on information from CANS meetings to other 
branch officials (observation). Jackie, the branch service and conditions officer 
and the only senior female branch official, complained that the newbranch 
secretary had 'unilaterally' removed her from the negotiations concerning 
casual and temporary workers. Her removal, she felt, was provoked not only 
because she was from the former NALGO branch but also because the branch 
secretary 'has a particular problem with capable women' (4.8.97). In this vein, 
the 'broad left' were further concerned that the NUPE branches had not given a 
high profile to equalities issues and this was being transferred to the new 
Unison branch. Jackie felt that, although the union nationally was improving on 
equality issues, the branch had been more innovative in this area prior to the 
merger. She gave the example that in the previous NALGO branch there had 
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been a women's and black members officer. 13 This position had been put 
forward for the new rules and constitution but had not been incorporated. She 
felt the final insult had been to elect a 'middle aged white man' as the equalities 
officer and a black woman as his assistant. 
Members of the 'broad left' considered that the merger had caused a 'major 
distraction from doing the job and serving the members' and that 'the branch 
has just been paralysed since [the merger]' (lead steward - children's services 
13.5.97). It was argued that regional and national full-time officials had taken 
the side of 'the right' by forcing a disputed constitution on the branch. Tlicý- 
felt that ex-NALGO officers had been stereotyped as 'young left-wing radicals' 
(ibid. ) and a number of broad left activists had been 'Rule Yd'(investi gated for 
bringing the union into disrepute). As a result it was felt that steward 
recruitment had been discouraged and existing stewards were attending 
meetings less frequently. This was argued by ex-NALGO officials to be 
particularly damaging as their branch had been typified by frequent and 
relatively well attended stewards' meetings. Furthermore the lead steward for 
adult's services, an ex-NALGO official. considered that the service ethos 
fostered by Unison was making it more difficult to recruit stewards stating: 
The union advertises itself as a service, not something that you have to 
participate in and do something for yourself. (adult's services lead 
steward Unison, City 13.5.97) 
The perspective of the new branch secretary was somewhat different. He felt 
that the NALGO branch had typified adversarial relationships with the City 
II There has also been a black members officer in a fonner NUPE branch 
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council and with other trade union branches. He argued that since the merger 
the prevailing relationship was one of 'reasonableness characteristic of NUPE 
negotiationsý (23.5.97). However it was clear that the continued and N-ocal 
opposition of the 'broad left' was beginning to take its toll: 
It's [the merger] been very traumatic. It's been verý- traumatic for me 
because there is a lot of resentment to the way I work for the reasons I 
have just outlined to you. (Unison branch secretary, City 22 3.5.97) 
This pressure continued and in the 1998 branch elections the branch secretary 
did not stand for re-election. Jackie, the ex- NALGO service and conditions 
officer (white, female), was elected as the new branch secretary. 
The circumstances surrounding the merger had affected the relationship with 
the new branch and regional office. As stated, members of the 'broad left" 
considered that regional officers had taken the part of the 'rigrht' by forcing a 
disputed rule-book on the new branch. To some extent the senior regional 
officer, a former NUPE official, supported this: 
[City] is a very large branch. It has a membership on paper of about 
20,000 in reality nearer 18,000. And it means it is very difficult to keep 
tabs on everything that is going on. So our relationship with the 
individual lay-officials varies enormously. It would do in a branch that 
size ... The [City] 
branches, there were previously seven of them, were 
forcibly merged against their will in 1996. And effectively I did that 
merger [pauses] and that was not an easy situation for anybody. They 
had to merge by virtue of national rules, which they themselves had 
voted for at national conference. So it was fine in theory but not in 
practice. There is a lot of difference between branches. Some of it is 
personality-based but most of it is ideological-based. (Unison senior 
regional officer. City, 6.1.98) 
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However it is interesting to note that the same official was keen to point out that 
regional officials had not allowed the political differences. 'vvhich had disrupted 
the merger to such a great extent, to bias the service that was provided from the 
regional office: 
Our relationship from regional officer to lay-official or activist does not 
depend upon which particular grouping those people are in as to whether 
we have a good relationship with them or not. And that is the truth. All 
three of us have good working relationships with people within the so- 
called broad left, with the people in the so-called right and with the 
people in the centre. (ibid. ) 
In practice the situation was more complex. Observation at negotiations 
meetings at which the regional officer was present confirmed his concern not to 
become too closely associated with branch officials connected with the 'right'. 
He did not sit with these officials during the meetings and preferred to chat with 
officials from the other trade unions during interludes. The latter was in stark 
contrast to the 'right' Unison branch officials who always sat next to each other 
and ensconced themselves in council chambers for secretive interlude 
discussions. 
County 
The Unison branch in County was formed in July 1996 following the relatively 
straightforward merger of one NALGO branch (2500 members) and two NUPE 
branches (1500 members). However rather than reflecting harmonious internal 
relations, any lack of friction was largely the result of specific features of the 
branch which led to a rather passive form of trade unionism. The branch had 
two full-time officials one of whom was a Unison branch organiser (a full-time 
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officer employed by Unison and assigned permanently to one branch). The 
other was a branch lay-official on full-time secondment for the duration of 
LGR. There were fifteen other branch officer positions but six were unfilled. 
one of which was the post of equality officer. It was clear equalities issues xvere 
given a low profile within the branch and there was limited awareness of race 
and gender issues. 
In 1998 there was a total membership of approximately 4.000 -a density of 
approximately 45.7% of the total eligible workforce, low by local govemment 
standards. Prior to the merger the branches had worked together well in 
campaigns against budget cuts and this had smoothed the path of the merger. 
However there was a history of considerable internal upheaval in the previous 
NALGO branch. This stemmed primarily from the "defection" of a previous 
branch secretary to the T&GWU followed by a substantial number of members. 
There were 104 shop stewards in the branch but activism was considered to be 
extremely variable with members often contacting the branch officers directly 
for information and assistance. One result was that much of the branch 
official's time was taken up by individual casework. Another was that the 
branch relied heavily on the support of regional officials. This had been 
initiated by the presence of a branch organiser and continued in his absence on 
long-term sick leave, by regional officials. The result was that the branch as a 
membershiP-led organisation had effectively become moribund and, as chapter 
four highlighted, industrial relations in County had become almost entirelý" 
related to smoothing the path of LGR. 
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The Teaching Unions 
There has long been a great deal of competition and rivalry between the main 
teaching unions both nationally and locally. At a local level this is exacerbated 
by facility time in both County and City being allocated on a pro rata 
membership basis. Therefore actual local membership numbers are a closely 
guarded secret with quoted numbers often being greatly inflated. In both 
authorities it was noted by both NUT and NASUWT officials that the combined 
official membership of each of the unions greatly exceeded the number of 
teachers employed by each authority and the rivalry between the unions 
surfaced regularly in the interviews conducted with trade union officials at 
every level. 
NUT 
In the NUT every association was a constituent of the national union with 
associations usually linked to the LEA. Some smaller associations combined to 
form divisions and the NUT in City, because of size, was an association 
division. Ideally, as long as somebody was willing to stand, each school had a 
representative. Whilst most schools in City did have a representative, the 
association secretary felt that the quality of representation varied greatly 
between schools. He also felt that it had become difficult to recruit 
representatives because of the added workload teachers faced. In addition. the 
advent of LMS has considerably personalised the employment relationship at 
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the level of the school. The combined effects of these pressures on v, -ork place 
activism were described by one trade union official: 
Some teachers end up doing four night meetings a week. Absolutely 
ridiculous but they end up being cajoled or bullied into doing 
them ... there is a sort of fear element now in which many head teachers 
use bullying and intimidatory tactics and people just don"t want to feel 
that they are in the firing line... (NUT association secretary. City 5.3.98) 
Decision-making in the NUT association in City was carried out via an 
association executive at monthly meetings. However the main form of 
communication to members was considered to be an association newsletter 
issued quarterly. The executive committee consisted of nine officer positions 
with the association secretary seconded on a full-time basis. The gender profile 
of the executive committee was two-thirds women to one-third men, reflecting 
the national membership profile. The association secretary was the only black 
executive officer with one other black activist. Although this is a statistical 
over-representation of black members in the local association, the secretary felt 
that the black membership was not very active stating 'it is still only two active 
black members' (5.3.98). 
Full-time officers were involved in association business usually only in a 
supportive role and, although members could approach regional office directly. 
they were often referred back to the association. Only when individual cases 
reached the stage of dismissal or when industrial tribunal proceedings looked 
likely were regional officials involved. The relationship between NUT regional 
office and City association was relatively good. However there ,, N,, as an element 
of dissatisfaction with the national union: 
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I think we have got a pretty good regional office... I am not happy with 
the support we get nationally but happy with the support from regional 
office. The only trouble is of course is that a lot of their decisions are 
driven nationally. So they are tied in many ways. I am particularlý- 
thinking when we are looking for the union to take some form of action 
or when we perhaps need to ballot members. We have got a structure 
for doing that, which quite often gets blocked or bogged down at 
national level. (NUT association secretary, City 5.3.98) 
Regional officials confirmed the tight control of the national union over 
regional offices: 
Because we are under the control of the national union, the priorities of 
the regional office are determined nationally because he who pays has 
the control. (NUT regional secretary 10.2.98) 
There was also a strong suggestion that regional officials preferred to keep 
negotiations at the level of the LEA and out of individual schools: 
There is inherent prejudice built in, either within the trade union 
movement because it is no different to the rest of the population 
generally. And there is inherent prejudice on the staff side, which is 
why you can't leave it to local bargaining, then they will let those fixed- 
term contracts go in a sacrificial way. So you can't rely on the staff in 
situ to look after the wider concerns of temporary staff. Which is why 
you have to continue negotiations with the LEA and cling to the LEA as 
employer and not let this devolution go on as it has done. Otherwise it 
will be the survival of the fittest when it comes to potential redundancy 
or whatever. Sometimes we find that we do have to say to our 
representatives that your job isn't to negotiate on behalf of the school. 
That's the division's responsibility. So for redundancy issues we like to 
send someone from outside who can be more objective. So we don't get 
much hassle with governors because we have really got to take the fight 
to the local authority because they will then have a wider application on 
other schools. (NUT regional secretary, 10.2.98) 
This is an interesting position when considering the weakened status of the LEA 
under LMS. It highlights the reluctance of the regional union (and therefore the 
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national union) to engage with the decentralised bargaining necessitated by 
LMS and the employer's powers it bestows on head teachers and govemors of 
individual schools. Underlying this position is a faith in the ability of the LEA 
to exert pressure on schools, which stands in stark contrast to the less than 
assured stance of LEA officials. It also reveals a lack of confidence in local 
activists,, which is justified by alluding to the plight of temporary teachers. This 
stance would seem somewhat problematic as chapters five and six indicate that 
decisions concerning temporary workers are made entirely at the level of the 
school with the LEA reduced to only an advisory capacity. It would also seem 
to stand in contradiction with the national policy that focuses action at the level 
of the school and may explain the limited impact this policy has achieved. 
The NUT division in County was made up of two associations that roughly 
coincided with the areas covered by the County authority and the new unitary 
authority following LGR. The division was therefore undergoing re- 
organisation itself in anticipation of the creation of the new LEA in the unitary 
authority. The divisional secretary felt that the re-organisation provided the 
opportunity to sort out what had become a complex and ad hoc alliance of 
schools: 
So we have used local government reorganisation to completelý- revamp 
it. So as far as we are concerned we have amalgamated into one NEW 
County association which we set about subdividing again but without 
having separate branches. So if you like we will have people 
responsible for various areas but not whole branch meetings as such... 
Its not a national thing. It is really a response to the way things have 
gone in County and as a result of LGR which seemed to make it the 
right time to look how you were organised and sort it. (NUT di,, 'Isional 
secretary, County. 22.2.98) 
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After LGR each association became a separate division reflecting the division 
of the LEAs. The split was mediated for sometime before the vesting date ývith 
the association linked to the new authority acting as a "shadow division'. 
However, up until the vesting date, the divisional secretary continued to 
negotiate for both associations. Following LGR she planned to continue 
negotiating for County whilst new officers would be elected for the division 
covering the new unitary authority. 
The 'core' executive officer positions in the division consisted of the secretary. 
treasurer, assistant treasurer, president, president elect, ex-president, 
membership secretary, equal opportunities officer, and health and safety officer. 
In addition to these posts there were a number of officers drawn from the 
membership and a number of locally relevant positions were created on an 
annual basis. The divisional secretary stated that the executive were flexible iii 
their duties: 
Because what usually happens is that yoti never have enough people to 
cover events at the time. So you are always needing people who are on 
stand-by. (22.2.98) 
The executive held regular meetings of elected members and aimed to have one 
division meeting each month but usually managed to have about ten meetings 
per year. These were supplemented with whatever additional sub-committee 
meetings are required. Union business was communicated to the membership 
via an unspecified amount of general meetings and the annual general meeting 
to which all members were in-vited. 
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As previously stated, membership figures between the teaching unions ýN-ere a 
particularly sensitive issue with neither the NUT nor NASUWT officials willing 
to reveal exact figures. The secretary of the NUT was particularly evasive: 
Oh I am not going to disclose those [laughs] ... It 
is a very sensitive area 
because what immediately happens is there then starts to be the 
arguments over how much time everybody should have (22.2.98) 
Even when pressed on the issue she would not reveal which of the unions had 
the larger overall membership but preferred to state that the NUT had the most 
members in primary schools whilst the NASUWT had more in secondary 
schools. 
However, despite high membership figures, the recruitment of school 
representatives was problematic: 
... there are also a lot of people who don't want to admit to being the 
union rep ... a lot of teachers in schools won't touch the idea of being the 
rep or even admit to being the correspondence person who opens the 
post. (22.2.98) 
When questioned as to the reason for this reluctance the divisional secretary felt 
that it was largely in response to the increased workload teachers now faced, but 
this was reinforced by a number of issues, such as employment law. She felt 
that the increasingly complex area of employment law and the greater use of 
contractual arrangements that were being made by head teachers discouraged 
people taking up the post of school representative: 
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The other thing is there is an implied responsibilitý- and most people feel 
that if they were a rep they would have to kno\v all sorts of thinLls that 
they don't know. (22.2.98. ) 
Further, NUT officials felt that there was growing evidence that bullying by 
senior teachers was becoming a problem in many schools and that teachers in 
these situations were unlikely to take on union duties: 
What you generally find is that some of the schools have got verN- good 
reps, they have been reps for years and that's fine. But what is difficult 
is getting the schools who haven't got reps to have reps. And sometimes 
you don't appear to have anybody in a school and when you get in there 
they are there and they are doing the reps job but trying to keep a ImN- 
profile. (ibid. ) 
Consequently there seemed to be a particularly high level of (invited) 
intervention by regional officials in the NUT in County, with the secretary 
perceiving the role of divisional officers as almost supplementary: 
... 
in the NUT we work very closely with our regional office ... Because 
sometimes its just essentially being an ear for somebody to let fly at 
rather than going and doing themselves an injustice. When they realb" 
aren't thinking logically and they want somebody to just thrash things 
out with who is outside of their school situation. ... 
So a lot of it is a sort 
of counselling role. So you are not going along with any particular trade 
union argument or anything to do with employment law ... Which I think 
you will find is a different set up to the NASUWT because they are set 
up differently. (22.2.98) 
This was supported during an interview with the regional secretary who. 
although covering both County and City, referred many more times to events in 
County and appeared to have a closer involvement with the division in County. 
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Paradoxically the division seemed to exhibit more independence from the 
national union: 
I mean headquarters suggested to me that I should negotiate with the 
LEA to ensure that all part-time teachers were paid the whole five 
'baker days' [personal development days]. Now bearing in mind as I 
said earlier,, the agreement that we have always run in County is that if 
you are a half time teacher you do half the Baker days. And bearincy in 
mind some people may not be available on those days, because if thev 
are a part-time teacher they may be a part-time something else we didii't 
pursue that one in County. It was almost, well it seems like a good idea 
but... (ibid. ) 
It is possible to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions if ffieý, are 
viewed as a function of the somewhat narrow view of trade unionism held by 
the divisional secretary: 
You have got your contact number on your membership card and it is a 
bit like the AA that is all you need. I suppose it's a bit like that for all 
the unions - we are just a bit like the fourth emergency service. As for 
being proactive and forming policy and trying to change things, they 
[members] feel they have enough to do and they feel they have paid 
their subscription for somebody to do it. (22.2.98. ) 
In this perspective the role of the regional union was seen to complement the 
individualistic view of trade unionism by extending casework and offering legal 
services, whilst the more abstract collective position of the national union was 
regarded as somewhat irrelevant. 
The divisional secretary portrayed the relationship between the NUT 
associations and the other teaching unions as being co-operative. Like the local 
government unions in County, the teaching unions had been drawn together in 
an effort to fight the budget cuts that had faced the education department. 
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However it was clear there were considerable differences between the unions. 
Differences separating the NUT and NASUWT were seen as larLiely between 
their 'philosophies' although the divisional secretary was loathe to expand upon 
them. The differences between the NUT and the head teacher*s unions (-NAHJ' 
and SHA) were more explicit: 
What I feel essentially happens in County is that to a large extent Nve 
actually work together. But that only works so far because you also 
have head teacher unions as well as teacher unions. And there are 
always points because head teachers are more in the role of employers 
than employees that you may get large differences with them (22-1.98) 
NASUWT 
The local structures within the NASUWT mirrored those of the NUT .. N-ith the 
association being coterminous with the LEA. The NASUWT claimed that, with 
five thousand members, it was the largest teaching union in City. The 
association consisted of a group of lay-local officers and a local executive. The 
local officers were a secretary and a deputy secretary both of whom had full 
time release for union duties. The other executive officers comprised a 
president, vice president, past president, treasurer and other officers identified 
on an annual basis to take up specific duties. Three of the executive officers 
including the general secretary and assistant general secretary were women but 
there were no black officers. The local executive also consisted of up to oxenty 
member officers elected from amongst members in the city. The executive met 
on a six-weekly cycle and there was a standing agenda of referral of local 
business and treasurer's report. The association secretary was also a national 
executive member. Communication and decision making within the association 
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was achieved by general meetings at least once a term and an annual general 
meeting supplemented by meetings held for specific groups of members as and 
when those were necessary. These meetings vvere open to all members with 
dates and invitations to attend circulated to all schools. 
The association strove to recruit a school representative in each school with 
NASUWT members and coverage was considered to be good. The assistant 
general secretary was more positive about the quality of school representatives 
than the NUT association secretary but she did mention difficulties in recruiting. 
activists in the changed climate following LMS: 
In some schools, those schools where you know you are going to have 
difficulties, where there are issues to do with bullying, then it is difficult 
to sometimes get reps, but we try and encourage it by going in meetings 
with the members, letting them put an officer's name to a face and 
giving them whatever help and advice they need. (NASUWT association 
assistant general secretary, City 27.4.98) 
The assistant general secretary of the association felt that, in City, the 
involvement of full-time regional officers occurred only on a very limited basis 
with the majority of casework and consultation meetings with the LEA dealt 
with by association officials. However in certain circumstances the specialist 
knowledge of full-time officials was sought and on these occasions she felt the 
support given both at a regional and national level was 'excellent'. This support 
usually took the form of asking for a second opinion on contractual issues but 
other legal aspects such as industrial tribunal cases and industrial injury claims 
were usually taken over by regional officials. 
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Before LGR there were two local NASUWT associations in County that 
essentially covered each of the main areas to be divided bý- LGR. Howeý,, er. 
unlike the NUT , it was planned that a third association would be created for the 
new unitary authority and County would retain the two existing associations to 
cover the north and south of the county. Also, unlike the -NUT. the t-wo 
associations already had separate committees. The officers of the committees 
comprise a secretary, treasurer, president, who was the chair and then 
approximately six other committee members who took on duties depending on 
the needs of the association. 
There was also a federation that was an amalgamation of the two associations. 
This was a small federation by national comparison but reflected the fact that 
there was a third association in the past, which would now be recreated 
following LGR. The federation function was essentially for negotiation 
purposes and it met two or three times a term. Each association had a 
negotiations secretary who reported back to the federation any negotiations that 
had taken place and took orders on these from the federation. There were 
regular general meetings to which members were invited, but the negotiating 
secretary considered that information was "passed down" to members via 
newsletters sent out twice a term. 
Membership numbers were again a sensitive area because of the fear of loss of 
facility time and the federation secretary would not disclose any figures. The 
information he did disclose mirrored that given by the NUT official in that he 
felt that NASUWT membership was strong in secondarý, schools. He said that 
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many secondary schools in County had only NASUWT members but conceded 
that the union had few members in primary schools. He considered that this 
represented a gender split within primary and secondary schools, which 
reflected in union history stating: 
I think it is probably historical. I mean we used to be the NAS - the 
National Association of School Masters and we merged , N-ith the 
National Union of Women Teachers. So as I say I think it is historical. 
But it has been a long time - since the 70s I would say that the two 
unions merged. (NASUWT divisional secretary, County, 10.2.98) 
He further stated that although association general meeting in his association 
attracted as many women as men members, general meetings in the other 
association attracted very few women members despite the fact that there was a 
female association secretary. It was also clear that, locally at least, traditional 
notions of gender stereotyping pervaded the philosophy of the union: 
We had a history of being more militant - the NASUWT. I think the 
NUT are recognised as being a bit militant in London, but generally we 
have been more militant than the NUT. And I think men tend, in the 
past -I think things have changed now - men have tended to be more 
militant than women. I mean I was talking the other day to a woman 
who has been made redundant in one of the schools and she said 'it is 
only pin money'. And I think there is still a lot of women who do it for 
pin money in effect. And there isn't that militancy there. My wife 
doesn't do it for pin money she does it because we need the money! 
(ibid. ) 
The union's policy was to have a school representative in place in every school 
that had NASUWT members and the divisional secretary felt that this had 
largely been achieved. However he considered that the effectiveness of 
individual school representatives varied and that there had been difficulty in 
recruiting activists, particularly committee members. Recruitment of members 
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generally was again similar to that of the NUT with the most concerted efforts 
being to attract NQTs. It was interesting that little attention ývas paid to 
teachers returning to teaching after a career break. although picking up new 
membership from existing teachers in other unions was valued: 
I think most returners look back to which union they were in before theý- 
left. But we have picked up a lot of members. I try to be proactive. We 
picked up a lot of members recently in one of the districts because there 
was a big hooha in one of the schools where all 19 teachers were 
members of the NUT and they weren't happy with how the NUT 
handled the case. So they have started coming over to us (ibid. ) 
Regional officials played only a small role in the activities of the associations 
and federation: 
He [regional secretary] doesn't play that much of an active roll. He 
comes along to our federation meetings and he will buy the drinks after! 
But he covers far too big an area and the NASUWT is run on a 
shoestring. At each conference they say we are the richest trade union 
in the country and I am sure that we are because they won't spend any 
money! So [the regional secretary] ends up running a huge area but 
consequently does very little in County (ibid. ). 
The federation secretary even handled certain industrial tribunal cases, which is 
unusual for lay-officers. However it was clear that the regional secretary and 
the divisional secretary had a close and friendly relationship. The regional 
officer confirmed these points adding that federation officials had a great 
amount of autonomy in the NASUWT generally but federation officials in 
County had proved particularly adept at dealing with union business without the 
intervention of the regional office. 
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Summary 
The two branches of Unison operated very differently. The merger of the 
Unison branch overshadowed trade union activity in City. However this at least 
resulted from active and passionate beliefs about trade unionism including race 
and gender issues. Regional officers did play a part in branch activities but this 
was contested and tentative. The difficulties of the branch merger resulted in 
further distanced relations with the regional and national trade union 
organisation. By comparison dependence on regional officer input had 
seriously weakened the Unison branch in County. The loss of the branch 
organiser left the branch in considerable disarray at a time when LGR NA-as 
leading to substantial restructuring of employment policies. Equalities issues 
were not given a high profile in the branch and were not a consideration ii-i 
negotiating LGR. 
There appeared to be a number of differences of approach between NUT 
association/divisional officials in City and County. Despite being served by the 
same regional office, the association secretary in City appeared to be far more 
independent of full-time officers than his counterpart in County. There also 
seemed to be differences in perspectives between the two officials as to the 
modus operandi of the union. The association secretary in City viewed the 
union as an activist based organisation and gave equalities issues a high profile 
whereas the official in County had a far more service based orientation to trade 
unionism. One similarity between the two NUT officials was their vie,, N- of the 
national organisation as distanced and somewhat irrelevant. 
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The NASUWT association officials in both City and County operated largeIN 
independently of both the regional and national union. However in both 
authorities the activism of the union rested with a small number of key 
individuals who operated, in effect, as full-time officers. It was clear that in 
County gendered stereotypes still pervaded the perspective of the leading 
officers of the association, which impacted upon his view of women as activists 
and workers. One similarity between NASUWT officials and their counterparts 
in the NUT was the belief that union activism at the level of the school NN-as 
discouraged by the bullying tactics of school managers. 
These features had implications for the representation of temporary workers in 
the case study authorities. The lack of articulation between national and local 
policy and practice meant that, even where national policy on temporary 
workers had been formulated, no co-ordinated action took place. Poor 
communication was also a feature within branches and stemmed primarily from 
collaborative forms of negotiation, which excluded all but a few trade union 
activists. Women activists seemed to fair particularly badly under these 
arrangements. Where this style of negotiations occurred it was underpinned by 
a view of trade unionism as a vehicle for servicing a passive membership. One 
outcome was that bargaining agendas were not directly informed by 
membership interests and were limited, with the result that equalities issues 
were largely absent from negotiations. Another was that workplace activism 
was substituted with full-time lay officer led negotiations at the level of the 
council chamber or the LEA. The specific impact of these features on trade 
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union representation of temporary workers is examined in the following 
chapter. 
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9. Local Union Responses to Temporary Work 
The previous chapter outlined the general context in which Unison, NUT and 
the NASUWT operated in the two case study authorities. There xvere \vIde 
variations between the unions and even between branches of the same union 
towards equalities issues, national policy, activism and trade unionism 
generally. The following section examines how these factors directly 
influenced trade union responses to temporary work in the two case stud), 
authorities. 
Recruiting Temporary Workers 
Job freezes on permanent positions in City and County meant that union 
recruitment had reached a plateau. The agreements made in County in relation 
to LGR, which meant that temporary workers would be laid off first, posed 
something of a difficult situation in relation to their recruitment into the union. 
Firstly, the short-term nature of their employment meant that their union 
membership was also likely to be brief Therefore there was little incentive for 
officers to make special arrangements to recruit new entrants over the period of 
LGR. Secondly, as discussed more fully in the following section, Unison 
branch officers in County were also aware that the agreement meant that theý 
could not easily represent temporary workers on issues relating to the 
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termination of their contracts, which also added to the disincenti-ve to recruit 
new members from their ranks. 
Unison branch officials in City, by comparison. had begun to exploit the 
recruitment possibilities presented by the growing numbers of casual and 
temporary workers. In pressuring the City council to reassess the temporarý- 
contracts of workers in a number of departments, Unison had initially picked up 
substantial numbers of new members. However. the interest of the union in 
pursuing this method dwindled as local managers became more adept at 
avoiding issuing permanent contracts. Without this strategy Unison faced a 
number of difficulties in recruiting temporary workers. Firstly their main 
recruiting method, a list of new starters provided by the council, did not include 
temporary and casual staff. This, coupled with the general reluctance of 
temporary workers to come forward, meant recruitment was not the usual 
straightforward process: 
Trying to identify who they are is difficult because temporary workers 
themselves are not keen on coming forward. They feel if they raise their 
heads above the parapet the local manager, with whom they have to 
have the best relationship in the world, will just turn off their money, 
will just say right we don't want you any more. And they have no 
rights. People are fearful and so they keep their heads down. (Unison 
Joint Chief Steward #1ý City, 9.7.97) 
In this case it was clear that the reliance of the union on the goodwill of the 
employer presented a significant barrier in the recruitment of temporary 
workers. Although the recruitment opportunity had been spotted by branch 
officials in City, the added work involved proved to be a potent disincentive. 
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There was also some feeling that temporary vvorkers, particularly part-time 
temporary workers, would not consider the union to be relevant to them: 
They may not see the relevance at all. If theN- are only in ten hours a 
week they think well what has the union got to do -ýN-Ith them. What can 
it possibly offer them. It is the sort of thing that the full-timers who 
have been here for ten years join. (Unison Joint Chief Steward -- 1. C ity. 
9.7.97) 
It was also considered that this could be remedied by a visible union presence at 
the workplace. Membership rates amongst temporary and casual workers were 
noted to be far higher in workplaces where there was a steward present and 
were boosted when union action on their behalf was visible: 
The benefit [of using temporary workers] to employers is obvious but 
there are benefits for the union as well because we can target these 
people and say 'look this is what we are doing for you. Don't you tlllnk 
you ought to join the union' Not all of them do but a good percentage 
do. (Unison branch secretary, City 23.5.97) 
Difficulties in recruiting temporary workers into the union had the Icnock-on 
effect that temporary workers, even when they were recruited, were unlikely to 
become activists. The issue of their vulnerability was discussed in chapters five 
to seven. In relation to this it was noted that stewards were often recruited 
when a grievance arose in the workplace. As temporary workers rarely took out 
grievances, it was unlikely that this would motivate them to become stewards. 
In addition to this it was clear that an informal policy of seniority (length of 
service) operated in relation to electing representatives. One steward had said 
how he had waited until he was sure that he *wasn't stepping on anybody' s 
toes' (9.7.97) before he stood for election. As a result stewards tended to be 
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those workers with long service. Nomithstanding their vulnerabilitv. temporan- 
workers were therefore unlikely to be considered, or consider themselves. as 
stewards. They often have broken service and also considered themselves as 
having less status than their permanent counterparts. The result was: 
Of the 25 stewards we have got, none of them are casual workers and 
this is probably illustrative of the way they are not prepared to come 
forward. (Unison steward, City 9.7.97) 
Recruitment of temporary workers followed a different pattern for NASU%N'l- 
and NUT. As previously identified, many temporary teachers were NQTs who 
were traditionally recruited into one of the teaching unions as student teachers 
before their contractual status was decided. The likelihood that many NQTs 
would initially be employed on temporary contracts and would probably require 
advice concerning their contractual status, was not used by either of the unions 
as a specific recruitment incentive. 
As already identified, another source of temporary employment amongst 
teachers, women returning from child care breaks as supply and agency 
teachers, was not specifically targeted by either the NASUWT or the NUT as a 
recruitment possibility. The NASUWT particularly seemed to prefer to pick up 
extra membership from dissatisfied but already unionised teachers. The NUT 
did produce recruitment material for part-time teachers, which as chapter four 
identified, would also probably cover the majority of this category of temporary 
teachers. However there was no specific mention in this literature of temporary 
work or related contractual issues. 
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Overall, apart from a brief opportunistic attempt by Unison in City, there was 
no systematic attempt by any of the unions to recruit temporary workers as a 
specific category of potential membership. Furthermore the fact that stewards. 
traditionally the engine of workplace recruitment and the human face of the 
union, were unlikely to be temporary workers meant that the union did not 
project an especially familiar or welcoming image to temporary v, -orkers. 
However, particularly in the teaching unions, temporary workers Nvere likelý' to 
be members of a union. This raises interesting questions about the 
representation of temporary workers once they became trade union members. 
Representing Temporary Workers 
There can be no doubt that public sector trade unions have faced unprecedented 
attacks from managers and employers at all levels. The workload this created 
was cited as the main reason for the low priority of, and halting support given 
to, temporary workers. Despite this there was evidence that they had become 
something of a 'sacrificial lamb'. The general feeling of the trade unionists 
interviewed was that non-standard employment contracts were an evil that had 
to be endured: 
The general thinking is that we don't like FTCs. We prefer people to be 
in permanent employment - end of story. Any variation - FTCs, 
temporary contracts and so on - we don't like and we try to avoid 
people going on to them. (Regional officer, Unison, County 19.7.96) 
Underlying attempts to fight the cause of temporary workers, and expressed bý- 
all the union officials interviewed, was the vieNx- that the good of 
members I was paramount. In local government, the management strategy of 
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avoiding redundancies by using temporary workers also preserved the trade 
unions from a potentially very damaging confrontation should the a(zreement be 
breached. In both City and County this was facilitated by the informal 
bargaining arrangements that had evolved. As one Unison branch official in 
City stated, the temporary worker issue had become sensitive because are 
up to our ears in backdoor deals because of CCT" (informal discussion, 
15.6.97). 14 
In relation to these points, a member of the joint trade union forum (not a 
Unison official) in City stated that a number of his colleagues on the forum had 
"turned a blind eye to the use of casual and temporary workers to protect a 
small core of the workforce and union membership". He considered that "'lazy, 
complacent trade unionism had resulted in a lazy and complacent management" 
who were allowed to use temporary staff because it offered a short-term 
solution for both parties (informal discussion, UCATT official 10.12.97). 
Although these tendencies were less pronounced in the teaching unions, LMS 
and the tighter control of school budgets meant that redundancies amongst 
teachers had occurred and forced the teaching unions into unfamiliar industrial 
relations territory. One result was that in both authorities the NUT and 
NASUWT officials said they had signed agreements, which resolved that 
redundancies should be sought amongst temporary staff before permanent staff. 
The NASUWT official for the County association was scathing of this approach 
but the other officials considered it to be the most reasonable course of action, 
14 Foster and Scott (1998) have noted collusion between local authority managers and unions in 
attempts to resist contracting and the undermining effect this has on union credibility with its 
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feeling that the job security of permanent teachers should be protected above all 
else. 
The most blatant and sanctioned example of the use of temporary workers to 
protect the 'core' workforce is provided in County in relation to LGR. The 
strategy of using large numbers of temporary workers to cushion the blow of 
LGR had been almost unquestioningly accepted by Unison: 
... there 
is a practical reason for having FTCs on occasion-and LGR is 
one. Given the way the government is funding it, there aren't going to 
be many jobs at the end of the day. So to preserve existing members in 
permanent jobs we have agreed with the authority that people appointed 
now will be on FTCs. That expires when LGR takes over and that's a 
mechanism for preserving existing member's jobs (regional Unison 
officer, County 19.7.96) 
This view was further reinforced by a branch official: 
some of these 'as and when' [zero hours contracts] people are our 
members but we must obviously look after our permanent members first. 
(Unison branch officer, County 11.7.96) 
This position had been undoubtedly facilitated by the entrenched collaborative 
relationship between regional and branch officials of the union and senior local 
government officers. It was only when it became clear that this was not limited 
to the duration of LGR and would not guarantee the protection of 'core' 
workers, particularly union activists, that the union in County began to show 
any concern. However, even at this point, branch officials stated that although 
membership when they have been implicated in reduced terms and conditions. 
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temporary workers were invited to join Unison, the union would be unable to 
represent them on issues pertaining to their contract. 
The priority given to permanent members was also something that mana-gers in 
County were aware of- 
Q: Have you encountered any particular problems in relation to the use 
of temporary workers? 
A: In terms of the unions I would say certainly during the local 
government re-organization process. The trade unions have been keen 
to exclude temporary staff in terms of the appointments process. You 
know their preference is to safeguard the permanent meinbers of staff 
and temps just have to look after themselves I think as far as they are 
concerned. So I would say that as far as the trade union is 
concerned ... the pecking order is permanent members of staff are more important to them than temporary members of staff. (personnel officer, 
social services, County 4.12.97) 
This perspective gives rise to the possibility that the trade union marginalisation 
of temporary workers increased their appeal for managers. 
In City the priority given to permanent workers rights was more subtle, but 
nonetheless evident. Certain Unison branch officers had been instrumental in 
pressuring the city council to review their use of temporary labour. This 
influence had resulted in the department by department review of the contracts 
of temporary workers and, to a lesser extent, the creation of a centralised pool 
of casual staff in social services. However, during the course of the research the 
issue of temporary workers was allowed to drop from the negotiating agenda 
when a dispute concerning pay dates and essential car user allowances was 
allowed to take precedence. The regional official had also noted this: 
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Yes it [the casual worker issue] literally dropped off the agenda at the 
meeting didn't it. I think that is right and I am realh, seriously 
concerned about this bloody pay date thing because everything is just 
piling up behind it. Single status, you know. I know we are going to 
have serious problems with the authority on single status and because 
we are not talking to them about anything because of this dispute we are 
just not dealing with it. (Unison regional officer. 6.1.98) 
It was clear that his concern is not with the relegation of the casual worker 
issue, but with the stalling of negotiations on Single Status - another agreement 
which, as discussed in chapter eight, excludes casual workers. In later 
discussions with the regional officer it was apparent that the temporary Nvorker 
initiative was considered to be a local matter and the business of the lay branch 
officers. The regional officer had little interest in the issue and had only beeii 
present at the CANS meeting because of the threat of industrial action over the 
pay date dispute that had knocked the temporary worker question from the 
agenda. Therefore issues regarding temporary workers were largely dealt N\ Ith 
at the level of the branch without any guidance from the regional office. 
At branch level the use of temporary workers was not subject to any collective 
agreements. Representation of temporary workers was individuallsed and 
usually involved an informal telephone call to the manager and personnel 
officers involved. The recent departmental review was the result of attempts by 
branch officers to address the issue on a more systematic and collective basis. 
However employer resistance to enter any new collective agreements meant 
even this had degenerated into identifying and approaching individual workers 
in a 'case by case" manner. As a result the revievv process was exceptionallý 
lengthy and time consuming for both personnel mana(-)7ers and trade union 
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officials with the effect that it essentially became a war of attrition. The lack- of 
a collective agreement also meant that representatives still encountered 
resistance and thinly veiled threats from departmental managers: 
Sometimes a local manager will say 'well I can't afford to pay this 
person as a permanent and if you force me to do it then I can't pay then-i 
at all' and that's when it starts to get a bit difficult. (Unison branch 
secretary, City 23.5.97) 
The failure of the union to proceed with negotiations at branch level often 
reflected a lack of detailed knowledge of the practices concerning the usage of 
temporary and casual staff by local managers. This was apparent in Unison, 
NUT and NASUWT and was exacerbated by the dominance of branch officials 
in negotiations, the corollary of which was poor workplace organisatioii and 
steward coverage. The outcome was that important information about the 
tactics used by local managers did not filter up. In observing consultation and 
negotiation meetings it was clear that the bargaining position of the unions was 
hampered by their limited knowledge of workplace practices. This prevented 
any effective challenge to the assertions of the employers. Ironically it also 
meant that the unions were unable to recognise and therefore capitalise on the 
disarray caused by conflicting management policies. 
Conversely, in schools, the decisions to use temporary teachers were made at 
school level where little, if any, union consultation or negotiation took place. 
As identified earlier, the preferred tactics of the teaching unions were to avoid 
school-based negotiations and to maintain industrial relations at the level of the 
LEA. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the issue of ternporarý' 
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contracts amongst teachers had featured to any great extent in LEA 
negotiations. This, coupled with the ambiguous position of both LEAs in 
respect of temporary staff and the limited input by governing bodies. meant that 
head teachers had something of a free hand in the use of temporary contracts. 
Poor workplace organisation has been particularly noted in relation to local 
government by Kessler (199 1) and is a traditional feature of pubic sector unions 
used to negotiating issues at centralised levels (Fairbrother 1996). However. 
certainly in City, this varied from department to department. In leisure and 
community services, steward organisation was more extensive and active than 
in social services. The stewards in this department had recognised that, at a 
branch level, the union had taken a rather instrumental view in taking up issues 
on behalf of casual and temporary workers: 
I mean the union does fudge a bit with casuals. I mean when the union 
does get the permanent contracts it goes 'hurrah for the union'. But I 
don't think it is proactive enough really ... 
You need some real militant 
action to get people on permanent contracts because you are asking a lot 
of employers. (Steward, leisure and community services, City, 9.7.97) 
Leisure and community services were the first department in City to be assessed 
under the initiative to review temporary contracts. Unlike the second phase of 
the initiative in social services, stewards had been more involved in the process 
and there had been a far higher rate of converting temporary contracts into 
permanent. It was also clear that steward action and pressure had continued in 
this department after the formal review had been completed: 
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Because they are employees of the department, whatever their status. the 
department can't refuse to talk to us and so we haý-e recentlý- been 
successful in getting four workers who have been on casual contracts for 
15 years established on permanent contracts. (Unison Joint Chief 
Steward #I ý 9.7.97) 
The way in which the stewards in this department had pressured the managers 
to concede permanent contracts to the workers involved had been to enlist the 
support of the permanent members of the staff in collective action. In this way 
a grievance concerning the use of temporary contracts, which would have been 
difficult for vulnerable workers alone to bring, had succeeded. 
What I did is to go through the procedure. I got all the staff together and 
had a union meeting and said 'lets put a joint grievance in' because 
under the grievance procedure they have to meet with you ... within five days of having this meeting and sending the letter off, they have said 
they can have permanent contracts. (Unison Joint Chief Steward #2, 
11.6.97) 
In schools, although there are higher numbers of workplace representatives 
(Ironside and Seifert 1995), their activity is variable and sometimes 
questionable. In two of the schools visited, both the NASUWT and NUT 
representatives were either the head teacher or the deputy head teacher. 
Similarly in local government, many trade union activists, particularly in 'white 
collar' occupations, have come from managerial grades (Fitzgerald et al. 1996). 
Decentralisation and LMS therefore have serious implications for the structure 
of workplace unionism in public services. It brings to the forefront 'the very 
real class differences between manual and non-manual workers, between those 
in managerial positions and those in routine clerical and related administrative 
positions' (Fairbrother 1996: 139). The effects of these changes on membership 
confidence in the union are detailed below. Clearly LMS and decentralisation 
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are beginning to render traditional union structures obsolete and the temporarý- 
worker issue provided a good example of this development. 
One other worrying aspect of local trade union nescience towards temporary 
workers concerned equal opportunities issues and illustrated manv of the 
general shortcomings on the issues discussed above. None of the trade union 
officials interviewed knew how many temporary employees v, -orked in the local 
authority or LEA they covered let alone their gender, age or ethnicitý'. although 
this information could have been legitimately requested from employers. 
Similarly, whilst the teaching union officials were aware of the equalities issues 
involved, there was some resistance by senior Unison branch officials to this 
issue. The male officials often became reticent when this point was raised 
during interview: 
Q: Do you think that temporary contracts have an adverse impact on 
women? 
I really wouldn't like to say. I mean one would assume that they must 
be when you have got so many people on them in the county council and 
75% of our workforce is female. So they must be unless they are 
purposely discriminating against men when they issue them. I must say 
that the more problems we have had with them have been men. But 
maybe that is just because they have kicked up about them. (Unison 
Branch official, County 11.7.96) 
The irony of this lay official's response is not only in his obvious lack of 
understanding of the equality implications of temporary contracts, but in the 
way discrimination against men arises as a concern. Furthermore there had 
clearly been little attempt at considering why male temporary workers had been 
more willing to approach the union with problems than women. 
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Jackie, the terms and conditions officer in City. was the only full-time female 
official in both of the Unison branches and she was keen that the casual issLie 
should be given a higher profile as an equal opportunities question. She had 
been instrumental in drawing up the report that had been originally submitted to 
the JNC. The report firstly asked the Council to abide by its own policy, to 
allow the use of casual and other temporary contracts under certain tightly 
defined circumstances. A second point was that, where possible, temporary and 
casual workers should be given the same terms and conditions as permanent 
workers. Thirdly the report demanded that temporary staff should be equalit,,, 
monitored and included in the City's EO policy. The report finally called for a 
two-year limit on temporary/casual status after which workers should be given a 
permanent contract. 
The report was subsequently passed by the JNC and entered into negotiations 
with the council. However in the intervening period the branch had undergone 
the forced merger. Jackie's removal as a negotiating officer also removed her 
from the casual worker's forum with the result that equalities issue was not 
pursued at consultation and negotiation meetings when the question of 
temporary workers was eventually raised. Only one woman was present on the 
trade union side of the negotiating committee. She was a representative of the 
T&GWU but accompanied another T&GWU official and did not speak at any 
of the meetings. There were no black officers present. The Unison equalities 
officer (a white male) was present but did not raise any equalities issues, despite 
the bald assertion in the minutes of previous meetings that: -The majority of 
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casual and part-time employees tend to be either women and. 'or minority ethnic 
groups". Indeed, this point was not expanded upon or incorporated into the 
discussions in any way. The only trade union official at the CANS meetings to 
raise an equalities issue with respect to the gendered nature of casual Nvork was 
the JNC Chair -a Union of Construction and Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UCATT) official who did not represent any female members! The outcome at 
departmental level negotiations was the failure of the new officials hivolved hi 
the reassessment of temporary contracts in City to challenge the gendered 
significance of the ten-hour per week criteria. 
Temporary Workers' Experience of their Trade Unions 
With the exception of two teachers, all of the temporary workers interviewed 
were members of a trade union. The residential social workers (RSWs) ývere all 
members of Unison; two of the teachers were members of the NUT; three kvere 
members of the NASUWT and one was a member of the Association of 
Teachers and Lecturers (ATL). Of the two teachers who were not trade union 
members, one, Mr Dep, the new language instructor in City, had been 
, approached by a union (he could not remember which) and was given the forms jr 
which he had not got around to completing. He had not been approached again 
by this or any other union representative. The other was Sandra, a teacher in 
County who had returned to temporary teaching work after leaving to have 
children. Her trade union membership had lapsed at that point and she had not 
considered it necessary, as a temporary teacher, to rejoin. Pamela, an RSWin 
City, was also worried that although she considered herself to be a member of 
Unison, her subscriptions may have lapsed. She explained that she had paid her 
292 
subscription by check-off but. because she had been given different payroll 
numbers for each of her temporary contracts, she feared it may have 'gone 
astray somewhere along the line' and may have lapsed. 
The general feeling of the workers concerning their unions was one of 
inactivity, both from union representatives and from themselves as members. 
The majority of the workers said there were no workplace union meetings and, 
where there were meetings, they had not been encouraged to attend. Ray. an 
NQT in County, said that he had not been impressed by his workplace 
representative and thought her only trade union duty had seemed to be to put the 
union newsletter in each teacher's pigeon hole. The trade unions obviously had 
a low profile in the working lives of the people interviewed. Some of the NQTs 
interviewed were not sure of the acronym of their union (NASUWT) and 
Pamela did not know who her trade union representative was or the procedures 
for seeking help from the union if she needed it. The virtual indifference of 
temporary workers towards their unions stemmed from a feeling that they 
lacked relevance to the issues they felt were important. A revealing view of how 
NQTs view their union was obtained during an informal conversation following 
a group interview. Katy, an NQT in City, asked me whether the union would 
help her out on an injury claim for a non-work related injury that she had 
received. It seemed strange that she had not considered taking her complaints 
about her contract and the way that the head teacher had treated her to her union 
official. However, this became less surprising when it was revealed that her 
representative was the deputy head. 
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In the minority of the cases where the union representative was active and there 
were regular meetings held, contractual issues had not been on the agenda. 
Similarly none of the temporary workers knew what their trade union's position 
was on the issue of temporary and casual workers. Unsurprisingly the result 
was that temporary workers doubted that their union could improve their 
situation: 
People have lost faith in the union. People just pay the fees but I doil*t 
think that people have got much faith in them. (Pamela, City 11.5.98) 
When asked whom they would approach when faced with a problem at work, 
the union was not at the top of the list for temporary workers. Max. an RSW in 
City said that he would consult a solicitor if he had problems with his contract 
before he would approach his union. Marie, an NQT in County. said she would 
approach her 'mentor' first and then her head teacher. Similarly Fiona said she 
would approach her head teacher and considered this to be a matter of control 
rather than representation: 
I think the head seems to have sole control over certainly myself and 
maybe even the qualified teachers that are part-time. (9.7.98) 
This comment also supports and echoes the argument in chapters four to seven 
concerning relationships between temporary work, part-time work and 
increased levels of control. 
Max had some serious concerns about his union: 
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Even though I am a member of Unison, I don't find them to be very 
independent to be honest. I find that Unison tends to be made up of staff 
working for social services [management]. So even though they are 
called Unison,, I don't really think that they are independent aýxay from 
social services. I think a lot of the key people in Unison are made up of 
the key personnel staff in social services. So I didn't really contact 
Unison at all about anything to do with my contract. I found I got a 
better response from the managers I was working with at the time... 1 
don't really see that Unison has a role and can really do anything 
significant. Maybe I am disillusioned but I think tlýat the best union set 
up for temporary staff would be somebody that was independent and 
didn't have any links with the City council or social services. At the 
moment I think that the City council, social services and Unison are just 
one big happy family which is not in the interests of the staff ... I just don't see Unison as being in my best interests as a worker. (11.5.98) 
These comments indicate how a temporary worker and union member perceived 
the collaborative styles of negotiations preferred by the Unison branch secretary 
in City. 
Katy, one of the NQTs in City expressed similar feelings about the NUT. In 
this case the NUT was not the union she was a member of but the union her 
head teacher was not only a member of but also the school representative for the 
union. Katy felt that she had been pressured to change her union by her head 
teacher and that one of the reasons she did not have a good relationship with her 
head was that she had resisted. Furthermore Katy considered that this was an 
additional way her head teacher attemPted to exert control over members of 
staff and also used her position of school representative to withhold 
infonnation. Katy also raised an interesting point when she said that she had 
been recruited for the NASUWT by the teaching agency for which she had 
originally worked. If this is a growing practice, it raises important issues about 
the recruitment strategies of the teaching unions and their previously hostile 
attitude towards teaching agencies. 
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The low profile of the unions coupled with a lack of confidence and some 
serious misgivings meant that all of the temporary workers inten, iexý, -ed had 
given little consideration to the prospect of becoming a trade union 
representative themselves. This was reinforced by some additional concerns 
relating to their temporary status. Marie said that she wouldn't consider 
becoming a trade union representative because she felt it was too difficult for 
temporary teachers. The difficulty arose both from the lack of stabilitý, in aný, 
one school and also from the vulnerability inherent in temporary work. These 
were views that were echoed by most of the temporary workers interviewed. 
Pamela said that she had been discouraged from becoming a representative after 
watching how a colleague who had been a trade union representative had been 
treated: 
He really knew his stuff and they [management] really used to give him 
a hard time because he was informing workers of their rights. (11.5.98) 
Pamela considered that it would be much easier for managers to give temporary 
workers a hard time if they attempted to become trade union representatives and 
so she had not thought it feasible for herself 
Similarly Samantha stated that she preferred to keep a low profile in the 
circumstances. 
I just sort of go with the flow of things. I don't like getting involved 
with any controversial issues or anything like that and I think that as a 
union rep you would probably have to do that. (7.7.98) 
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Ray said he had been discouraged from being a trade union rep himself after 
witnessing how permanent members of staff at his school had shunned the job. 
It keeps changing. Nobody ever admits to being a union rep anymore. 
(1.3.98) 
Fiona felt that her part-time status as much as her temporary status militated 
against her becoming a trade union representative: 
I think that to do that [become a trade union representative] you have to 
be in school five days a week. You have to have been there and know 
all the issues that are going on. I would never get full-time employment 
in school so I think that rules me out. (9.7.98) 
Katy and Karen, NQTs in City, felt that the heavy workload of most teachers 
discouraged them from taking on union duties. They argued that this was a 
particular problem for temporary teachers because they took on additional work 
in an attempt to impress the head teacher and secure a permanent contract. 
Karen considered that one of the reasons that head teachers and deputy head 
teachers were often union representative was because they did not have the 
heavy teaching load of the classroom teachers, which meant they could 
undertake union duties more easily. When the issue of facility time was 
broached NQTs were sceptical feeling that, if they had difficulty getting 
classroom cover to undertake statutory training, they were unlikely to be given 
facility time for trade union duties. However towards the end of the 
conversation Katy did begin to consider that as 50% of the teachers in her 
school were temporary and NQTs they should have some representation and 
some input into running the school. 
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Despite the not too favourable view of their unions, temporary workers 
provided a number of examples of how they felt the union could improve their 
representation and make themselves more relevent to temporarý, workers: 
The sort of things I would love to see Unison raising is that - temporary 
work contracts - why is it only three months? Things like if you have 
been doing a temporary contract for almost a year and a half - XN-h)- 
shouldn't you have a full-time job? Things like why does the council 
take an hour off your pay packet when I don't know any casuals that can 
sit down and take an hour off the floor. (Max, City 11.5.98) 
Max also went on to describe how the council had recently introduced a charter 
which informed young people in care of their rights. He felt that Unison could 
provide a similar charter for temporary workers that informed them of their 
rights. 
Similarly Fiona had not been aware that, as she had completed five years 
continuous service at her current school, she almost certainly now had full 
employment rights regardless of her temporary status. Fiona felt this was 
something that she should have been informed of by her union and implicitly 
felt that her union had not given her the service that it provided for permanent 
teachers: 
I mean you have just advised me of something that I didn't know about. 
Therefore I think people like me should be catered for. Things are 
changing now and whereas we have probably been a minorit), in 
schools ... I mean I 
have been teaching for twelve years, so I have paid 
my dues for twelve years and I am here teaching like everybodý, else. I 
take the same responsibilities as every other teacher in the school so it 
would be nice if they did actually just advise us of ongoing or changes 
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that affect our employment and our lives - then that would be more 
helpful. (9.7.98) 
The NQTs felt that the prevalence of temporary contracts amongst their ranks 
meant that the teaching unions should provide support and information on this 
issue when they were recruited during their teacher training. Samantha said she 
had been discouraged from joining either the NASUWT or NUT because they 
had simply advised student teachers not to take temporary contracts. She had 
considered this to be unrealistic and poor advice considering the likelihood of 
an NQT securing a permanent contract was very remote indeed. Ray felt that 
the union should monitor the use of temporary contracts in schools and 
approach their members towards the end of their contracts to ensure fair 
treatment. In this way he felt that schools who particularly misused temporary 
contracts could be identified and challenged. These are important points as it 
was clearly evident that temporary workers were ill informed about their rights. 
This was the case generally with regards to contract issues, but teachers also 
had the added difficulty of falling foul of complex formulae to determine 
holiday pay entitlement. None of the teachers interviewed understood that their 
holiday was subject to calculation by predetermined formulae and the NQTs 
particularly felt that their head teacher could arbitrarily award holiday pay. 
Summary 
The case study data presented in this chapter has identified that local trade 
union initiatives concerning the representation of temporary workers have been 
largely absent. Where they did occur, in the Unison branch in City, theý- were 
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not informed by national policies because none existed. ýNlere national policl., 
had been formed, as in the NUT. conflicting strategies to restrict industrial 
relations to the level of the LEA meant that workplace structures were not in 
place to carry it forward. In both cases the result was that decentralised 
managerial decision-making in relation to temporary workers had largely gone ý ltý 
unchallenged. This was fuelled by a number of factors. 
Firstly, the organising traditions of individual branches clearly shaped their 
modus operandi and therefore responses to managerial use of temporary 
workers. Even if national policies had been in place, it is unlikely that the 
distinctive relationship between the Unison branch and employers in County 
would have facilitated anything other than the compromise that ensued. 
Secondly, all the unions displayed varying levels of ambivalence towards 
temporary workers with an underlying belief that the representation of 
permanent workers must take precedence. Coupled with this was an 
unwillingness to acknowledge the EO issues that are raised by temporary work 
and to use this as a platform for resistance. Certainly, in the NASUWT 
branches, stereotyped beliefs concerning the earnings of women teachers, ", ere 
likely to have played a part in the lack of interest displayed towards the 
recruitment and representation of temporary teachers. 
Unison branch action in City provided the only partial exception to these points. 
Steward activity in leisure and community services had sought to collectivise 
temporary and permanent workers with some success. However this was not 
generalisable and initiatives in the social services departments remained 
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individualised, avoided issues of equality and eN, entually fizzled out altogether 
when put under pressure both from management and internal union politics. 
Lastly, the marginalisation of temporary workers from representative machinerý- 
meant their fate remained in the hands of trade union officials whose jobs were 
permanent and therefore whose own security is considered to be enhanced bý- 
the presence of temporary workers. The irony of this situation was that 
exclusion from trade union representation was likely to make temporary 
workers even more vulnerable and therefore, as chapters five and six argue, 
increasingly attractive over permanent workers to employers seeking 
contractual control. 
Temporary workers were clearly aware that their trade unions offered them a far 
from perfect solution to their problems. Some of the difficulties are elementary, 
practical barriers. For example temporary workers highlighted that union 
membership procedures, such as check-off, are not designed to accommodate 
intermittent employment patterns. Others are more deep seated, relating to 
collaborative forms of negotiations and the ambivalence trade unions 
demonstrate towards temporary workers. Poor, if not sometimes antagonistic. 
representation resulted in a low profile of trade unionism in the lives of 
temporary workers. Participation was therefore discouraged ensuring that a 
vicious circle was created. The workers interviewed confirmed that their 
vulnerable contractual position was a strong deterrent from trade union 
activism. The general feeling was that life was hard enough for temporary 
workers without putting oneself visibly and literally in the firing line. Therefore 
temporary workers are discouraged from trade unionism from within and 
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without - both by their employer's practices and by their trade union's 
responses. 
Despite their seemingly negative experience of trade unionism. some positive 
indications can be drawn from the views of the people interviewed. Firstly 
temporary workers do join trade unions and, more importantly. they do perceive 
a possible role for trade unions in improving their working lives. Most of the 
temporary workers had strong views on what their union should be doing for 
them and had practical solutions as to how they could be represented. The 
problem was that the research interviews had been their first opportunity to 
voice their views, and as a number of the respondents noted, it was the first time 
anybody had shown any interest in their situation. This at least indicates that, 
should trade unions settle their ambivalence and decide to take up the challenge 
in a collective rather than an instrumental strategy, temporary workers can be 
organised. 
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1O. Temporary Work: Towards Clearer Theory and Practice 
The theoretical and empirical data examined in this thesis indicates that the 
issue of job insecurity is of growing concern for academics and policý- makers 
in a number of arenas. However, temporary work, an important component of 
job insecurity, continues to lie in the midst of a definitional, theoretical and 
methodological morass. It is included alongside a number of forms of , vork that 
are considered to be either atypical, non-standard, contingent or flexible 
depending on the preference of the author concerned. Definitional problems 
have resulted in these forms of work either being classed as an homogenoLts. 
residual category or simplistic divisions being drawn between different forms of 
non-standard work. This definitional focus has both preceded and been 
reinforced by a narrow research methodology which, in the main, has focussed 
on large-scale statistical data that demands definitions that can be measured 
accordingly. In addition, much quantitative research has been directed at 
employers' use of temporary labour. Where temporary workers views have 
been sought, they have been measured by survey questions that certainly 
simplify and possibly obscure their experience. This oversight particularly 
affects women whose labour market decisions are likely to be complicated by 
family commitments. 
Underpinning and flowing from definitional vagaries and methodological 
narrowness has been theorising which has been partial and often at a high le\ el 
of abstraction that cannot provide an in-depth knoxvIedge of the genesis and 
.. 
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nature of temporary work. One cause of these limitations has been that theory 
in this area has straddled a number of disciplines, resulting in a literatui-e that is 
diffuse and disjointed. However, previous research contains important data and 
concepts that should not be dismissed. Therefore a fresh, 'joined up' analysis of 
these literatures identifies signposts that point the way to an altemative research 
methodology and theoretical re-focusing that can provide a clearer basis to 
conceptualise the origins, nature and impact of temporary work. 
The flexibility and labour market debates reviewed in chapter one provide the 
first pointers to the importance of the public sector for an understanding of Z-- 
temporary work in the UK. This was confirmed by a secondary analysis of the 
statistical data provided in chapter two. Temporary work is considered by many 
to be a very minor component of the British labour force. Standing at around 
6% it is half the EU average. However the numbers in temporary work have 
been increasing year on year since figures started to be collected in 1984. The 
most significant finding of a secondary analysis of US data came from a 
public/private sector comparison of temporary work. When temporary work for 
each sector is displayed as a percentage for that sector, figures for the public 
sector are more than twice those for the private sector and, at 13%, are slightly 
higher than the EU average. It is in this respect that temporary work is gaining 
significance in the UK. 
Further disaggregated statistical data from the public sector (LGMB 1998) 
highlights that local government offers a clear example as to the extent to xhich 
temporary work is a substantial feature of public employment. Therefore the 
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empirical focus of further research could usefullN, be narrowed to local 
government and more specifically to social services and education. This data 
also identifies the social groups (women; minority ethnic groups; disabled and I 
young people) who are most likely to experience temporary work. Ho,, vever. 
whilst the statistical data can provide 'where' and 'who' indicators, it cannot 
with any accuracy answer the 'why' and 'how' questions. Researchers who 
have relied on statistical data alone to speculate on these issues have overlooked 
important causal links between these aspects of temporary work. A return to 
the theoretical literature is required for this task but as argued above, a number 
of strands that have previously remained disconnected need knitting together. 
Debates concerning temporary work in the UK have largely been contained 
within the literature on flexibility. However the concentration on post-Fordism 
and flexible specialisation has meant that the theoretical focus has been almost 
exclusively on the private manufacturing sector. The incongruence of the 
public sector within this discourse has given rise to the paradox that, although it 
is seen as empirically important, it has not been incorporated within the theory 
in any systematic way. Although flexibility is portrayed as largely management 
driven, this has been viewed as either the result of competitive economic 
necessity (Atkinson 1984; 1985; Atkinson and Meager 1986) or as a way of 
enhancing Tayloristic management control at the micro-level (Pollert, 1988a; 
1988b; Pollert, 1991) and as a way of transferring risks and costs from capital to 
labour at the macro-level (Hyman 1991). These lines of theorising again make 
it difficult to locate the public sector within the debate. 
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Furthermore the abstract nature of theorising concerning flexibility has focussed 
on the employers' perspective despite empirical data pointing to the importance 
of workers and their organisations. Quantitative and qualitative data indicate 
that temporary work does not affect all groups of workers equallý-. Theories 
which draw links between labour market segmentation and segregation have 
been utilised to explain this phenomena. They indicate that workers who are 
women and/or belong to a minority ethnic group are likely to be segregated into 
certain areas of employment - the primary site for both is the service sector, 
particularly public services. However when attempting to bring worker 
organisation into the equation it would seem counter-intuitive to associate high 
levels of temporary work with buoyant trade union membership - both of which 
are present in the public sector. Therefore, although labour market theories caii 
flag up the relationship between the public sector and certain groups of workers. 
they cannot forge the links with temporary work or explain why public sector 
trade unions have seemingly been unable and/or unwilling to resist its growth. 
To address these issues it was necessary to examine two further broad areas of 
theory. The first required a deeper analysis of the specific nature of temporary 
work contained in chapter one whilst the second relevant body of theory, 
contained in chapter three, provided the public sector industrial relations context 
within which to locate this analysis. 
A critical analysis of labour law provided some illumination by highlighting the 
employment contract as primarily an instrument of control. The concept of a 
contractual arrangement becomes the way in which unequal poxver relations 
between employers and workers are obscured and legitimised. Feiiiinist 
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theorists have added to the debate by showing how this form of control has been 
particularly effective in the subordination of women workers. However, 
temporary employment is not a unified concept in labour law and the legal 
theorists have been unable to explain it other than to identify it as a degraded 
form of the permanent employment contract. In order to reach a fuller 
understanding of the employment contract as a method of control it is necessarý- 
to view it as one factor within the social relations of production and therefore to 
identify its place within the labour process. By taking this approach the 
employment contract is confirmed as the basis of control in the employment 
relationship. However its mask of legitimacy has proved to be a double-edged 
sword as workers and their organisations have sought to establish rights under 
the cover of contractual freedom. Some of this has been achieved via the courts 
but the open-ended nature of the permanent contract of employment has also 
been the basis for the struggle for control over the effort bargain in an attempt to 
achieve industrial citizenship (Burawoy 1979) in the workplace. 
Contractual Control 
The task facing employers has therefore been to re-establish a form of 
contractual control that resists giving workers legal rights and also weakens 
their position in the workplace struggle for control. It is argued that the 
temporary contract achieves both these aims. The law is such that the 
temporary worker has few, if any, employment rights. Temporary workers have 
to jump a number of vague hurdles to prove their status as employees before 
they can establish any claim to employment rights. Most of these, such as 
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establishing mutuality of obligation and continuity of employment, are so vague 
as to allow employers to evade them with relative ease. As a back up measure 
employers have, until recently, been able to rely on the waiver clause to dený- 
temporary workers their rights. 
At the workplace it is the open-ended nature of the employment contract that 
has given rise to the struggle for control. The temporary employment contract 
closes off this route by establishing the ease by which employers can offer and 
withdraw work and removes the indeterminacy that allows the struggle for 
control. Marginalising temporary labour from collective representation 
reinforces the power of the employer and is achieved by a number of routes. 
Firstly, the clear threat to a supply of work is likely to discourage temporary 
workers from making any stand against their employer. Secondly, employers 
are likely to use groups of workers, specifically women, minority ethnic 
workers and young people, who have traditionally been excluded from trade 
union representation and who are predisposed by their social status to poor 
working conditions. These issues raise important questions for trade unions 
generally and public sector unions, with high numbers of women and minority 
ethnic members, particularly. 
What is still unclear from this analysis is why this form of control would appear 
to be particularly attractive to public employers. Again the focus of labour 
process theorist has been capitalist production and a struggle for control over 
surplus value, which limits its use in an analysis of the public sector. There are 
a number of clues in the theories as to the relevance of the state, but lar(-)elN- as 
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legislator rather than employer with very little to link the two. The state. as a 
majority employer of women and ethnic groups. offers some inkling as to the 
significance of temporary labour. However to establish a firm theoretical 
grounding for these lines of thought it was necessary in chapter three to 
examine more closely the role of the state as employer generallý, and local 
govemment more specifically. 
Temporary Labour and the State as Employer 
The starting point for the analysis of the state as employer was to re-examine 
the concept of the state as a model employer. The model in its basic sense \ý as 
portrayed as the beacon to private sector employers as to what constituted good 
employment practice. The empirical evidence of low pay and discrimination 
cited in chapter three points to a very different reality. So much so that a 
number of theorists (see Carter and Fairbrother, 1999) have doubted the 
existence or continuance of the model. One problem is that the public sector 
workforce is unique in its heterogeneity and an alternative view may be that, if 
the model exists at all, it may only apply to the top strata of public sector 
workers, although deciding where the top strata begin may prove difficult. A 
radical change in the form of the model since the 1980s has also highlighted 
severe contradictions. An alternative argument put forward in chapter three is 
that the concept of the model employer has, since its inception, been misleading 
in that assumptions are made that the promotion of good employment practice 
was directly meant to indicate improved terms and conditions for workers. If the 
model is recast as one that essentially sought to promote the prevailing logic as 
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to how a capitalist state is to best secure the conditions under which capital can 
flourish, then apparently polar conceptions of the state as a model employer can 
be reconciled. 
Further support for this line of argument is gained when considering that the 
voluntaristic nature of industrial relations in the UK has considerably reduced 
the options for the state to intervene. This has meant that its role as the lan-lest 
single employer has taken on a greater importance in efforts to influence 
industrial relations. Therefore when the state view was that orderly. centralised 
collective bargaining would secure the optimum conditions for capital 
accumulation, the model employer reflected this. When, on the other hand. 
market principles, decentralisation and flexibility are thought to be the key to 
economic prosperity the model is transformed to encourage this view. 
Although this transition can be exPlained concisely in theoretical terms, actually 
putting the changes in to practice has entailed a massive restructuring of state 
employment. Removing orderly collective bargaining as the lynchpin of the 
model has meant dismantling centralised public sector industrial relations and 
thereby marginalising public sector trade unions. Introducing market 
disciplines into what neo-liberal governments since 1979 have considered to be 
ineffective and over-resourced public services has required that state managers 
and local public employers reassess their employment practices towards a 
clearer striving for surplus labour, if not surplus value (Carter 1997). 
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In local government, pressures to do this have taken a number of forms. In 
direct opposition to the spirit of the Fair Wages Resolutions, abolished in 198.3. 
legislation introducing CCT required that local authorities subject some public 
services to private sector competition. For those services that could not be 
easily contracted out, quasi-market principles such as the purchaser/provider 
split have been introduced. Underpinning these changes has been a barrage of 
legislation, the main aim of which has been to reduce the financial and political 
autonomy of local government and create greater reliance on centrallý- 
controlled funding. Many of these sources are not guaranteed and are often 
time-limited. Therefore a considerable degree of uncertainty has been 
introduced into the financial management of local authorities, which has been 
used to justify increasing numbers of temporary workers. 
Education departments are most often the largest elements in local authority 
budgets and have come under particular scrutiny by central government. As the 
employment statistics in chapters two and four indicate, they are also the site of 
large numbers of temporary workers. Chapter three notes the barrage of 
legislation that has drastically altered industrial relations in schools. The most 
sweeping reforms were contained in the 1988 Education Reform Act which 
introduced LMS and removed the financial control of schools from LEAs. The 
funding of schools was made to mimic market principles by requiring the 
income of individual schools to vary according to pupil numbers. Coupled 
with parental choice, LMS means that school funding, including its allocation 
for wages and salaries, is subject to fluctuation and is now at the discretion of 
school managers. This has had the same effect as uncertainty in local 
government funding more generally as ftinding volatility has been used to 
justify increasing numbers of temporary staff. 
In addition to restructuring school finances ERA significantly altered the 
personnel management of schools. The Act removed primary responsibility for 
staffing matters from the LEAs and bestowed powers of appointment - 
including contractual control, suspension, discipline and dismissal on head 
teachers and governing bodies. In local government generally, similar trends 
are present in the decentralisation of budgets and the creation of individual 
workplaces as business units to facilitate the logic of internal markets. 
Devolved personnel management has been less direct in local government but a 
number of initiatives have resulted in the creation of cost centres and the hiring 
and firing of temporary and casual workers has often been devolved to the 
individual unit manager. 
These trends represent moves towards what has been termed New Public 
Management (NPM). However the concept is not clear and, as Cockburn 
(1977) highlights, imported management techniques have a history of being 
treated as a panacea when local goverm-nent is put under pressure by the central 
state. Despite this, the thrust of these initiatives is to give state managers more 
control over state workers - only the level at which this occurs has varied. 
Therefore, whilst central government pressures are likely to be blamed for the 
worsening of workers' terms and conditions, they have provided fertile ground 
for restructuring initiatives and political objectives at the local level. 
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One aspect of increasing the control of local managers has been to devolve 
contractual control. As identified in chapter one, contractual control is larLlely a 
device used for extracting surplus value or in the case of state ý, N, orkers surplus 
labour. The difficulty of identifying surplus value in the context of state 
employment, and the focus of labour process theorists on manufacturing. has 
prevented labour process theories of control from being convincingly applied. 
The clearer wage relationship established by state restructuring (Carter 1997: 
Carter and Fairbrother 1999) means that typologies of control developed 
originally to explain control mechanisms in early capitalism can iioxv ironically 
be used to fit the public sector. For this to be fully achieved the position of 
workers must be insecure and vulnerable - precisely the conditions created bv 
contractual control. 
From Theory to Research Agenda 
Drawing together various stands of literature relevant to a study of temporary 
work has enabled the development of a sharper research agenda in three ways. 
Firstly, an analysis of the literature has established the importance, both 
empirically and theoretically, of the public sector as a research site. 
Disaggregated data has helped to refine the focus to local government. and 
further still to social services and education. Secondly, a critical review of the 
literature highlights the need to alter the perspective of previous debates from a 
solely management driven agenda to one which incorporates workers and their 
organisations into a comprehensive social relations of production approach. A 
detailed analysis and synthesis of theory provided a framework around which to 
develop the set of research questions contained at the end of chapter three. 
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Thirdly, and emanating from the first Vvo points, a research method was 
established. 
The full justification of the methods used for the study is contained in appendix 
one. A recurring theme highlighted by the literature review and analysis was 
the limited ability of large scale surveys to capture the kind of information 
required to meet a social relations of production approach. The case study 
design, by comparison, provided the context between the research sites and 
main actors (employers, workers and trade unions) that permitted the research 
questions to be ftilly explored. The following section summarises the main 
empirical contributions established by using this method and demonstrates the 
efficacy of qualitative methods in exploring the complex social relations 
engendered by the increased use of temporary work in the public sector. 
Temporary Work in Local Government 
The heterogeneous nature of local government suggests that pressures towards 
the use of temporary work are likely to be mediated through diverse 
circumstances. The analysis in chapter four confirmed this hypothesis by 
detailing how the general pressures of centrally imposed state restructuring had 
been experienced differently in the two case study authorities. The outcome in 
relation to temporary work meant that, although state restructuring had resulted 
in its greater use, this had been channeled through a number of local factors. 
One example was that, whilst restrictions on local government financing were 
cited as the major cause of the increases, the effects were uneven. Years of 
under-funding in County had clearly taken their toll, but this took a backseat to 
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LGR in the justification for increasing the casualised component of its 
workforce. By comparison, the less cash-strapped City frequently used the 
threat of budget cuts to defend increasing numbers of temporary workers. 
What further emerged from the analysis was that in both authorities centrallý 
imposed pressures masked local restructuring. This was motivated by a 
complex interplay of Party and internal power politics between elected 
members, executive officers and the trade unions. In City, the power and 
political stability of the elected members ensured that a pluralist tradition of 
industrial relations had been maintained and trade union presence was afforded 
considerable importance in policy development and implementation. However, 
these arrangements had begun to succumb to the influence of a new Director of 
Personnel who was seeking change. Extensive decentralisation of personnel 
functions had further reduced the power of elected officers. In conjunction with 
this, the division of accountability served to blur many of the issues surroundino 
the recruitment and conditions of temporary workers. 
In County, by comparison, the retained corporate structure marginalised already 
insecure elected officers. The low key approach towards personnel issues at the 
level of the council chamber meant that staff restructuring under the aegis of 
LGR was driven through by executive officers with the minimum of formal 
trade union consultation. The lynchpin of restructuring was the extensive 
casualisation of a large swathe of council employees that had gone virtuallý- 
unchallenged by the unions. 
In education the imposition of LMS and the consequent weakening of the LEAs 
removed a great deal of the ability for local authorities to influence eN eiits. The 
result was that the experience in the education departments of both case studv 
authorities was more evenly matched. Devolving personnel functions to 
individual school managers meant that, below the authority level, there ývas 
considerable scope for differentiation in the use of temporary labour. Statistical 
data prepared for the DfEE indicated that the overall trend has been towards the 
extensive use of temporary contracts, particularly amongst women part-time 
teachers. 
In relation to this latter point, the different emphasis placed on EO in the two 
authorities also emerged as a possible mediating factor in the use of temporai-N 
employment. Equal opportunities policy was not a high priority in County and 
little5 if any, consideration was given to the adverse impact of temporary 
employment on vulnerable groups of workers. In City, by comparison, a large 
ethnic community and a history of poor race relations meant that officials were 
sensitive to EO issues. However, although recognised as disproportionately 
affecting women and minority ethnic groups, temporary work had not been 
subjected to any comprehensive EO policy. 
The different paths of City and County leading to the use of temporary workers 
were pursued in chapters five and six by identifying the mechanisms that 
promoted and restricted the use of temporary labour in each authority and the 
tensions and pressures which shaped these mechanisms. In City the stiength of 
the elected officials, their political affiliation and close links with the trade 
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unions, meant that temporary workers were strategically viewed as helping to 
avoid breaking 'no compulsory redundancy' agreements. In addition to this. 
centralised attempts to control budget deficits by blanket recruitment and over- 
time bans coupled with decentrallsed budgets and staffing arrangements 
indirectly encouraged local managers to rely on hiring temporarv xvorkers. 
Devolved power to local managers meant that the recruitment of temporary 
workers was informal and largely fell outside established EO procedures. 
Informality led to arbitrary decisions by local managers with the result that xvide 
variations occurred between the terms and conditions of temporary workers, 
which led to accusations from temporary workers of favouritism and patronage. 
The very real threat of discrimination occurring under these circumstances 
coupled with sensitivity to EO issues, fears about the hidden costs of 
casualisation and pressure from the trade unions led council leaders in City to 
attempt to re-centralise control over temporary worker recruitment. The 
measures taken to ensure this proved highly unpopular with local managers who 
challenged threats to their autonomy by finding various ways to by-pass or 
obstruct centralised control and monitoring. The result was that attempts to 
reduce the numbers of temporary contracts were largely unsuccessful. 
In County a balance of power which fell in the favour of non-elected officers in 
conjunction with the imperative of LGR meant that decisions concerning 
temporary workers were centralised. However, nominal decentralisation still 
ensured that local managers had a high level of discretion about the contractual 
details of temporary workers. The result. as in Citýý, was that inequalities were 
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clearly apparent. However, unlike City, EO policy was not high on the aLienda I-- 
of either County officials or trade unions with the result that decisions 
concerning the use of temporary workers were largely uncontested. 
The homogenising effect of LMS on LEAs meant that divergence between the ltý 
case study education departments was minimal. LMS also meant that the focus 
of decision-making was almost entirely at the level of the individual school with 
the LEA relegated to a largely advisory capacity. There was evidence to 
suggest that LEAs in both City and County were concerned about the escalating, 
use of temporary contracts amongst teachers. However there were no directly 
asserted EO concerns and the LEAs had very little power other than to raise 
concerns with individual schools. The research data also highlight the minor 
role played by school governors in decisions concerning temporary staff. These 
factors coupled with a weak trade union presence at the level of the school 
meant that head teachers wielded almost total control over decisions concerning, 
temporary staff. 
One interesting similarity between the local managers in social services 
departments and head teachers was the preference for informal arrangements 
concerning temporary workers. A number of the head teachers interviewed 
considered that the informal, personalised arrangements created by local *pools' 
of temporary and casual teachers further increased their already considerable 
control over such staff. However the autonomy bestowed on head teachers by 
LMS was under-pinned by a number of pressures which greatly influenced I 
decisions to use temporary contracts. A number of changes to the way in,, 6N-hich 
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school budgets were calculated created extensive volatility and instability in the 
financial arrangements of schools. School funding was closely linked to pupil 
numbers and parental choice meant that, particularly in relation to infants. 
competition occurred between schools. The result Nvas that pupil numbers 
cannot be estimated with any certainty and budget decisions, including staffing 
costs, were therefore short-term. 
Pressure on school budgets also forced head teachers to bid for external 
funding. Such sources were time-limited,, often short-term and would therefore 
only support the recruitment of an additional member of staff on a temporar)- 
basis. At least one of these sources, so-called Section II funding, was 
indirectly linked to the recruitment of teachers and instructors from minority 
ethnic groups. Another such source provided temporary funding to encourage 
the recruitment of disabled members of staff. 
Budgetary factors constituted very real pressures for head teachers. The 
research data also suggest that the threat of financial uncertainty was mingled 
with a preference for the increased control that temporary contracts provide 
over staffing issues more generally. This was particularly apparent in the 
almost 100 per cent use of temporary contracts for NQTs and a high level of use 
amongst part-time teachers. This latter point, in conjunction with temporary 
workers used to cover for maternity leave, offered some explanation for the 
gender imbalance amongst temporary workers in both authorities. 
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A recurrent theme in the above analysis is the high level of control sought by 
local managers over temporary staff. The analysis proceeds by examining how 
this is manifested in the employment relationship in the form of contractual 
control. The research data indicate that the informal, personalised approach 
preferred by local managers reconstituted itself as favouritism and bullying in 
the workplace. The vulnerability created by the job security inherent in 
temporary work sharpened the definition between favouritism and bullying in 
what was often referred to as the carrot and stick approach. One result Nvas that 
contractual control was aimed at securing a compliant workforce, which 
manifested itself as work intensification, absence control and formal and 
constructive exclusion from grievance and disciplinary procedures. Exclusion 
from procedural mechanisms was coupled with discouragement from trade 
union association ensuring that temporary workers were effectively isolated and 
marginalised thereby consolidating their vulnerability. 
The research data highlighted a number of mechanisms adopted by local 
managers to secure contractual control. Some rested on formal legal principles 
that further reduced the job security of temporary workers such as the waiver 
clause or inserting a notice period into an already short-term arrangement. 
Others were aimed at the relationship between managers and temporary workers 
and involved highlighting the distance in status and power between them. 
Much of this latter approach was gendered, largely by its association with part- 
time work and cover for maternity leave. The research data therefore offers 
extensive evidence for the concept of contractual control. Furthermore it 
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illustrates the importance of gender relations and of decentralised management 
relations, a central feature of NPM, in securing this forrn of compliance. 
What About the Workers? 
One of the criticisms of the flexibility debate has been its narrow focus on 
employer's use of flexible labour (Allen and Henry 1997). The above analysis 
indicates that numerical flexibility has a huge impact on the lives of workers 
and has serious implications for trade union organisation. The aim of chapters 
seven to nine was to counter the bias in the existing literature by examining 
temporary work from the perspectives of these actors. 
The literature reviewed in chapters two and three drew links between temporary 
work and the demographic characteristics of the workers it affects. The 
research data in chapter seven supports these arguments in finding that gender, 
ethnicity and length and level of professional qualification were identified as 
particularly related to experiences of temporary work. Whilst the low status 
assigned to temporary work was differentially experienced by these groups, the 
outcomes of the insecurity and vulnerability inherent in temporary employment 
contracts were common across the groups. 
Financial insecurity and an inability to plan for the future, both on a personal 
and professional level, arose as a major issue for temporary workers. The 
vulnerability created by insecurity and fostered by the management of 
temporary workers is identified as a powerful deterrent from confronting 
)21 
employers and managers. Similarly the powerlessness engendered bý, the 
inability to positively affect their circumstances had an adverse impact on the 
psychological well being of temporary workers. Depression. marital tensions 
and fatalism were key complaints voiced by the workers interviewed. It was 
also clear that the 'carrot and stick' approach to managing temporary workers 
was instrumental in raising hopes only to severely damage confidence when 
these were dashed following the non-renewal of a contract. One important 
outcome of reduced confidence levels was the self-blame and passivity this 
elicited from temporary workers. 
Despite managerial assumptions to the contrary, temporary workers displayed a 
high level of commitment to their jobs. Most of the workers were therefore 
concerned about the lack of or inequality in their training provision. Some of 
the temporary workers interviewed related this to their perceived low status and 
highlighted it as a factor that ensured that they were unlikely to move out of 
temporary work. Others related a lack of training to practical issues, such as the 
difficulty temporary workers have in making the long-term plans often 
necessary to arrange training courses. 
The analysis of temporary work from the workers' perspective is concluded bý- 
an exploration of the relationship between workers - both temporary and 
permanent. The research data provide support for the argument that contractual 
status may have joined a number of dimensions that have been used by 
managers to create divisions between workers. Status distinctions created 
between permanent and temporary workers provide one platform for such a 
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division whilst the competition encouraged between temporarý- workers hinders 
effective bonds of solidarity growing out of shared discontent. DesPite the 
obvious constraints on collectivism, there were some glimmers of shared 
discontent amongst temporary workers and some sympathy from pernianent 
workers. It is argued that this unrest may provide a platform for trade union 
organisation and the analysis in chapters eight and nine turns to the trade union 
representation of temporary workers in public services. 
Trade Union Representation of Temporary Workers 
Although the focus in chapters eight and nine is trade union organisation at the 
local level, the analysis begins by placing it within the national policy context 
beginning with the TUC. An analysis of TUC policy reflects some of the 
deficiencies previously identified in the academic coverage of temporarý, work. 
The TUC recognises the increased potential for the exploitation of temporary 
workers but policy has centred on the weak legal position of non-standard 
workers. Their prescription was therefore to lobby the government for 
legislative change. The partial nature of legal arguments concerning temporary 
workers was highlighted in chapter one. However the most serious flaw in the 
TUC approach was, as in much of the academic literature, a failure to confront 
the unequal distribution of temporary work with its concentration amongst 
public sector employees. By ignoring this point the TUC failed to recognise 
that the government as employer cannot be viewed as a 'disinterested' or 
neutral' legislator. Policy based on legislative reform is therefore likely to be 
problematic. Furthermore. a tentative relationship v, -Ith the current Labour 
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government coupled with the wider TUC agenda of promoting social 
partnership may have prohibited any direct criticism of the state - even in its 
role as employer. 
In addition to relations with the state, national unions have to contend Nvith 
pressures from employers and their membership. They are also hierarchical1v 
organised institutions and therefore intra-union pressures influence their 
policyrnaking. These factors were particularly apparent in relation to policy 
concerning temporary workers. The three unions studied in the research, 
Unison, NUT and NASUWT, had recognised the increasing numbers of 
temporary workers amongst their actual and potential memberships and had 
attempted to address the issue in various ways and with varying amount of 
success at a policy level. 
Unison had attempted to draw together a policy on temporary workers in local 
government via a series of motions at national conference and a national survey 
of branches to ascertain quantitative details. The success of the latter project 
had been hampered by a poor insight into the issues that surround temporary 
work. The main impediment was that policy on these issues had been 
overshadowed by the priority given to the Single Status Agreement (SSA). An 
important factor to note here is that the SSA was hailed as an exemplary act of 
social partnership. However, equally as important is the exclusion of casual 
workers from the agreement. 
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The teaching unions have taken quite different approaches. The NASUWT 
mirrored the TUC position by relying on lobbying for legislative reform. 
Furthermore they concentrated their efforts on reforms for agency teachers 
rather than pursuing a broad coverage of temporary work amongst teachers. The 
NUT in comparison has researched the area of temporary work amongst 
teachers extensively in a series of surveys. As a result they demonstrated a 
thorough understanding of most of the causes and issues surrounding the grox\-th 
of contractual insecurity in schools. They identified the links between 
temporary contracts, NQTs and time-limited funding, and recognised the 
potential for discrimination in these areas. Unlike the rather arms length 
, approach of the NASUWT, the strategy of the NUT has been to encourage a 
proactive engagement with these issues at the level of the school. However. 
even here, there is a suggestion that temporary work will not be contested quite 
so vigorously if the union is involved in the decision-making process about 
employment practice. 
The uptake of national policy at a regional and branch level is uneven in most 
unions and is governed largely by distinct local circumstances. This was the 
case in both City and County and therefore the analysis of trade union action at 
a local level is prefaced with an outline of the relevant local contexts in NA-hich 
this took place. Unison activity in City was overshadowed by internal political 
divisions within the branch. These had been considerably exacerbated by the 
controversial merger of NALGO, NUPE and COHSE branches that had been 
imposed following the national merger. The ensuing power struggle for key 
positions within the branch had a profound impact on the ftinctioning of Unison 
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within City. The outcomes had particular implications for the gender balance 
within the branch as the only female negotiating officer Nvas excluded from the 
authority-wide negotiating machinery. This had a particular impact on 
negotiations concerning temporary workers as she had been the instigator of 
moves to pressure councillors on this issue. By comparison. the seeminglý- 
smooth Unison branch merger did not mean that all was Nvell in Countv. 
Instead it was a symptom of the apathy that had been fostered by a reliance on 
full-time officials. 
Trade unionism in education departments in City and County was typified bý- 
rivalry between, rather than within, unions. Close membership numbers 
between the NASUWT and the NUT meant both claimed to represent the 
largest number of teachers in the authority. One result was that membership 
details, including those concerning temporary teachers, were a closely guarded 
secret. A number of characteristics in the local organisation of both the unions 
highlighted important issues. Firstly, for similar reasons, both unions were 
experiencing difficulty in recruiting workplace activists. The increasingly 
heavy workload of teachers was cited as the main reason for a reluctance to take 
on additional responsibilities. Trade union officials also argued that LMS had 
personalised the employment relationship to such an extent that it had 
discouraged workplace activism. Linking these two points was the view that 
teacher's contractual arrangements were now so complex as to require 
specialised knowledge. Already overworked school based representatives , N, ould 
have difficulty in acquiring the skills necessary to effectively challenge the 
decisions of their head teachers, even if they felt confident enough to do so. 
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In the NUT the weakness of school based activism was reinforced bv a re6onal 
and association structure which still sought to regulate industrial relations 
primarily at the level of the LEA. This raised particular problems for 
negotiations concerning temporary teachers as decisions concerning them were 
almost entirely the remit of head teachers with the LEA relegated to a purely 
advisory role. Underpinning the preference for more centralised negotiations 
was a view of the membership as either passive or self-serving and therefore 
requiring a greater reliance on full-time officer input. This stance stands in 
contradiction with national policy, which sought a proactive school based 
, approach to tackling the issues relevant to temporary teachers. The dislocation 
between national and local perspectives may offer some explanation of the 
limited uptake of national policies. 
Paradoxically, although national NASUWT policy on temporary teachers took 
an 4 arms length' approach, local officials appeared to have a more positive 
outlook on school based activism and at the association level there was less 
reliance on full-time officers. The reality of the situation was that association 
officials effectively took on the role of full-time officers and very little union 
activity was based in schools. 
These general characteristics of trade union organisation in the case study 
authorities had a number of implications for temporary workers. Some of the 
most evident have already been highlighted. Others were less obvious and 
require further explanation. For example, the recruitment of trade union 
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members in both social services departments was dependent upon the 
collaborative relationship between local trade unions and employers. based on 
traditions of consensual industrial relations. Temporary workers fell outside 
these traditions and were consequently more difficult to recruit. Furthermore. 
whilst there was some recognition that the growing numbers and vulnerability 
of temporary workers enhanced the need for trade union recruitment. their 
representation was viewed as largely problematic. 
Trade union ambivalence towards temporary workers reflected the status 
divisions between temporary and permanent workers fostered by employers and 
manifested itself in the issues which were prioritised in the bargaining agenda. 
Temporary work was raised only when strategically convenient and contained 
little appreciation or focus on equality issues. Even when temporary work did 
find its way onto the agenda it was easily overshadowed by traditional 
bargaining priorities, to the extent that temporary workers were used as a 
bargaining tool by trade union officials to protect agreements that secured the 
jobs of permanent workers, including their own. This approach was again a 
feature of, and facilitated by, the collaborative relationship between branch 
officials and employers. Furthermore, there was some evidence that where 
workplace activists had represented temporary workers, more proactive and 
informed action had resulted in greater gains. 
Temporary Workers' News of Trade Unions 
The limited representation they received from their trade unions had not gone 
unnoticed by the temporary workers who v, -ere interviewed. Their comments 
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highlighted a number of shortcomings of trade union functioning. Some were 
directly related to trade union procedures, such as check-off, designed around 
permanent employment. Others were more deep-seated failings of trade unioii 
democracy. 
Firstly, the collaborative relationship between trade union officials and 
employers in social services had led to some doubt as to the independence of 
the trade union. This was also an issue in schools as the trade union 
representatives at the majority of the schools included in the research were also 
school managers. There was some evidence that. where this occurred, the trade 
union position was abused and clear conflict of interests prevailed. Secondly, 
temporary workers were aware of low trade union participation at the level of 
the workplace generally and were particularly aware that here and at higher 
levels contractual issues were not on the union agenda. A vicious circle of 
discouraged participation ensued, as temporary workers did not perceive their 
unions as relevant to their concerns. 
Not surprisingly there was little consideration amongst temporary workers of 
becoming active within their unions. This was not determined solely by their 
poor view of trade union effectiveness but also their own vulnerable 
employment position. Temporary workers were therefore isolated from trade 
unionism from within and without - by both trade unions and employers. 
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Despite the seemingly bleak prospects for an effective trade unionism for 
temporary workers, the workers themselves ý, N-ere not completely apathetic. 
Most of the temporary workers were still members of a union. Furthermore. 
most felt that there was a role for the union in improving their working 
conditions and enthusiastically offered practical ideas concerning how theý, 
would like to be represented. Whilst their reluctance to become visibly active 
within their unions meant that this represented a somewhat *backseat approach'. 
it did offer the seeds of a collective solution to their dilemma. However. the 
problem, as they noted themselves, was that nobody had ever bothered to ask 
them what they thought. 
Conclusions 
A recurring theme of this thesis has been that context is crucial to an 
understanding of temporary labour. Previous theorising in this area has failed to 
progress beyond high levels of abstraction largely because context has been 
ignored. A contextualised theoretical framework has required that temporary 
labour is located within a social relations of production analysis. This has been 
achieved by bringing together previously disparate bodies of theory to support 
the argument that legal and other conceptual aspects of temporary employment 
contracts sharpen the inequality in the employment relationship and provide 
employers with an effective method of control over the labour process. 
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At the highest level of empirical analysis context becomes important bý, 
identifying the public sector as the site of the highest concentration of 
temporary workers. Although the relationship between temporary labour and 
the public sector is diminished by nationally aggregated statistical data, each 
level of disaggregated analysis highlights the prevalence of temporar-Y work 
within key areas of the public services, namely local government and education. 
Furthermore, by locating temporary labour within these sites. it has been 
possible to dispel some of the misleading assumptions drawn from aggregated 
and decontextualised data. By tracing the course of temporary labour to local 
government and education it is concluded that workers who are most likely to 
be employed on a temporary basis are not the highly paid, highly trained 
professionals, assumed from such analyses. Temporary labour in these sites is 
disproportionately carried out by women, minority ethnic groups. young and 
disabled workers: the groups of workers traditionally associated with lox paý, 
and poor training opportunities. These findings bring the role of the state as a 
model employer' into question and highlight the contradictions of the state as 
legislator and employer. 
Employer Policy 
It is only by fully contextualising temporary labour within the case studý, that 
the mechanisms behind these phenomena can be identified. This is achieved by 
locating the analysis at a number of different levels and from a number of 
perspectives. At the level of the state. radical restructuring of public service 
finance and delivery has been the spur to insecurity in public employment. 
3 
Tight central controls on public spending coupled with an increased emphasis 
on competition between public organisations for time-limited funding has 
created a climate of uncertainty. In conjunction with this have been pressures 
for public sector managers to conform to a model of employment relations 
which mirrors a small business mentality and hierarchical control (Edwards 
1979). Numerical flexibility is one amongst a raft of human resource methods 
sought by public employers in their quest for 'value for money'. HoNN-ever the 
research presented here suggests that rather than representing a neutral indicator 
of organisational efficiency, numerical flexibility in its de-euphemistic form of 
casualisation is a method of control used for extracting surplus labour. 
Nominally devolved budgets and decentralised managerial control over labour 
has been a key feature of this aspect of restructuring. They have been 
particularly pronounced in areas of local government which have not been 
amenable to formal privatisation, largely social services and education. Local 
management of schools is perhaps the clearest example because its basis hi 
legislation has led to more uniform effects. Similar pressures in social services 
have been more open to political influences within individual authorities, again 
highlighting the impoitance of context in the analysis. 
Despite the heterogeneous nature of local government generally and the two 
case study authorities specifically, a number of similar conclusions concerning 
the use of temporary labour can be drawn. Firstly, temporary labour was 
prevalent in the social services and education departments of both authorities. 
although clear statistical data was difficult to access in social services. 
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Furthermore, despite differences in EO policy in the M-o authorities. temporary 
labour particularly affected women, minority ethnic groups and young people. 
Therefore it was clear that in practice discrimination against these groups 
materialised in the poorer working conditions associated ý, vith temporary 
employment contracts regardless of the profile given to EO issues. 
A key mechanism in this outcome has been decentralised managerial control. 
which has provided the informality and personalised relationships between 
managers and workers that has allowed favouritism and patronage to flourish. 
The informality of recruitment and dismissal procedures for temporary workers 
has allowed local managers to evade EO policy. Theories of control alone can 
not adequately explain these findings. Their focus on manufacturing has meant 
that, to a large extent they have been 'gender blind', and as a result they have 
interpreted power in a uni-dimensional way. Women's subordination in the 
workplace is also enforced by their subordination in the private sphere (Pateman 
1988; Glucksmann 1990). In this respect the arrangements for temporary work 
such as the casual pool in City and the general link between temporary and part- 
time work indicate that managers specifically targeted women with domestic 
responsibilities. The research identifies that one of the determinants of 
contractual control is the perceived low status and powerlessness of temporary 
workers, which is achieved to some extent by defining it as 'women's work* 
One outcome has been that gendered perceptions of temporary work coupled 
with informality and vulnerability has meant that temporary contracts provide 
opportunities for sexual harassment. Harassment is contingent on the effects of' 
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two forms of power: individual (or personal) power and institutional power 
(Herbert 1992). Decentralisation considerably increases the personal power of 
local managers whilst institutional power can be identified on two levels. 
Firstly, the nature of the temporary employment and the inadequacN- of 
employment protection legislation provide institutional power at a structural 
level. Secondly, exclusion from grievance and disciplinary procedures fumish 
institutional power at the level of the organisation. As such, current practices 
of devolved control, particularly in relation to temporary labour. seriousIN- 
impede claims of being an equal opportunities employer -a sensitive area 
generally but particularly for City. 
It may be concluded that temporary labour does not figure in either the long or 
short EO agenda (Cockburn 199 1) of either the state or state managers. Equal 
opportunities legislation and policy has been and still is a blunt instrument in 
combating discrimination but, by discovering the many ways in which it is 
dulled, research in this field can help to hone it. In relation to temporary labour 
this means understanding the nature of temporary employment contracts and 
identifying how, where and why they become an equalities issue. The 
multidimensional approach undertaken in the thesis has been developed with 
precisely this in mind. 
The circumstances that have given rise to this dilemma may prove difficult to 
reverse as there is considerable evidence to suggest that local managers prefer 
the high levels of control provided by temporary contracts and have resisted 
centralised policies that have sought to limit their use. Therefore it is likely that 
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the use of temporary employment contracts will increase and may even become 
the norm for the majority of new appointments, particularly in teaching. lkhilst 
these developments are viewed as relatively unproblematic by employers and 
managers, the perspectives of temporary workers are understandably less 
sanguine. They offer the vision of a large, growing bodýý of public service 
workers who are poorly trained, are acutely aware of the status divide that 
separates them from permanent staff and are considerably disgruntled. Whilst 
the vulnerability and isolation of temporary workers is a substantial barrier to 
both individual and collective action, it should be bome in mind that retrograde 
steps to early capitalist models of hierarchical control also recreate the 
conditions that gave rise to collective consciousness and resistance. 
Trade Union Responses 
Paradoxically another barrier to organising temporary labour appears to be the 
public sector trade unions themselves. Again, context becomes important 
because the policies and approaches of public sector trade unions to temporary 
labour are a product of their circumstances. Public sector trade unions have 
developed within an industrial relations framework which, under the aegis of 
the model employer, has sought to institutionalise collective bargaining at 
highly centralised levels. The data presented here in relation to temporary 
workers suggests that these traditions have influenced trade union structures to 
such a degree that the rapid transformation of the model has left them somewhat 
out of kilter and unable or unwilling to adjust to decentralised relations. 
Beaumont (1981), using Prandy's (1965) analysis of administrative unionism. 
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described public sector trade unions as 'hothouse' flowers. dependent on the 
cultivation of the state for survival. Fairbrother (I 994a; 1994b; 1996) has 
argued that state sector restructuring, specifically decentralisation, offers public 
sector unionism an opportunity to escape this dependency by reinvigorating 
workplace structures and activism in a process of renewal. The response to the 
challenges of renewal, particularly in local government, has been problematic 
and limited (Colling 1995; Gall, 1998). Trade union renewal is an uncertain and 
hazardous route, particularly for national trade union structures accustomed to 
the considerable control afforded by highly centrallsed operations. 
These arguments are not mutually exclusive. The evidence presented in this 
thesis indicates that both national and local trade union structures have been 
unwilling to decentralise and have therefore been unable to contend ýý-ith issues, 
particularly the growth in temporary labour, which have gained momentum 
following decentralisation of some management functions. But, where national 
union structures, specifically in the NUT, have focussed on events at the 
workplace, they have been more successful in identifying the mechanisms that 
result in increased temporary labour. Unfortunately a reluctance to move 
beyond traditional patterns based on negotiations with the LEA and not with 
individual school managers, now demanded by LMS, has meant that national 
policies have had little impact at the local level. Conversely whilst Unison has 
no national policies with regards to temporary workers. local responses have 
been understandably mixed. Most have relied on traditional collaborations with 
employers that have resulted in tacit acceptance of divisions between permanent 
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and temporary staff. On the few occasions where local trade unionism has 
acted outside of these traditions, gains have been made for temporary workers. 
The change of government in 1997 added a certain amount of clarity to the 
responses of public sector trade unions. Social partnership, the possibilit-Y of 
harmonious relations between state, capital and organised labour. is noNv 
tentatively considered to be back on the agenda. Social partnership offers an 
alternative path of least resistance under the rubric of 'new unionism'. Twenty 
years of being 'out in the cold' is leading public sector trade unions to seek 
shelter in the perceived warmth of social partnership. However the partnership 
on offer in the 1990s and beyond bears little comparison to any former 
'hothouse' environment. As Kelly (1996: 90) argues: 'The proponents of social 
partnership have seriously underestimated employer hostility... ' and notes that 
the 'new style agreements' associated with social partnership often contain 
concessions to, amongst other things, 'various forms of flexibility' (ibid: 86). 
He further cites evidence which suggests that, where job security is offered to 
the core workforce, it is often gained by the use of temporary workers. 
The evidence presented here supports these observations. The incoherence 
between national and local policies and the resulting low priority given to 
combating the misuse of temporary contracts represents ambivalence on behalf 
of national and local trade union organisation. This, in part, reflects a renewed 
interest in social partnership and the ensuing difficulty of reconciling the 
rhetoric of 'flexibility and security of employment' contained in the SSA when. 
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for a growing proportion of their membership. flexibility means anything but 
security of employment. 
Ironically the SSA excludes casual workers, which brings in to doubt the very 
notion of a single status for local government workers. Therefore, 
paradoxically, the rhetoric resonates with the core/periphery terminologý- of 
Atkinson's model of the flexible firm discussed in chapter one. Furthennore 
trade union ambivalence to their temporary membership may be adding a new 
twist to a tired concept. One tentative conclusion stemmino from this research 
is that a core/periphery model appears to be developing amongst trade union 
memberships. This may not be an entirely new suggestion. The discipline of 
industrial relations has often been accused of portraying the white, middle-aged. 
male worker as the 'core' of trade unionism with the inference that members 
that fall outside of these classifications are peripheral. Temporary workers are 
more likely to be black, young and women. Therefore temporary work is likek 
to fall into the periphery of trade union membership as well as the labour 
market model. 
The model of the flexible firm does not provide a perfect fit as an analysis of 
what may be occurring within trade unions in response to temporary labour. 
Atkinson's contention was that the periphery could be easily shed when the 
economic climate required it. Trade unions never want to shed members, 
particularly in times of economic crisis. However data presented here suggests 11: ý ltý 
that, when times get hard, they do choose to lose some members rather than 
others. Again this is not an entirely new suggestion as the feminist debates 
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concerning LIFO have indicated. The sensitive question this raises for trade 
unions seeking social partnership is: how far does 'nexv unionism" provide 
inroads for old prejudices? Temporary work is, as argued in this thesis. a fori-n 
of work that disproportionately affects socially oppressed groups. Therefore 
trade unions that use temporary work to secure the jobs of permanent workers 
under the aegis of social partnership and new unionism are faced with the 
logical conclusion that these developments in trade union organisation exhibit 
many of the discriminatory elements evident in past practice. 
In this respect trade union responses to temporary labour raise a number of 
issues in relation to trade union democracy. Debates surrounding trade union 
democracy usually revolve around the articulation between workplace 
participation and representation at higher levels. It is clear from the research 
presented here that temporary workers suffer deficits in both these arenas. 
Participation is non-existent and representation is largely limited to the reactive 
and individualised response of tribunal representation in a tiny minority of 
cases. Temporary workers are in a weak and vulnerable position and as such 
need the support and activism of more secure union members and officers. 
Therefore any impact on the (mis)use of temporary contracts requires proactive 
workplace involvement. However, if attempts to represent temporary workers 
are to move beyond the sporadic and instrumental examples detailed in this 
research, clarification of the ambivalent position of both national and local trade 
unions to the use of temporary labour needs to be established. 
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Furthermore the links between temporary work and gender. ethnicity and young 
workers require trade unions to re-engage with a number of demons that have 
dogged the issue of trade union democracy. The use of temporary workers to 
cushion the blow of re-organisation and redundancy of 'core' members is akin 
to LIFO and therefore contains the same discriminatory elements. Temporary 
contracts have the potential to be more detrimental than LIFO in that temporary 
labour may never gain the required status or tenure to be protected from unfair 
selection for redundancy. Temporary labour is part of the compromise that 
Kelly (1996) argues exists between organised labour, the employer and the state 
when the state is the employer. The gendered nature of temporary xvork thus 
also represents another manifestation of what Campbell (1989: 20) described as 
the 'historic compromise between capital and labour that has cost women a 
fortune. ' 
Policy and practice that claims to use temporary workers to secure jobs should 
be recognised by public sector trade unions for what it is: divisive and 
discriminatory. Accepting this stance would be incompatible vvith agreements 
that use temporary workers to stave off redundancies and may require public 
sector trade unions to drastically rethink their agenda. Refocusing may be 
painful for trade unions, particularly as a committed approach would require the 
diversion of resources from more palatable and favoured projects. However a 
failure to engage with this issue is likely to have repercussions. Not only does 
this kind of bargaining lay bare the problematic progress that has been made 
towards equality and democracy in trade unions, the case study evidence 
suggests that it does not deliver what it promises. Permanent jobs are still lost 
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and the risk is that the rate may even be speeded up as employers recognise the 
increased power they can wield over vulnerable temporary workers. 
Although public sector trade union membership density has remained high in I 
comparison to the private sector, local government has experienced a sWnificailt 
drop in density since 1979 (Waddington and Kerr 1999). Waddington and Kerr 
(ibid: 154) have noted the importance of the successful recruitment of part-time 
workers to the future health of Unison membership figures. They have also 
noted that the extent of satisfaction amongst women members, particularly part- 
time workers, is markedly lower than for men. They suggest *that more wonien 
representatives are required in order to support the majority female membership 
of Unison' (ibid. 160). The data contained in this thesis adds to these arguments 
in two ways. Firstly, the strong links between part-time and temporary work 
indicate that if Unison wishes to attract and retain the membership of part-time 
workers, it must also look more closely at the needs of temporary ývorkers. 
Secondly, as Jackie's experience highlighted, the retention rather than the 
marginalisation of female activists would pave the way for a better 
representation of part-time and temporary workers. 
Trade unions have a vital role to play in the support of temporary workers. The 
case study evidence identifies that, when workplace and national trade unionism 
can shake free from traditions of collaboration, real gains can be made for 
temporary workers. Male domination and outright marginalisation of women 
activists thwarted this at the branch level, as did a failure to recognise the 
equalities issues at national level. Trade unions haN, e much to gain by 
14l 
harnessing the vitality of women activists - some relevance to the growing I 
numbers of temporary workers who are either actual or potential members 
provides just one example. The statutory recognition provisions in the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 mean that membership levels may be a crucial 
factor in public sector industrial relations in the near future. Securing the 
membership of temporary workers in some authorities, County for one, maý- 
make the difference between assured recognition or an uncertain future. 
However, by displaying ambivalence towards temporary workers, trade unions 
risk alienating the new generation of public sector workers and their potential 
members. 
Further Research Possibilities 
Reconceptualising flexibility has required the deconstruction of previously 
homogenised forms of non-standard work. The task of this thesis has been to 
examine one of these forms, temporary work, in depth. Future research could 
build on this method by adopting a similar approach using other forms of non- 
standard work as a focus both within and beyond the UK public sector. A 
logical progression would be an examination of agency labour. Although 
agency labour is a subset of temporary work, it has not been examined 
systematically in this thesis. During the course of the research there was 
evidence to indicate that temporary labour agencies that provide specialised 
public sector services were increasing their 'market share'. Agencies providing 
temporary teachers are probably the best example of this development (NUT 
National Officer, 5.11.99). However, in certain regions, agencies specialising, 
in providing social work and health care staff also have a high profile 
(TUC 
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1999). A study of agency work would also benefit from a comparati've analý sk 
with agency provision for the private sector where this form of labour is wcll 
established. 
The dominance of managerial perspectives in past analyses has meant that the 
concerns of temporary workers and their unions have been neglected. Therefore 
an important contribution of this thesis has been to include their responses. 
Future research could usefully build upon these foundations by ensuring that 
that the views of all relevant parties are sought. The focus of the research in 
this thesis could be expanded by comparisons within and outside the public 
sector. For example severe skill shortages in nursing are likely to increase the 
bargaining power of agency and bank nurses. Increased labour market power 
could ensure that temporary employment provides flexibility that does match 
worker, as opposed to employer, requirements. As a result their experiences 
may be more positive than the temporary workers interviewed during the 
research detailed in this thesis. 
Trade union responses have formed a major part of the focus in this thesis. This 
focus could be usefully extended using similar comparative analysis outlined 
above. For example, some trade unions in the private sector, such as the media 
and entertainment unions, have long traditions of organising non-standard 
workers. An examination of their policies and strategies could glean useful 
recommendations for the public sector unions who are, as this thesis has 
identified, struggling to adjust to a changed environment. Similarly trade 
unions in other countries have recognised the importance of organising 
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'atypical' workers (Engberg, 1993), which features greatly in a variant of trade 
union renewal that has become known as the organising model. An 
international comparative study could therefore add further dimensions to this 
aspect of the current research. The organising model has recently been 
endorsed in the UK by the TUC. However, there are a number of contradictions 
between the philosophies of the organising model and the quest for social 
partnership, which the TUC as yet have not addressed and that therefore require 
some analysis. 
Finally, further research could be usefully undertaken in a more general 
international comparative context. Chapter two outlined the international trends 
in temporary work and in doing so identified some interesting lines of 
convergence and divergence. Different patterns of regulation and industrial 
relations structures along with varied approaches to social welfare influence the 
context in which decisions concerning temporary workers are made. Chapter 
two also identified the persistence and growth of temporary work in the UK 
economy generally and the public sector specifically. These trends highlight 
the importance of gaining a fuller understanding of the processes and 
mechanisms that lead to temporary employment whilst qualitative research is 
required to identify the human and organisational. experiences that lie behind the 
numbers. 
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I I. Appendices 
Appendix I- Methods 
Research Design 
In the most elementary sense, the design is the logical sequence that 
connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions, and 
ultimately to its conclusions (Yin 1994: 19) 
The driving force behind methodological decisions in research design are the 
research questions that inform the research and how they can best be answered. 
The research questions for this thesis were developed after examining existiiio L- 
literature that indicated a number of limitations of research methods that have 
so far been used to study 'non-standard' work. Much of the literature reviewed 
in chapters one and two points to the dominance of quantitative research and the 
partial data this has produced. Chapter two gives numerous examples of how 
statistical data alone is ill-suited to a study of temporary work and Felstead and 
Jewson (1999) note how this has particularly affected attempts to theorise non- 
standard work. These limitations result largely from the inability to draw causal 
inferences from statistical data (Casey, et al. 1997). 
The limited progress that has been made towards a comprehensive 
understanding of the issues surrounding non-standard work generally and 
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temporary work specifically, means that research in this area is still largely 
exploratory. This in itself contains a number of pit-falls for quantitative 
methods. As May (1993: 86) argues 'By the verý, design of questiorinaii-eý,. it 
has already been decided what are the important questions to ask. Millxvard 
and Hawes continue this argument stating 'Structured sun, eys ... using mainly 
closed questions, need prior knowledge which can only be acquired from other 
methods' (1995: 7 1). The danger of conducting a survey before 'prior 
knowledge' of issues concerning temporary work has been obtained is well 
illustrated by the fate of the Unison survey (see chapter nine). 
Furthermore, quantitative methods, particularly large-scale surveys, seem 
particularly insensitive to certain areas of research and theorising. Phizacklea 
and Wolkowitz (1995) noted the inability of quantitative methods to reveal the 
complex issues surrounding the choices women face when entering the labour 
market. Similarly Morris and Wood (1991) contend that surveys do not capture 
the processual changes that may be occurring in industrial relations, such as 
subtle changes in the balance of power between trade unions and employers. 
The focus of this research means that these limitations would be particularly 
unacceptable. 
The main reason West (1996) gives for the limited usefulness of national 
statistical data is its inability to capture events at the level of the workplace and 
concludes by saying 
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The significance of [non-standard work] in the UK economy can only be 
fully grasped from workplace data and case study research which can 
chart the complex processes involved in decisions to restructure 
company employment programmes (1996: 140). 
Similarly Casey et al. (1997) have noted the benefits of the case study method 
as an antidote to the shortcomings of a purely quantitative approach. They 
contend that there is much about the *how and why' of employment practice 
that cannot be addressed by the survey method. By comparison the case study 
approach allows the researcher to gain greater knowledge of the use of different 
practices that is 'essential for an understanding of the development of flexible 
practices in employing organisations and in the labour market' (p. 77). 
Furthermore, Yin (1994: 1) states: 
In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or 
"NA'Iiý` 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon ýý Ith 
some real-life context. 
Robinson (1993) considers that case studies are the most usual and appropriate 
research strategy for undertaking exploratory work as they are flexible enough 
to: 
lo Seek to find out what is happening 
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*Seek new insights 
*Allow questions to be asked and followed up 
*Assess phenomena in a new light 
These qualities are particularly well suited to address the research questions 
raised at the end of chapter three. They also provide an indication of the 
collection techniques that are best suited to capture relevant data. Three data 
collection techniques were utilised during the research: semi structured group 
and individual interviews, observation of meetings and documentary analysis. 
These formal methods were supplemented on occasion by data collected durim, tý 
informal contact, that is, telephone conversations and 'chats' in betx\, eeii 
conference proceedings, before and following formal interviews and in 
corridors prior to entering council meetings. These proved to be valuable 
sources of data and the ability to incorporate information that came to light in 
this way illustrates another of the strengths of the case study design. As Kitay 
and Callus (1998: 108) note, 'The art of a good case study is in being able to 
follow leads and pick up on interesting issues as they arise'. 
However, by far the most extensive of the formal methods were individual 
interviews of which 59 were conducted. Two group interviews were carried out 
and one interview schedule was completed in writing and retumed by post. In 
addition, six council meetings and one branch union meeting were attended 
purely in the capacity of a non-participant observer. Interviews and meetings 
lasted between half an hour and two hours. ývith the majorivy of interviews 
taking approximately one hour. Full CANS meetings usually took between two 
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and three hours. All of the formal inteirvie,, vs xvere tape-recorded and either full 
transcripts or detailed interview notes were completed using the recordings. 
Tape recording of the meetings would have been neither permissible nor 
feasible 15 . Therefore in-depth field notes were made immediately subsequent to 
the meeting (usually on the train home). 
Research Sites, Access and Politics 
In a similar way to the research design, the choice of research sites was 
influenced by information gleaned whilst reviewing previous research and 
literature. This took place on a number of levels so that the primary choice of 
research focus, the public sector, was determined by establishing its 
predominance in the statistical data but neglect in the theoretical debates. 
Narrowing the choice to local government social services and education ý\ as 
again driven by the predominance of temporary work in these institutions 
highlighted in the statistical and case study data reviewed in chapter two. 
The next level of decision concerning research sites was encountered in 
choosing the case study authorities. Although case studies bý- their nature are 
small samples that do not claim to be representative (Robson 1993; Yin 1994), 
the rationale for a particular choice of case must be clear. Case studies in local 
government add to the difficulty of generalisation since local authorities are 
highly heterogeneous organisations. The choice of case studies attempted to 
The council chambers were large, cavernous rooms, which would require more sophisticated 
sound reproduction than would have been possible with a portable tape recorder. 
Furthermore 
the meetings often became animated and heated with many people talkin(y at once. 4: ý 
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reflect a number of the main dimensions along which authorities differ and are 
surnmarised in table AI below. 
Table Al 
Comparison of City and County 
Population 
Covered 
Structure/ 
Geography 
Political 
Control 
No. of 
Employees 
Union 
density 
(Unison) 
City Im City Labour 52,000 69% 
ethnically Council Stable 
diverse Urban 
12,000 46% 
County 431k County Hung 
largely Council Lib/Lab 
white Rural Unstable 
Despite their heterogeneity, City and County had in common employment 
policies that affected the number and terms and conditions of temporary 
workers. Whilst this made for interesting and dynamic research data, it could 
indicate the atypicality of the research sites. However informal chats during 
conference proceedings with personnel and trade union officials covering a 
wide number and variety of local authorities indicated that these or similar 
policies were not uncommon elsewhere. 
Initially access to the case study authorities was largely unproblematic. Access 
0 arrangements in County were made over the telephone with the corporate 
personnel director. After the initial interview he also introduced me to the 
personnel officer in the LEA. Procedures in City were more formal and I was 
requested to send a copy of my research proposal to the authority' s research 
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officer. He made a minor alteration to the pseudonym to be used for the 
authority and requested copies of interview schedules to be used. Hoýý e\-er he 
was positive about the proposal referring to it as 'a ý'ery timely piece of work' 
(correspondence, 9.5.97). Access to City LEA was more problematic. At the 
time of the research the LEA was being inspected by OFSTED and vvas at the 
centre of a public debate between the chief education officer and Chris 
Woodhead, the director of OFSTED. As a result the LEA was highly sensitive 
to criticism and the LEA personnel officer refused a face-to-face interview but 
answered questions from the interview schedule in writing. This was not ideal 
as the schedule was not designed to be answered in this way. However the 
information provided was surprisingly detailed. 
Table A2 summaries the range of formal interviews conducted within each case 
study. Interviews were conducted at central and departmental levels with 
personnel managers. Similarly regional and branch trade union officials were 
interviewed. Below this level it was intended that four local research sites in 
social services and four schools would be selected for each authority. In social 
services, because local units were divided between adult and children's 
services, it was initially decided to select two units from each. In schools two 
primary and two secondary schools were selected from each authority. 
However, initial research in County revealed that, due to LGR, decisions 
concerning temporary workers in social services were limited at the local level. 
As the main function of interviews with unit managers at this le\, el was to 
ascertain how and why decisions were made, it , vas decided that intervie\ý s at 
this level would be largely unfruitful. To compensate for this. a larger number 
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of interviews were carried out at the 'corporate' level from whence such 
decisions emanated. 
Table A2 
Range of Formal Interviews Conducted 
County City 
Workers 6 6 
Unison (branch) 3 5 
Unison (region) I I 
NUT (branch) I I 
NASUWT (branch) I I 
NUT (region) I same 
NASUWT (region) 1 same 
Joint Trade Union chair 0 1 
Shop Stewards 1 4 
Councillors 1 0 
Central personnel 3 1 
Social services personnel I I 
LEA 1 0 (postal) 
Unit managers 1 2 
Head teachers 5 4 
Governors 3 2 
Totals 30 29 
-,, -:, 
2 
The choice of social service units in City was largely dictated by the 
departmental personnel officer. Interviews were conducted , vith the unit 
managers of two residential children's units and two residential units for adults. 
Whilst it was possible to speak to temporary staff in the two children's units. it 
proved impossible to arrange meetings with staff in the adult units. This 
resulted largely from the high number of night shifts worked bý- staff in these 
units and the more casual,, 'on call' nature of their appointment. The decision 
not to interview unit managers in County also had the unforeseen effect of 
making it difficult to contact individual temporary workers. Contact with two 
temporary workers in social services was arranged via Unison in Countý-. As 
most of the adult services in County had been 'externalised', temporary staff in 
this area were not contacted. None of the social services units visited in either 
City or County had active shop steward representation. However ste,,, N, -ards from 
other units were contacted at branch meetings and at national conference and 
interviewed formally where possible and informally when not. 
Research sites in schools were selected from the current education yearbook for 
each LEA. Using systematic probability sampling (Blaxter et al. 1996). the first 
and tenth primary/secondary school on the list was initially selected and a 
telephone call made to the head teacher. If the head teacher was unavailable (as 
was often the case) or an interview was declined, or where the school did not 
use temporary teaching staff (which was not often the case) the next school on 
the list was selected. One interesting point noted from the initial telephone 
conversation with head teachers was their discomfort xvith the terms "temporary 
teacher/contract'. It was noted that after using these terms head teachers 
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sometimes became evasive and on t-, xo occasions inteniews were declined. 
After this initial response these terms were dropped from the introducton, 
description of the research and replaced by the term The 
amendment produced a more positive response and no further interviews NN ere 
declined. 
In six of the schools, the initial interview was arranged with the head teacher as 
the person responsible for decisions concerning teacher's contractual issues. Oti 
two occasions (in large secondary schools) the head teacher referred me to their 
deputy head teacher as responsibility for teacher's contracts had been delegated 
to them. At one of the schools in County, staff contractual issues were not dealt 
with by a member of the teaching staff but by a school administrator. In 
another of the secondary schools in County, after an initial interview with the 
head teacher, I was referred to his secretary who held the details of teacher's 
contracts. 
At the initial interview in each school further interviews were arranged with 
school governors where it was thought that they played an acti-ve role in 
decisions concerning teachers contracts. Three governors were intervie,, ved: 
two in County (both in primary schools) and one in City (a large secondary 
school). Interviews with temporary teachers were arranged where possible but. 
as in social services, this proved more difficult. Firstly, because of the nature of 
their appointment, supply teachers were difficult to pin down. Therefore all of 
the teachers interviewed were currently working on temporarý' and fixed-term 
contracts. However, many of these teachers had also worked as supplý- and 
1 
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agency teachers and so were also able to give account of ývork under these 
conditions. In three of the eight schools interviews were not conducted with 
temporary teachers because school managers were, in various ways, obstructive. 
For example, the head teacher of one primary school in County became mIIdIv 
aggressive when the suggestion of interviewing the NQT who was emploý'ed on 
a fixed-term contract in his school was made. Initially he refused permission 
for the interview but then demanded that. if the interview were to take place, he 
must be present. When I pointed out to him that I must extend the same rights 
of privacy to the teacher as I had to him, he relented but insisted that I produce 
references from both the LEA and the university. After I had sent both of these 
to him he agreed to let me speak to the teacher over the telephone to arranoe an 
interview with her. Whilst speaking to the teacher it was clear that she too had 
been 'bullied' by her head teacher and was reluctant to arrange an mterview at 
the school. I offered to interview her at her home but she said that she %\ OLIId 
prefer to wait until her contract at that school had ended and that she ý\ ould 
contact me then. I did not hear from her again. 
Because of the difficulty of gaining access to temporary teachers via the 
systematic sampling of schools outlined above, a form of snowball sampling 
was also utilised. A group of three temporary teachers employed in City (2) and 
County (1) were introduced via a personal contact. Whilst this group of 
teachers were not employed by the schools selected from the respective 
yearbooks, their experiences confirmed that the issues facing temporarN- 
teachers were widespread in the case study LEAs. Interviewing these teachers 
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as a group also proved to be a valuable research experience as data was gathered 
by virtue of observing their discussions with each other as much as N-la the 
questions posed by me. I also felt that, by bringing the teachers together and 
initiating this topic of discussion, they began to vocalise their concerns and 
exchange information. Interestingly the teachers began to question me as to 
their employment rights and how they could approach their union for help. In 
this way group interviews could be considered to constitute a form of 
participatory action research (Whyte 1998). Another group interview 
conducted with two temporary teachers at the same school in Countý- illustrated 
some of the limitations of this method. I felt that the two teachers, because they 
were employed in the same school and were possibly in competition with each 
other (see chapter seven), were more guarded in their responses. These 
experiences indicate that context and the group dynamic are important factors 
when undertaking this form of interview. 
It was also intended that temporary workers would be contacted via their 
unions. This was not undertaken for two reasons. The first was that the unions 
were reluctant to provide this contact initially on the grounds that trade unions 
had a duty of confidentiality in their dealings with members. I suggested that 
the way round this was for the unions to approach their temporary members 
with details of the research and, if the members were agreeable, there details 
could be passed to me. This was dismissed as too complex and time consuming 
for already busy branch officials. I also became aware that a number of 
temporary workers who had approached their union \vere now in dispute with 
the union over the way their grievance had been handled and this may explain 
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the reluctance of the unions to pass on their details. Secondly, although 
valuable data could have been gleaned from these contacts. I considered that 
they may represent a biased sample of temporarý,, workers: a) because they had 
actually approached their union and therefore were likely to be unusuallv 
'politicised' and b) by definition, they had experienced contractual difficulties. 
By choosing to monitor the progress of particular initiatives within the two 
authorities, a form of longitudinal approach has been taken, whicli is perhaps 
inevitable in the case study method. This has involved interviewing and/or 
observing the same actors on a number of occasions at various stages of policy 
initiatives. The benefits to this approach are that a processual insight is gained 
which avoids the 'snapshot' situation of catching people on either a particularly 
good or bad day. It has also provided some interesting insights as to how the 
relationship between the parties and their attitudes changed as the initiatives 
progressed and produced unexpected outcomes. One example of this occurred 
in County when the difficulties of running the authority on high levels of fixed- 
term contract staff became apparent as did the antipathy that developed towards 
the new unitary authority (see chapter four). 
Another benefit was that respondents became more forthcoming in subsequent 
interviews, possibly as something approaching a trust relationship was formed. 
Developing trust also meant that the people interviewed became involved and 
interested in the research. For example. after three interviews, the corporate 
personnel manager in County seemed much more able to voice his concerns 
about LGR and was less inclined to give 'the party line*. He enquired about 
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how I was finding the research, what I was hoping to do after the research when 
he had previously been very detached and defensive. In some waý-s the 
relationships that developed between myself and the people I inten'lewed 
allowed a more reciprocal exchange of information. In a similar NN-a,., - to the 
group interviews with teachers, there have been a number of occasions when I 
have been able to provide information to trade unionists when they have talked 
about an area of difficulty or wanted to know more. For example, when the 
Unison branch officer in County expressed concern at a problem he was facing 
with a temporary worker who was pregnant, I sent him details of industrial 
tribunal cases which had featured this situation and covered the main legal 
considerations. 
The nature of the relationship between employers and trade unions meant that 
maintaining trust on both sides was sometimes difficult. This became 
particularly apparent in City when industrial action was looming. The industrial 
dispute/action concerning the change of pay date in City meant that both 
managers and trade union officials were 'edgy' and less respoiisive. The distrust 
that began to build up between the parties as a result of the dispute began to 
jeopardise my position as a researcher as I was increasingly expected to 'take 
si es . 
The political situation within the Unison branch at City following the merger 
also added to these difficulties. Not only could I not be seen to be takin(-, sides I- 
with either employers or the union, but I also became aware that factions \\ ithin 
the union were attempting to evaluate whether my sympathies lay with either 
I 
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the 'left' or the 'right'. I was later advised by the JCC chair (who was not a 
member of Unison and therefore largely outside the conflict) that the Unison 
branch secretary, who was the leader of the *right', had decided not only that I 
sided with the 'left' but that I was also a member of the Socialist Worker's 
Party (SWp). 16 The implications of these erroneous beliefs began to manifest 
themselves in access difficulties, as invitations to CANS meetings became 
restricted. Again the JCC chair informed me that the Unison branch secretarv 
had used his close relationships with certain councillors to attempt to block my 
attendance. This did not work entirely because I was allowed restricted access 
to observe discussions that did not directly relate to the impending industrial 
action. 
The growing distrust of me by the branch secretary was picked up bý, Unison 
branch officials on the left who, by virtue of this, decided I must be on their 
side. The result of this was that they attempted to use my attendance at CANS 
meetings to overcome the lack of information passed to them by the branch 
secretary by asking me to pass on details of the meetings. This placed me in a 
very difficult predicament for, having lost the trust of one half of the branch 
officers, by refusing to pass on information, I risked losing the trust of the other 
half I felt I had become something of a pawn in the battle between the -left' and 
the 'right' and I eventually decided to attend only those meetings at which the 
issue of temporary workers would be raised and to leave the meeting if aný- 
other issues were being discussed. I felt this course of action,, although 
sacrificing valuable data gathering opportunities. offered a gesture of *good- 
16 The recent claims of 'witch hunts' against local government Unison activists in the S%VP bý 
the national union adds currencv to this experience. See %\ N\ \%jabOL11-IIet. uk. ()r,., for details 
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will' towards the 'right' and prevented the 'left' from questioning me on 
subjects other than my research. 
Data Analysis 
Even at the stage of having completed only 20 interviews it became clear while 
doing a small piece of written work that my data was starting to overxN-helm me 
and I felt that I was 'losing control' of it. I realised that I needed some method 
of organising my data that would facilitate retrieval of relevant information 
during the writing process. After consulting members of my department I 
decided to use Ethnograph, a computer software package designed to aid the 
analysis of qualitative research data. The programme can be used on full 
interview transcriptions, field notes, open-ended answers on surveys and 
documents. I used the programme on interview transcriptions and field notes. 
The essence of the programme is to group together related segments of 
qualitative data and code them. In this respect the programme design draýý s 
heavily on grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) 
On first acquaintance with the package I considered that Ethnograph would be 
valuable only as a way of retrieving data and that actual analysis. which 
constitutes the coding process, would still be largely manual. Hmvever on 
reflection I realise that using Ethnograph has facilitated analysis in a number of 
ways. Firstly, having to prepare data for the coding process required me to 
handle data that I had not looked at since I had transcribed/made the field notes. 
I also had to become familiar enough with the data to form a coding framework 
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and whilst doing this I began to see links and possibilities that I had not 
previously noted. Secondly. reading the manual chapters (especialk, Appendix 
E-) (Seidel et al. 1995) which discuss the philosophN r on which Ethnograph and 
qualitative data analysis are based, made me consider again the processes 
involved in collecting and analysing qualitative data. 
Ethnograph basically provides a regime that disciplines the researcher into 
thinking about and handling data in a more concrete fashion. Using the 
programme organises the data in a way that makes it easier to form ideas, 
identify connections between these ideas and therefore formulate ncý\ NvaN-s of 
looking at the data. The words "regime" and -discipline" make the process 
sound very rigid, but I found that the programme was flexible enough to alloNý a 
great deal of personal input in how the programme could be applied to the data. 
The authors importantly address the limitations of Ethnograph and indicate 
where sorting and coding stops and where 'right brain' begins (Seidel et al. 
1995: E9). Reading this advice helped me to think about how I was going to 
approach data analysis. As Seidel et al. state, the risk of breaking data down 
into coded segments means that you might 'end up finding the codes. but losing, 
the phenomena' (ibid. ). As a result I decided that the first stage of the coding 
process should be to read the transcript/field note through in its entirety and 
make a note of the overall impressions of the interview when devising the 
coding map. It also made me think when identifying segments to code about 
how this would read when taken out of its context. This often led me to make 
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the segment larger so as to include important contextual information or to 
include a contextual note. 
Another useful discussion in the programme manual was the emphasis placed 
on data analysis as an 'iterative, recursive and holographic' process (Seldel et 
al. 1995: E2). Whilst the main components of data analysis may be 'noticing, 
collecting and thinking' (ibid: E3) about data, the three processes overlap each 
other. So that whilst collecting data the researcher is also thinking about it and 
visa versa i. e. they are not discrete operations. However it could be argued that 
analysis begins before the data is collected in that the researcher is alreadý, 
armed with questions to which they are seeking answers (either literally or 
mentally). Analysis also takes place during the physical collection of the data 
when following up interesting answers to questions or paying attention to 
interesting behaviour. All this would seem to support the argument made by 
Seidel et al. that analysis does not simply flow from sorting and coding data. 
Data drawn from documentary sources contributed only a small amount to the 
total collected and was not analysed using Ethnograph. Some sources such as 
local authority annual reports and LEA yearbooks provided mostly factual and 
numerical data. However the emphasis in even these sources provided 
interesting insights into more qualitative issues. 17 Other sources of 
documentary data such as council meeting minutes and conference reports were 
largely political and rhetorical in nature. Therefore as Mav contends. 'the text 
must be approached in terms of the intentions of its author and the social 
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context in which it was produced' (1993: 140). In this respect analysis consisted 
of a critical reading of such documents in relation to other aspects of the 
research data. 
Ethical Issues 
The research was conducted with reference to the British Sociological 
Association Statement of Ethical Practice (1992). The following section details 
how the research met the recommendations of the code. 
Professional Integrity and Reflexivity 
Firstly, the research was not subject to any restrictions on publication or 
dissemination of the research finding and the likelihood that the results would 
be published at some stage was made clear to all participants. Secondly, with 
regards to the possible consequences of the research, I am aware that ethical 
research should be as un-intrusive as possible. Therefore, whilst I did not ýý ish 
to 'rock the boat', particularly for already vulnerable individuals, it was hoped 
that, by merely conducting the research, a signal will be sent to both employers 
and unions that temporary work is becoming a focus of attention and worth 
deliberation on their own behalf However. I realise that past research has 
sometimes not been used in the way envisaged by the researchers. It is mN, 
intention that the research should be used to improve the conditions of 
temporary workers. The research has identified that temporarý, contracts are 
often used, not only to reduce employment terms and conditions, but also to 
For an example of this see chapter 4. which identifies hoxv the budget shortfall in City's 
yearbook was described as being met by 'efficiencý gains' and the 'reduction' of 409 council 
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coerce employees to work harder and reduce absence. Whilst I maý- consider 
this to be morally objectionable. I realise that these aspects of temporary 
contracts may be attractive to some employers and that, by drawing attention to 
these findings, my research may be used in a prescriptive and damaging way. 
For that reason it is important that I also highlight the disadvantages to 
employers of using temporary contracts. 
Thirdly, reflexivity is an important aspect of qualitative research (Whipp 1998) 
and I was aware that my personal politics placed limits on my detachment and 
involvement from the research. As stated above my intention was that the 
research should help to improve employment conditions of temporary workers 
and on occasion this led me to pass information to workers and trade uiuoiust 
concerning their employment rights. Furthermore, after spotting one or two 
flaws in the arguments used by employers to justify what I considered to be the 
inappropriate use and poor treatment of temporary workers, I %vas tempted to 
make suggestions to the trade unions concerning negotiations. However, as an 
ethical issue, I realised that by doing so I would be misusing the trust given to 
me by some of my respondents to attend meetings as an observer only. 
Relationships with research participants 
Because of the possible implications for industrial relations, it was made clear 
to all interviewees at the outset that both management and trade unions would 
be consulted. The industrial action in City. whilst not directly related to the 
research, illustrated how this impacted on my position as a researcher. 
employees. 
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Similarly, the political situation between branch officials in Citý- placed me in a 
difficult predicament. My decision to withdraw from what was a volatile and 
potentially damaging dispute reflected my awareness of my responsibilities as a 
researcher not to provide any opportunities that could be used to ftirther inflame 
the situation. 
I was also keenly aware of the vulnerable position of employees working oii 
temporary contracts and wanted to take every precaution not to exacerbate this. 
The tenuous position of temporary workers was brought sharply into focus after 
attempting to arrange an interview with a 'bullied' NQT in County. Afterthis 
experience I considered that applying too much pressure to gatekeepers might 
have an adverse impact on the already powerless. Therefore the desire to gain 
an interview needed to be balanced against any possible backlash this might 
have for the temporary workers involved. Furthermore I attempted to make the 
interviews that I did manage to arrange with temporary workers as positive an 
experience as possible for them. In some respects this was achieved just by 
showing that someone was aware of and sympathetic to their situation. 
However, as indicated above, more practical assistance was given in the form of 
information where possible. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Offers of confidentiality were given to both individuals and local trade union 
organisations. Anonymity was also guaranteed to both case studý- authorities. 
Access arrangements in both authorities were granted only under these 
circumstances. Guarantees of anonymity were given to iiidividuals in most 
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cases. However, where employers "-ere the gatekeepers to temporan. - workers. 
this was not of course completely possible. It was not realistic to extend an offer 
of anonymity to national trade union organisations as the limited number of 
unions involved and their mass coverage rendered them easilv identifiable. 
Maintaining the guarantee of anonymity was not without consequences for the 
research. There have been a number of tribunal cases and trade union 
circumstances that have been directly relevant to the research subject. but wliich 
could not be directly referred to without j eopardi sing anonymitN-. Similarlý- 
there have been a number of articles published by the National Statistics Office 
that would have been useful, but again could not be referenced 'without 
compromising the anonymity of the case study concerned. 
All individual and group interviews were audio recorded. Permission was 
obtained at the beginning of each interview and I guaranteed that no one other 
than myself would listen to the tapes. In addition to gaining permission, I placed 
the pause button within control of the interviewee and informed them that they 
could stop the tape at any time during the interview. I felt this began the 
interview by initiating the basis of trust between the interviexN, ee and myself and 
also offered individuals some control over the proceedings. Furthermore, by 
using this method, I hoped that I could accrue the benefits of using tape 
recordings to analyse data more fully, but avoid participants withholding 
information that they would give informally but not on tape. I felt this was a 
successful strategy as none of the participants reftised to be taped and the option 
to use the pause button was used on a number of occasions. The result Nvas that I 
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managed to capture detailed information by using the tape recorder but also 
accessed information that participants were reluctant to commit to tape. 
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Appendix 2- Interview Schedules 
This appendix contains examples of the three main types of interview schedule 
used to collect data. However schedules were tailored to meet the individual 
circumstances of the interview with, for example, questions relating to LN I. S 
included in those used for school managers (head teachers and governors) and 
questions relating to LGR in schedules used for managers and trade union 
officials in County. 
Interview Schedule -Departmental Manager 
N. B. This is a guide only. It is intended that the interview will be semi- 
structured to allow interesting points to be expanded. It is expected that the 
interview will take no longer than one hour. 
1. Biographical Information 
" Name (optional) 
" Sex 
" Ethnicity 
9 Age 
" Grade/Job title 
" Length of time injob/FTC 
" Employer/Place of work 
" Union membership 
2. Statistical Information 
How many workers in your department are on temporary contracts -% 
Which jobs 
Gender/Ethnicity breakdown 
Average tenure 
How does above compare to five/ten years ago 
3. Deciding to use Temporary Contracts 
* Who decides when a vacant position is to be filled by a temporary contract 
* How is this decision made - what criteria are used 
" Is the decision subject to any authority wide policy 
" Is the decision subject to any trade union agreements/discussion 
" Are temporary contracts used for internal job moves/promotion i. e. "Acting 
Up I 
4. Terms and Conditions of Temporary Workers 
" What is the usual duration of an temporary contract - initial and roll over 
" Are waiver clauses used 
" Are temporary workers entitled to holiday pay, sick paý', pension rights to the 
same extent as other workers 
" Are temporary workers given the same training and promotion opporttinitic,, 
as other workers 
9 What happens at the end of a temporary contract 
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5. Issues and Problems 
" Have you encountered any particular problems in relation to the use of 
temporary contracts - e. g. legal, disciplinary. grievance, union opposition 
" What do you see as the main benefits of using temporary contracts 
" What do you see as the main disadvantages of using temporary contracts 
" Do you see their use increasing or declining 
" Any other relevant points you feel have not been covered 
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Interview Schedule - Worker, SocialServices 
N. B. This is a guide only. It is intended that the intervie, ýv will be semi- 
structured to allow interesting points to be expanded. It is expected that the interview will take no longer than one hour. 
1. Biographical Details 
* Name (optional) 
o Sex 
Ethnicity 
Age 
Grade/Job title 
Length of time in j ob/temp. contract - how many times renewed. 
Employer/Place of work 
Union 
2. Your Contract 
How did you get your job 
What reason were you given for your contract being temporary rather than 
permanent 
Would you prefer a permanent position 
Do you think/hope that your temporary contract will lead to a permanent 
contract a) at the same unit b) in another unit/department 
3. Work Group 
" Do you think that certain groups of workers are more likely to be on 
temporary contracts e. g. part-time 
" Is it widely known who is and who isn't on a temporary contract 
Do you feel you have the same status as workers on permanent contracts 
Are you treated any differently by your manager or permanent workers - give 
examples 
Do you receive the same opportunities for training/promotion 
Do you think working on a temporary contract affects your performance 
Is there much use of agency/supply staff - how do you think their situation 
differs from yours 
Have you ever considered raising any issues about your contract or any other 
aspect of your job - do you know how you would go about this -do you 
think it would be feasible 
3. Trade Union 
How do you think the teaching unions differ a) generally b) in their 
approach to temporary workers 
If you are member of the union, how were you recruited 
Do you pay a reduced subscription 
What contact do you have with the union -NN-orkplace representative. 
workplace meetings, branch meetings - do ý, ou think this is adequate 
Do you think the union could improve communications between themselves 
and temporary workers e. g. by having a special section for them. 
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" Do you think the trade union would help you if you ývanted to raise an is-"ue 
about your contract. 
" What issues, if any, would you like the union to take up on behalf of 
temporary workers 
" Would you consider becoming a representative - why yes'no 
4. Impact on Home Life 
How secure do you feel your job is 
Do you feel that working on a temporary contract has effects on ý-our home 
life e. g. ability to plan for large purchases, holidays etc. 
Do you worry about your contract not being renewed 
5. Are there any other issues concerning your job ,,, -hich you think are 
important 
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Interview Schedule - Trade Union Branch Official - Unison 
N. B. This is a guide only. It is intended that the intervie,, N- xvill be semi- 
structured to allow interesting points to be expanded. It is expected that the 
interview will take no longer than one hour. 
1. Biographical Information 
" Name (optional) 
" Sex 
" Ethnicity 
" Age 
" Grade/Job Title 
" Length of time injob 
" Employer/Place of work 
" Union Position(s)/length of time in position 
2. Branch Structure 
within the authority as a whole 
within the branch 
membership numbers 
steward/senior stewards/convenor numbers - representation 
communication and decision making within branch e. g. Executive, JSSC 
consultation/negotiation with managers 
involvement of full time officials 
any particular activity in respect of temporary workers 
3. Recruitment 
" how are new members recruited 
" how are shop stewards enlisted 
" any problems in relation to temporary workers - any solutions 
4. Temporary Contracts 
" What experience do you have of representing temporary workers - recent 
examples 
" any particular department/jobs susceptible to the use of temporary contracts 
" numbers involved 
" any particular length of tenure 
" terms and conditions of temporary workers - waiver clauses. holidays, 
sickness, pensions etc. 
" any collective/informal agreements 
" grievance/disciplinary 
" less formal issues - give a recent example 
372 
5. Managers 
" who makes the decisions about which jobs will be filled bý' temporar-ýý 
workers 
" any authority-wide policies 
" what are the main stated reasons 
what are the main unstated reasons 
what, if any, discussions are you involved in with managers concerning 
temporary workers - any particular forum 
6. Future Developments 
" How do you see managerial policy and practice moving in the future 
" How do you see the trade union (branch/regional/national) responding 
" Future research - referrals to temporary workers who are members 
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